Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 12 October 1910
• Parties: METROPOLIS THEATER CO. et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

246 Ill. 20

92 N.E. 597

METROPOLIS THEATER CO. et al.

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 29, 1910.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1910.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge.

Suit by the Metropolis Theater Company and others against the City of Chicago. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.Edward J. Brundage, Corp. Counsel, Charles M. Haft, and James F. Burnes, for appellant.

Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt (Herman Frank, of counsel), for appellees.

VICKERS, C. J.

The Metropolis Theater Company and numerous other theatrical companies and individuals, as owners and operators of various theaters in the city of Chicago, filed their bill in the circuit court praying for an injunction against the enforcement of a city ordinance which classified theaters into five classes and fixed an annual license fee for each, based on the prise of admission, exclusive of that charged for box seats, on the ground that said ordinance is unreasonable and void. A demurrer was interposed to the bill by the city, which was overruled. The defendants declining to answer further, a decree was entered perpetually enjoining the enforcement of section 104 of the ordinance in question. The city has appealed to this court.

The only question presented is the validity of section 104 of the ordinance. Section 99 of the ordinance in question classifies all entertainments given for gain, and puts theatrical, operatic, dramatic, vaudeville, variety, and spectacular entertainments in the first class. Section 104 fixes a license fee for the entertainments in the first class, as follows: ‘First class-if it be intended to produce, offer or present entertainments of the first class, and the highest price of admission charged thereto, exclusive of that charged for box seats, is one dollar ($1) or more, the annual license fee shall be one thousand dollars ($1,000); if the highest price of admission, exclusive of that charged for box seats, exceeds fifty cents (50c) but is less than one dollar ($1) the annual license fee shall be four hundred dollars ($400); if the highest price of admission, exclusive of that charged for box seats, exceeds thirty cents (30c) but does not exceed fifty cents (50c) the annual license fee shall be three hundred dollars ($300); if the highest price of admission, exclusive of that charged for box seats, exceeds twenty cents (20c) but does not exceed thirty cents (30c) the annual license fee shall be two hundred and fifty dollars ($250); if the highest price of admission, exclusive of that charged for box seats, does not exceed twenty cents (20c) the annual fee shall be two hundred dollars ($200).’ Section 110 of the ordinance provides that the license issued shall state the highest price of admission that shall be charged for the entertainment to be given, also the seating capacity of the place, and that no more than the highest price shall be charged for admission to such entertainment, and that no more than the number of persons for which such place has seating capacity shall be allowed to enter or occupy such place at any one time. It provides that any person, firm, or corporation having a license limiting the maximum price which may be charged for admission to entertainments may at any time apply for a license authorizing such person to charge a higher maximum price for admission to entertainments upon paying the difference between the license fee already paid and that to be charged by the terms of the ordinance for the license for which such application is made.

The bill sets out in detail the situation of the several theaters, with the seating capacity of each, and alleges that many of the theaters which charge lower rates for admission, owing to their greater seating capacity and more frequent entertainments, have a much larger income than other theaters with less seating capacity which charge the lower prices for admission, and upon this allegation appelleesbase their principal argument against the validity of the ordinance. The power of taxation is a necessary incident of sovereignty, and is possessed by the state without being expressly conferred by the people. This inherent power with us is vested in the Legislature, which possesses plenary power over the subject except so far as it is restricted by our Constitution or that of the United States. 1 Cooley on Taxation, 7; Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis Railroad Co., 76 Ill. 561. The power to tax for local purposes, as well as the power to license and regulate, may be delegated by the Legislature to local municipalities. City of East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 Ill. 392. Local municipalities have none of the elements of sovereignty in them. They do not possess, independently of grant, any inherent power. The statute under which they act is a grant of power and not a limitation, as is the Constitution of the state. In the case of a municipal tax, its validity depends upon whether the power to levy it has been expressly granted, while in respect to a tax levied by the state the only question is: Does the Constitution prohibit it? A license is a privilege granted by the state directly or indirectly through the medium of a municipality, usually upon the payment of a valuable consideration, called a license fee. The license must confer authority to do something which...