Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
| Decision Date | 11 February 1977 |
| Citation | 136 Cal.Rptr. 453 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | METROMEDIA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 14591. |
John W. Witt, City Atty., and C. Alan Sumption, Deputy City Atty., for defendant and appellant City of San Diego.
Walter C. Wencke, San Diego, for amicus curiae San Diego Environmental Charitable Trust, on behalf of defendants and appellants.
Carter J. Stroud, City Atty., City of Alameda, for amicus curiae City of Alameda, and John W. Scanlon, City Atty., City of Hayward, for amicus curiae City of Hayward, on behalf of defendants and appellants.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher by Theodore B. Olson, Los Angeles, and Hillyer & Irwin by Oscar F. Irwin, San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent Metromedia, Inc.
Snell & Wilmer by John J. Bouma and Guy G. Gelbron, Phoenix, Ariz., and Higgs, Fletcher & Mack by Joe N. Turner, San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent Pacific Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc.
Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine by Mahlon F. Perkins, Jr., New York City, for amicus curiae American Association of Advertising Agencies, on behalf of plaintiffs and respondents.
Weil, Guttman & Davis by Gilbert H. Weil, New York City, for amicus curiae Association of National Advertisers, Inc., on behalf of plaintiffs and respondents.
Phillip Tocker, Brownsville, Tex., for amicus curiae Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc., on behalf of plaintiffs and respondents.
This appeal raises issues concerning the constitutionality of a city ordinance which prohibits the erection and maintenance of all off-premise advertising displays within the entire limits of a large metropolitan city. The validity of such sweeping legislation in this area has not been considered by an appellate court in California since 1909 (see Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P.867).
The City of San Diego appeals from a summary judgment declaring City Ordinance No. 10795 (New Series) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the City from taking any steps to enforce the ordinance. 1 Separate actions attacking the ordinance by respondents Metromedia, Inc. and Pacific Outdoor Advertising, Inc. had been consolidated by stipulation. After extensive interrogatories and requests for admissions had been answered, all parties moved for summary judgment based upon a joint stipulation of facts, the pleadings and papers filed, and matters subject to judicial notice.
The respondent companies are engaged in the outdoor advertising business. Each of them owns a substantial number of outdoor advertising signs in San Diego which were lawfully erected and which have a substantial market value. On March 14, 1972 the San Diego City Council adopted Ordinance No. 10795 (New Series). As it relates to and affects respondents' businesses, the ordinance cuts a wide swath, prohibiting all off-premise outdoor advertising displays within the City and providing for the abatement of all such existing advertising displays over a four-year period.
Generally expressing the intent to promote safety, economic, aesthetic and general welfare interests, the ordinance first declares:
'A. PURPOSE AND INTENT
'It is the purpose of these regulations to eliminate excessive and confusing sign displays which do not relate to the premises on which they are located; to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about by distracting sign displays; to ensure that signing is used as identification and not as advertisement; and to preserve and improve the appearance of the City as a place in which to live and work.
'It is the intent of these regulations to protect an important aspect of the economic base of the City by preventing the destruction of the natural beauty and environment of the City, which is instrumental in attracting nonresidents who come to visit, trade, vacation or attend conventions; to safeguard and enhance property values; to protect public and private investment in buildings and open spaces; and to protect the public health, safety and general welfare.'
The ordinance next prohibits all outdoor advertising display signs in the City except signs which designate the owner or occupant of the premises upon which a sign is placed, identifying such premises or advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which a sign is placed. Existing signs which do not meet the requirements of the ordinance are declared nonconforming, and the ordinance provides for the abatement of all such signs, based upon an adjusted market value. Under the ordinance the adjusted market value of a sign is computed upon the basis of its original cost, less ten percent of the original cost for every year a sign has been standing.
The abatement schedule provided in the ordinance is as follows:
'Adjusted Market Value Abatement Date
Less than $500.00 April 1, 1973
$ 500.00 to 999.99 July 1, 1973
1,000.00 to 1,499.99 October 1,1973
1,500.00 to 1,999.99 January 1, 1974
2,000.00 to 2,999.99 April 1, 1974
3,000.00 to 3,999.99 July 1, 1974
4,000.00 t0 4,999.99 October 1, 1974
5,000.00 t0 7,499.99 January 1, 1975
7,500.00 to 9,999.99 April 1,1975
10,000.00 to 12,499.99 July 1, 1975
12,500.00 to 14,999.99 October 1, 1975
15,000.00 to 19,999.99 January 1, 1976
20,000.00 and over April 1, 1976
Irrespective of adjusted market value, the ordinance requires the removal of all off-premise signs which can be viewed from a freeway, parkway or scenic highway within 90 days of its effective date. The ordinance makes no provision for compensation to the owners of the signs it requires to be removed.
The written stipulation of facts filed in the superior court was prefaced with this recital:
The parties to this litigation are filing cross-motions for summary judgment. This Stipulation of Facts is entered into for the purpose of these motions and for any judgment thereon or appeals therefrom and for no other purpose. The parties agree that the facts specified herein are true for said purpose only and none of the parties hereto shall be bound thereby for any other purpose.'
The following pertinent facts (as originally numbered) were set forth in the written stipulation:
'2. If enforced as written, Ordinance No. 10795 will eliminate the outdoor advertising business in the City of San Diego.
'13. Each of the plaintiffs are the owners of a substantial number of outdoor advertising displays (approximately 500 to 800) in the City of San Diego.
'14. Substantially all of the displays owned by plaintiffs are located on property leased by the owners thereof to the plaintiffs for the purposes of maintaining outdoor advertising displays thereon.
'15. Each of the displays were legally erected in full compliance with all applicable municipal and state laws and are in full compliance with such laws except for the contested legality of Ordinance No. 10795.
'16. The cost of producing and erecting each display was substantial.
'17. The displays have varying values depending upon their size, nature and location.
'18. Each of the displays has a fair market value, as a part of an income-producing system, of between $2,500 and $25,000.
'19. Each display has a remaining useful income-producing life in excess of 25 years.
'20. All of the signs owned by plaintiffs in the City of San Diego are located at areas zoned for commercial and industrial purposes.
'28. Outdoor advertising increases the sales of products and produces numerous direct and indirect benefits to the public. Valuable commercial, political and social information is communicated to the public through the use of outdoor advertising. Many businesses and politicians and other persons rely upon outdoor advertising because other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive.
businesses outside the City of San Diego in that many national or state-wide advertisers will be inclined to select other media capable of communicating with a wider segment of the consuming public, including San Diego, rather than selecting outdoor advertising which would be unable to communicate with the citizens of San Diego.
signs are within 660 feet and others are within 500 feet of Interstate or Federal Aid Primary highways and are designed to be viewed therefrom.
'34. 'The amortization provisions' of Ordinance No. 10795 have no reasonable relationship to the fair market value, useful life or income generated by the signs and were not designed to have such a relationship.'
In their motion for summary judgment, respondents attacked the ordinance on seven grounds. The same issues are argued on appeal.
1. Is the ordinance an improper exercise of the police power?
2. Does the ordinance deprive respondents of their property without due process of law and without payment of just compensation as required by the Federal and California Constitutions?
3. Does the ordinance deny equal protection of the law?
4. Does the ordinance violate First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech?
5. Is the ordinance invalid due to a conflict with or preemption by federal and state legislation?
6. Is the abatement schedule provided in the ordinance unconstitutional?
7. Is the ordinance invalid because of the City's failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act?
Before entering its judgment invalidating the ordinance and enjoining its enforcement, the trial court filed and entered its written Memorandum of Intended Ruling. Reference to the memorandum indicates the trial court predicated its judgment on two grounds: first, the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of the police power; and, second, the ordinance violated ...
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