Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. City of St. Louis

• Citation: 106 S.W.2d 435,341 Mo. 62
• Parties: The Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, a Corporation, Plaintiff, and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company of America, a Corporation; United Cigar Stores Company of America, a Corporation; John R. Thompson Company, a Corporation; White Castle System of Eating Houses Corporation, a Corporation; F. W. Woolworth Company, a Corporation; S. S. Kresge Company, a Corporation; Wolff-Wilson Drug Company, a Corporation; Scott Stores, Incorporated, a Corporation; Mavrakos Candy Company, a Corporation; City Ice & Fuel Company, a Corporation; Moss & Lowenhaupt Cigar Company, a Corporation; Walgreen Drug Stores, a Corporation; and Thrifty Drug Stores, a Corporation, Intervenors, v. City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation, and Fred A. Renick, License Collector of the City of St. Louis, Appellants
• Decision Date: 21 June 1937
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

106 S.W.2d 435

341 Mo. 62

The Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, a Corporation, Plaintiff, and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company of America, a Corporation; United Cigar Stores Company of America, a Corporation; John R. Thompson Company, a Corporation; White Castle System of Eating Houses Corporation, a Corporation; F. W. Woolworth Company, a Corporation; S. S. Kresge Company, a Corporation; Wolff-Wilson Drug Company, a Corporation; Scott Stores, Incorporated, a Corporation; Mavrakos Candy Company, a Corporation; City Ice & Fuel Company, a Corporation; Moss & Lowenhaupt Cigar Company, a Corporation; Walgreen Drug Stores, a Corporation; and Thrifty Drug Stores, a Corporation, Intervenors, v. City of St. Louis, a Municipal Corporation, and Fred A. Renick, License Collector of the City of St. Louis, Appellants

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 21, 1937

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. John W Calhoun, Judge.

Affirmed.

Edgar H. Wayman, John G. Burkhardt and Andrew J. Reis for appellants.

(1) The city of St. Louis has power to levy license tax upon "merchants," and it may by legislative action subdivide the class upon any reasonable basis. Automobile Gasoline Co. v. St. Louis, 326 Mo. 435, 32 S.W.2d 281; Ex parte Asotsky, 319 Mo. 823, 5 S.W.2d 22; St. Charles ex rel. Palmer v. Schulte, 305 Mo. 124, 264 S.W. 654; Viquesney v. Kansas City, 305 Mo. 488, 266 S.W. 700; City of Aurora v. McGannon, 138 Mo. 38, 39 S.W. 469; Campbell v. Harrisonville, 50 Fed (2d) 670. (2) The classification of merchants into chain store merchants and other merchants is reasonable, constitutional and valid. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 79 L.Ed. 780; Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 77 L.Ed. 929; State Board, etc., v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75 L.Ed. 1248, 73 A. L. R. 1464; Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 58, L.Ed. 974, 34 S.Ct. 493; Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 33 S.Ct. 441, 57 L.Ed. 730; Bradley v Richmond, 227 U.S. 477, 33 S.Ct. 318, 57 L.Ed. 603; Quong Wing v. Kirendall, 223 U.S. 59, 32 S.Ct. 192 56 L.Ed. 350; Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 33 L.Ed. 892; Am. Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 45 L.Ed. 102; Great A. & P. Co. v. Maxwell, 154 S.E. 838, 199 N.C. 433, affirmed 52 S.Ct. 26; Great A. & P. Co. v. Morrissett, 58 F.2d 991, affirmed 284 U.S. 584; Southern Grocery Stores v. S. C. Tax. Comm., 55 F.2d 931; Ex parte Asotsky, 319 Mo. 810, 5 S.W.2d 22; Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 259 N.W. 352, 270 Mich. 659; Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P.2d 784; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 573, 54 L.Ed. 883; Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 71 L.Ed. 968; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 53 L.Ed. 923; Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L.Ed. 303; St. Louis Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 63 L.Ed. 599; Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U.S. 331, 58 L.Ed. 985; Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 72 L.Ed. 177. (3) The city of St. Louis has the power to classify merchants into chain store merchants. Safeway Stores v. Portland, 42 P.2d 162; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Spartanburg, 170 S.E. 273, 170 S.C. 262; Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 328, 46 L.Ed. 569; Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 57 L.Ed. 730. (4) There is no other license tax upon the privilege of operating chain stores and no question of double taxation is involved. St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 574; St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 263 Mo. 448; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 619; St. Joseph v. Ernst, 95 Mo. 360; St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266. (5) Plaintiff's merchant's license does not constitute a contract with the city so as to bar the right of the city to impose the tax in question. St. Louis v. United Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266. (6) Ordinance No. 39619 is not in conflict with Sections 10100, 9870, 7289, 7596 or with Article XVII, Chapter 59, Revised Statutes 1919. (7) Section 9 of Ordinance No. 39619, when properly construed, is merely a provision to prevent the establishment of ingenious, corporate or organization structures, which would prevent the application of the ordinance to stores which are within the class designated. Great A. & P. Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N.C. 433, 154 S.E. 838, affirmed 52 S.Ct. 26. (8) Exemption of those whose principal business is that of dealing in petroleum products is within the bounds of reasonable classification. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., v. S. C. Tax Comm., 55 F.2d 931; Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 284 U.S. 575, 76 L.Ed. 500; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 79 L.Ed. 780; Moore v. State Board, 40 S.W.2d 349, 239 Ky. 729; Read Drug Co. v. Chemical Co., 166 A. 742, 165 Md. 250; Penney Co. v. Diefendorf, 32 P.2d 784; Viquesney v. Kansas City, 305 Mo. 488, 266 S.W. 702; McKenney v. Alexandria, 147 Va. 157; Smith v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352. (9) When the power to tax exists, the extent of the burden is a matter for the discretion of the lawmakers. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 79 L.Ed. 780; Alaska Fish Salting & B. Company v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44, 65 L.Ed. 489. (10) The motive, purpose or intent of the board of aldermen in passing an ordinance cannot be inquired into by the courts. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 78 L.Ed. 1109; State v. Gardner, 218 Mo.App. 217; State ex rel. v. Brooks, 220 Mo.App. 708; Bennett v. Pulaski, 52 S.W. 913; Downey v. State, 160 Ind. 578; Shepard v. Seattle, 59 Wash. 363; Vories v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 199.

Nichols, Morrill, Wood, Marx & Ginter, Rassieur & Rassieur and Alfred C. Wilson for The Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company and United Cigar Stores Company of America.

(1) The ordinance attacked, imposing a license fee upon owners or operators of chain stores, graduating the tax in proportion to the number of stores operated, exceeds the city's powers and is void for the following reasons: (a) A municipal corporation has no powers which are not derived from and are subordinate to the State. All powers of the city of St. Louis must come from either a constitutional or legislative grant. Art. X, secs. 1, 10, Mo. Const.; Art. IX, secs. 16, 23, 25 Mo. Const.; Kansas City v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W.2d 198; Taylor v. Dimmitt, 78 S.W.2d 841; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.W. 998; St. Louis v. Atlantic Quarry & Con. Co., 244 Mo. 479; St. Louis v. Kaime, 180 Mo. 322, 78 S.W. 140; St. Louis v. King, 226 Mo. 334, 126 S.W. 495; 6 R. C. L. 23, sec. 12; 19 R. C. L., pp. 728-732, secs. 35-37; 43 C. J. 176; 1 McQuillin Mun. Corps. (2 Ed.), p. 416, sec. 145; 1 Dillon Mun. Corps. (5 Ed.), p. 88, sec. 55. (b) The ordinance in question seeks to exact a license fee with a view to revenue and is therefore an exercise of the taxing power and is not an exercise of the police power to regulate. Kansas City v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W.2d 198; City of Ozark v. Hammond, 329 Mo. 1118, 49 S.W.2d 129; Viquesney v. Kansas City, 305 Mo. 488; State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375. (c) No constitutional or legislative grant empowers the city of St. Louis to impose an occupational license fee or tax on merchants, graduated in proportion to the number of stores owned or operated. Sec. 10, Art. X, Mo. Const.; Sec. 23, Art. IX, Mo. Const.; Sec. 7596, R. S. 1929; Kansas City v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W.2d 198. (d) The city of St. Louis is granted power to impose upon merchants an annual license fee, graduated in proportion to annual sales, and not otherwise. The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" applies. Sec. 10, Art. X, Mo. Const.; Sec. 23, Art. IX, Mo. Const.; Sec. 7596, R. S. 1929; Kansas City v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W.2d 198; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.W. 998; St. Louis v. Atlantic Quarry & Con. Co., 244 Mo. 479; Siemens v. Shreeve, 317 Mo. 736, 296 S.W. 416; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 288, sec. 216; 2 Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), pp. 916, 922, secs. 491, 493. (e) The city of St. Louis is granted power to impose a separate license tax upon merchants for each place of business and not otherwise. The power to license multiple places of business is negatived under the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius ." Sec. 10097, R. S. 1929. (f) The city of St. Louis has not specifically been granted power to impose a license tax upon the pursuit or business of operating chain stores and such power is therefore expressly withheld by statute. Sec. 7287, R. S. 1929; Kansas City v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W.2d 198; Viquesney v. Kansas City, 395 Mo. 488; Keane v. Strodtman, 323 Mo. 161, 18 S.W.2d 896; Siemens v. Shreeve, 317 Mo. 736, 296 S.W. 416; City of Ozark v. Hammond, 329 Mo. 1118, 49 S.W.2d 129; Nafziger v. Salisbury, 329 Mo. 1014, 48 S.W.2d 563; City of Lebanon v. Joslyn, 58 S.W.2d 289; Pierce City v. Hentschel, 210 S.W. 31; Campbell Baking Co. v. Maryville, 31 F.2d 466; Cripe Baking Co. v. Bethany, 64 F.2d 755. (g) Powers conferred upon a municipality cannot be enlarged by liberal construction. Instead enumeration of powers granted operates to exclude all others and all doubts and uncertainties as to the existence of the power must be resolved against the municipality. Kansas City v Case Threshing Machine Co., 87 S.W.2d 198; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.W. 998; Van Eaton v. Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 477. (2) The ordinance is unconstitutional and void because: (a) The taxes levied thereunder are not uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, in violation of Section 3, Article X, Missouri Constitution, and deny to persons affected thereby the equal protection of the laws, in conflict with the Fourteen Ame...