Metlakatla Indian Community Annette Island Reserve v. Egan Organized Village of Kake v. Egan

• Decision Date: 20 June 1960
• Docket Number: 327,Nos. 326,s. 326
• Citation: 4 L.Ed.2d 1397,363 U.S. 555,80 S.Ct. 1321
• Parties: METLAKATLA INDIAN COMMUNITY ANNETTE ISLAND RESERVE, Appellant, v. EGAN, Governor of Alaska, et al. ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE et al., AppellantsV v. EGAN, Governor of Alaska
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

363 U.S. 555

80 S.Ct. 1321

4 L.Ed.2d 1397

METLAKATLA INDIAN COMMUNITY ANNETTE ISLAND RESERVE, Appellant,

v EGAN, Governor of Alaska, et al.

ORGANIZED VILLAGE OF KAKE et al., AppellantsV

v. EGAN, Governor of Alaska.

Nos. 326, 327.

Argued May 18, 1960.

Decided June 20, 1960.

Mr. Richard Schifter, Washington, D.C., for appellant in No. 326.

Mr. John W. Cragun, Washington, D.C., for appellants in No. 327.

Mr. John D. Calhoun, New York City, for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court, in both cases.

Mr. John L. Rader, Anchorage, Alaska, for appellees in both cases.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

These consolidated cases were commenced on June 22 and 24, 1959, in the interim District Court for Alaska, by complaints seeking permanent injunctions against threatened enforcement by the new State of Alaska, its Governor, and other agents, of an Alaska statute (Alaska Laws 1959, c. 17, as amended, Alaska Laws 1959, c. 95) making it a criminal offense to fish with traps. The statute was assailed on the ground that it was in conflict with applicable federal law. On July 2, 1959, orders were entered denying the injunctions, dismissing the complaints with prejudice, and denying an injunction pending appeal to this Court. 174 F.Supp. 500. On July 11, 1959, Mr. Justice Brennan, acting in his capacity as a circuit justice, granted appellants' application for an injunction pending final disposition of their future appeals to this Court. His opinion noted the existence of substantial questions, both as to our jurisdiction and the merits. 80 S.Ct. 33, 4 L.Ed.2d 34. The notices of appeal were filed on August 6, 1959; on December 7, 1959, we postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the cases on the merits. 361 U.S. 911, 80 S.Ct. 254, 4 L.Ed.2d 181.

If the orders rendered on July 2, 1959, were those of the 'highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,' the appeals are within our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2), since the court below sustained a statute of the State of Alaska against a claim of unconstitutionality under the United States Constitution. The jurisdictional problem arises out of the enactments governing Alaska's accession to statehood, specifically, in relation to the Constitution of the new State and to the state and federal laws governing the termination of the former territorial courts and their displacement by a new state judicial system and a Federal District Court for the District of Alaska. The State Constitution, which took effect 'immediately upon the admission of Alaska into the Union as a state' (Art. XV, § 25) on January 3, 1959, provided for a Supreme Court, to 'be the highest court of the State, with final appellate jurisdiction,' a superior court, and such other courts as the legislature may provide. Art. IV, §§ 1, 2. Article XV, § 17, provides that in the transitional period until the new courts are organized, 'the judicial system shall remain as constituted on the date of admission * * *' and that '(w)hen the state courts are organized, new actions shall be commenced and filed therein, and all causes, other than those under the jurisdiction of the United States, pending in the courts existing on the date of admission, shall be transferred to the proper state court as though commenced, filed, or lodged in those courts in the first instance, except as otherwise provided by law.'

The Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339, which also became fully effective on January 3, 1959, in §§ 13—17, 48 U.S.C.A. preceding section 23, makes similar provision for the eventual disposition of business pending in the territorial district court upon the organization of the new District Court for the District of Alaska. However, it too provides, in § 18, that 'the United States District Court for the Territory of Alaska shall continue to function as heretofore' for three years, or until the President proclaims that the new District Court 'is prepared to assume the functions imposed upon it.' In June, 1959, when these actions were commenced, and on July 2, 1959, when decision below was rendered, neither new federal nor state courts were in operation.

The first question presented is whether the interim Alaskan District Court was the 'court of a State' in deciding these cases. Sections 12 to 18 of the Statehood Act, 72 Stat. 339, make it plain that the interim court was not intended to be the newly created United States District Court for the District of Alaska, 28 U.S.C. § 81A, 28 U.S.C.A. § 81A; otherwise the nature of the court, whether state or federal, is not explicitly set forth. It is apparent, however, that the court is to a significant degree the creature of two sovereigns acting cooperatively to accomplish the joint purpose of avoiding an interregnum in judicial administration in the transitional period. The termination of the existence of the interim court is governed by federal law, Statehood Act § 18; but the termination of its general jurisdiction over state law matters, insofar as it is dependent on state consent, is governed by state law, Alaska Laws 1959, c. 50, § 31(2), which also provides for the accelerated organization of separate Alaska courts should the interim court be terminated before they are ready. Alaska Laws 1959, c. 50, § 32(4), amended by Alaska Laws 1959, c. 151, § 1.

To determine our jurisdiction we need not engage in abstract speculation as to the function of the interim court in cases not before us. Whether the court can serve as a federal court, and the permissible scope of its powers if it may so serve, cf. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 93 L.Ed. 1556; Benner v. Porter 9 How. 235, 13 L.Ed. 119, are perplexing questions, decision of which should not be avoidably made. It is apparent that the legislature of Alaska vested the judicial power of the State in the interim District Court for the time being, that the district judge in this case explicitly deemed himself to be exercising such power, and that, in light of the express consent of the United States, he properly did so. Benner v. Porter, supra. It follows that the District Court sat as a 'court of a State' to decide these cases.

The question remains whether the interim court was also the 'highest court' of Alaska within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257. At the time of the filing of the notice of this appeal on August 6, 1959, the latest time at which jurisdiction could properly be determined, no new Alaska state court was in actual operation, although on July 29 the Justices of the Court were designated by the Governor. The contention that the interim court was not the highest court of Alaska at that time rests upon this latter fact, and the terms of Alaska Laws 1959, c. 151, § 1, amending Alaska Laws 1959, c. 50, § 32, which amendment provides that in the event that 'a court of competent jurisdiction, by final judgment, declares that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from the District Court of the District of Alaska, the Judicial Council shall forthwith meet and submit to the Governor the names of the persons nominated as justices of the supreme court and appeals from the District Court of the District of Alaska may be made to the State Supreme Court.'

Because the Ninth Circuit had ruled against its appellate jurisdiction over the interim court on June 16, 1959, six days before this action was commenced, Parker v. McCarrey, 268 F.2d 907, it is urged that this provision, preserving appeals from the District Court to the Supreme Court of the State until the creation of that court, requires the conclusion that at least after July 29, when the Jus- tices were appointed, appellate review was sufficiently guaranteed to make the Supreme Court, and not the District Court, the highest court of Alaska in which a decision in the instant case could be rendered.

The question thus raised is not free from doubt. Viewing the cases as of August 6, when the notices of appeal were filed, it is fairly arguable that the preservation effected by Alaska Laws 1959, c. 151, § 1, of the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Alaska constituted the interim court as a lower court of Alaska within the intent of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257, to await the...