METROPOLITAN DEV. COM'N v. Schroeder
| Citation | 727 N.E.2d 742 |
| Decision Date | 27 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-9901-CV-40.,49A04-9901-CV-40. |
| Parties | The METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF MARION COUNTY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Thomas A. SCHROEDER, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Marguerite M. Sweeney, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
J.F. Beatty, Nancy G. Endsley, Landman & Beatty, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
The Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County (the "Commission"), seeking injunctive relief and the imposition of fines, filed an action against Thomas A.
Schroeder based on Schroeder's overnight outdoor storage of inoperable vehicles. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Schroeder following a bench trial, and the Commission now appeals.
We reverse.
I. Whether the trial court's judgment in favor of Schroeder on the Commission's action to enforce the zoning ordinance is clearly erroneous.
II. Whether the trial court's judgment in favor of Schroeder on the Commission's action to enforce a variance condition is clearly erroneous.
Schroeder is the owner of real estate located at the corner of South Meridian Street and East Thompson Road in Indianapolis, which is commonly known as 50 East Thompson Road and also known as 4989 South Meridian Street (hereinafter, "the Real Estate"). At all relevant times to this action, the Real Estate was located in the C-3 zoning district under the Commercial Zoning Ordinance of Marion County, a part of the Code of Indianapolis and Marion County. The zoning ordinance, which sets out the development standards for the C-3 district, provides in pertinent part that gasoline service stations, lubricating and oil change services, convenience markets, services centers or functions shall not include "the storage of inoperable, damaged or wrecked vehicles, other than those awaiting immediate repair." (R. 272-73).
In the early 1970's, the Real Estate was owned by Marathon Oil Company ("Marathon") and used for the operation of a three bay gas service station. The station closed in approximately 1973 and the Real Estate remained vacant for several years. Marathon subsequently leased the Real Estate to Arthur Henson and Dennis Merillat. In 1977, on application of Henson and Merillat, the Marion County Board of Zoning Appeals (the "BZA") granted a variance from certain use requirements to permit the expansion of the existing three bay service station to a seven bay transmission sales and service business with signs and off-street parking on the Real Estate. The BZA imposed several conditions upon the granting of the variance, one of which stated: "No outside overnight storage of vehicles other than one vehicle over a 24 hour period." (R. 234). The variance and its conditions were not recorded in the Marion County Recorder Office. Henson and Merillat then began to operate an AAMCO Transmissions business on the Real Estate.
In 1979, Henson and Merillat sold the AAMCO business to Schroeder, who began leasing the Real Estate from Marathon. In December of 1993, Schroeder purchased the Real Estate from Marathon. Marathon's Limited Warranty Deed to Schroeder conveyed the real estate subject to "zoning ordinances, subdivision and planning laws and regulations and building code restrictions and all laws, rules and regulations relating to land and structures and their use." (R. 392, 489). Because a title search of the Real Estate did not reveal the existence of the 1977 variance or variance condition, Schroeder was unaware of the 1977 variance that limited the number of vehicles stored overnight on the property. (R. 567).
In the Spring of 1995, Schroeder erected a fence around the perimeter of the Real Estate. On June 21, 1995, the Commission issued a civil zoning violation citation to Schroeder regarding the Real Estate (listed in the citation as 50 E. Thompson Road) for failure to comply with the development standards in that there was a barbed wire on the fence on the Real Estate.1 On July 7, 1995, the Commission filed a complaint for injunction and fine against Schroeder based on this alleged violation of the zoning ordinances and subsequent violations of the same. Specifically, the Commission sought 1) a fine for each violation; 2) an order requiring Schroeder to remove the barbed wire; and 3) an order permanently enjoining Schroeder "from using or permitting the use of the Real Estate for the operation of a permitted use without complying with development standards, specifically the location and maintenance of barbed wire in the required front yard and in front of the existing building, or any other use which is not permitted by Marion County zoning ordinances." (R. 398).
On May 9, 1996, the Commission moved to vacate a scheduled compliance hearing, stating that "[t]he real estate located at 50 East Thompson Road is in substantial compliance with applicable zoning ordinances" and that Schroeder had paid all fines and costs due. (R. 402). The trial court judge granted the motion, vacated the hearing and deemed the case "disposed of." (R. 405).
On October 3, 1997, zoning inspector Scott Brown inspected the Real Estate and observed twelve vehicles without current license plates. The Commission subsequently issued a civil zoning violation citation to Schroeder for the outdoor storage of inoperable motor vehicles on October 3. On November 3, Brown inspected the Real Estate again and observed five vehicles on the property.
In December of 1997, the Commission filed a complaint for injunction and fine against Schroeder. In Count I, the Commission alleged that on or about October 3, 1997, the Real Estate was "being used for the outdoor storage of one or more inoperable vehicles" in violation of zoning ordinance and that subsequent inspection of the Real Estate indicated that violations were continuing. In Count II, the Commission alleged that the Real Estate was "being used for the overnight storage of greater than one vehicle, which is prohibited by one vehicle condition of variance." The Commission sought several remedies, including: 1) the imposition of a fine in the amount of $2,500 for each violation; 2) an order permanently enjoining Schroeder from using or permitting the use of the Real Estate "for the unlawful uses described above;" and 3) an order requiring Schroeder "to remove any inoperable vehicles stored outside and to remove all vehicles stored outside overnight except one permitted by the variance grant." (R. 13). Schroeder generally denied the allegations of both counts and asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including: statute of limitations, laches, waiver and acquiescence, equitable estoppel, and issue/claim preclusion.
At the hearing, Schroeder testified that his company has "probably always had more cars on the lot than one car," and that "virtually over a long period of time there's always been ... a number of cars, fifteen or twenty, twenty-five cars parked outside" overnight. (R. 494). He further testified that the number of cars he keeps on the Real Estate had increased over the years because of 1) the increase in the length of time it takes to diagnose the car problems and 2) the decrease in the accessibility of the parts to fix the problems. Schroeder acknowledged that some vehicles had been on the Real Estate "for a number of months" and that it was possible that some vehicles had remained outside on the Real Estate for longer than a year. (R. 498). Schroeder claimed that he had been unaware of the 1977 variance when he began to lease the property from Marathon in 1979, and was unable to testify as to when he learned of the variance. When asked whether he could stay in business if he could only park one car outdoors overnight, he responded:
It would just be impossible to operate the business and only store one car overnight. I've got no alternative. I've got no place to put the cars. Even if I had a lot up the street, you know, if — I would have to take two people to — if I went to rent a lot somewhere, one person to drive the car and the other person to drive the car back. Some of the cars — what if the cars didn't move? They were cars that I just towed in at 5:00 in the afternoon and hadn't had a chance to work on them or check out even?
(R. 568).
On December 17, 1998, the trial court, upon timely request, made special findings of fact and stated conclusions of law thereon and entered judgment in favor of Schroeder on both counts of the Commission's complaint.
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we note our standard of review. When a trial court has entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law along with its judgment pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52, our standard of review is two-tiered. Estate of Whitehead, 718 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). We first must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Carnahan v. Moriah Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Ind.1999). The findings are clearly erroneous only when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a mistake has been made. Id. We disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. Id.
The trial court concluded that the doctrine of laches barred the Commission's action to enforce the zoning ordinance. It is well established that laches is not a defense to a municipality's action to enforce its zoning ordinances. See, e.g., Harbour Town Associates, Ltd. v. City of Noblesville, 540 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind.Ct. App.1989)
Commission of Marion County, 685 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). Because the trial court failed to follow this well-established rule of law, the trial court's findings and stated...
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