Methodist Protestant Church of Henderson v. Young
| Decision Date | 18 February 1902 |
| Parties | METHODIST PROTESTANT CHURCH OF HENDERSON et al. v. YOUNG et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, Vance county; Coble, Judge.
Action by the Methodist Protestant Church of Henderson and others against J. R. Young and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
T. M Pittman and A. C. Zollicoffer, for appellants.
T. T Hicks, A. J. Harris, R. S. McCoin, and H. T. Powell, for appellees.
On the 21st of September, 1880, in consideration of $1, W. A. Harris conveyed the land in controversy to "D. E. Young, Geo A. Harris, and John F. Harris," trustees of the plaintiff church, "and to their successors in office, upon which to build a church for the worship of Almighty God," with full warranty against the right and claim of all other persons whatsoever. But he provided that if said church "discontinue the occupancy of said lot in manner as aforesaid, then this deed shall be null and void, and the said lot or parcel of ground shall revert to the said W. A. Harris and his heirs and assigns, forever." The plaintiffs erected a church building on said lot soon thereafter, and continued to occupy and use the same as a place of worship until December, 1900, at which time, their church having increased until the building could not afford suitable accommodation for the congregation, the plaintiffs decided to build a new church; and for the reason that the location had become undesirable for a church, and for the reason that the plaintiffs thought the lot would be more valuable to sell it with the building on it than it would be to tear down the building, which they would have to do to build on the same lot, they purchased another lot near by, and built a church on that lot. In December, 1882, the said W. A. Harris died, leaving a last will and testament, and one son, W. C. Harris, and one daughter, Pattie Young, his only children and heirs at law. By his said will he devised and bequeathed his property to his two children, in which he used the following language: To Pattie Young, "one-half of all my real and personal estate, of every kind and description, not hereinbefore disposed of." Walter C. Harris is still living, but Pattie died in October, 1892, without issue, leaving a last will and testament, in which, after making numerous other dispositions of her property, she willed in item 19 as follows: "It is my will and desire that all the rest and residue of my property, real, personal, and mixed, of which I may die seised and possessed, shall be sold and collected by my executor hereinafter named, upon such terms as to time as he may deem best." She then named the defendant Young as her executor, and he claims one-half of the property in controversy, under this nineteenth item of Pattie Young's will; and the plaintiffs for the purpose of removing this cloud upon the title, brought this action.
It will be observed that the deed from W. A. Harris to the plaintiff is an absolute fee, which may have continued forever. But it contains a condition by which this absolute estate may be defeated, which makes it an estate in fee upon condition, or as it is called in the old books, a base or qualified fee, and is sometimes called a conditional limitation,--a condition by which the estate may be defeated or is limited. It is admitted that the condition had been broken by the plaintiff, and that W. A. Harris, if living, might enter and revest himself of the estate, and, as he is dead, that his heirs might do so. But it is contended that no one else can do so, and that at the time of the breach both W. A. Harris (the grantor) and Pattie Young being dead, Walter C. Harris being the only heir of said W. A. Harris and of Pattie Young, is the only one who could enter,--Gray, Perp., p. 6, § 12 (2),--and that since the breach of the condition, and before the commencement of this action, the plaintiff has received a quitclaim deed of conveyance from said Walter C. Harris, and is now the absolute owner of said property in fee simple; while the defendant contends that, although the breach did not take place until after the death of both W. A. Harris and Pattie Young, the said W. A. had a right or interest in said property which he could will and did will to Pattie, and that the will of W. A. gave her an interest which she could and did will to the defendant, and that the deed from Walter C. to the plaintiff only conveys a one undivided half interest therein, and that this defendant is entitled to the other half thereof. Until the breach of the condition, neither said W. A. Harris nor said Pattie Young had any interest or estate in this property. The absolute estate was in the plaintiff, and therefore could not be in any one else. Neither W. A. nor Pattie ever had an estate, an interest, nor even an expectancy in this property, as an heir may have in the estate of his ancestor, as by reason of natural causes the ancestor must die, and the law declares his heirs, to whom his estate will descend. But in this case there was nothing to limit the estate of the plaintiff, and until the breach the grantee had the same rights as if it was a fee simple. 2 Chit. Bl. *109, *110, note 15; Id. *155-*157; Gray, Perp., supra. And the grantor having nothing, he could convey nothing by his will, and Pattie had nothing to convey by her will. Suppose that A. is the next of kin and heir at law of B., and A. should die. His children would be the next of kin and heirs at law of B. A. dies in the lifetime of B., leaving a last will and testament, in which he willed to C. (item 19) as follows: "It is my will and desire that all the rest and residue of my property, real, personal, and...
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