SPCA v. City of Muncie ex rel. Scroggins

• Decision Date: 11 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 18A02-0201-CV-30.,18A02-0201-CV-30.
• Citation: 769 N.E.2d 669
• Parties: SOCIETY FOR PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND HUMANE SOCIETY OF DELAWARE COUNTY, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. CITY OF MUNCIE, Indiana, by Glenn SCROGGINS, Building Commissioner, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

769 N.E.2d 669

SOCIETY FOR PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND HUMANE SOCIETY OF DELAWARE COUNTY, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. CITY OF MUNCIE, Indiana, by Glenn SCROGGINS, Building Commissioner, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 18A02-0201-CV-30.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 11, 2002.

John G. Garman, Jr., Garman Law Offices, P.C., Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Charles R. Clark, Beasley & Gilkison, LLP, Muncie, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

The Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and Humane Society of Delaware County (collectively "SPCA") appeal the trial court's finding that they were in violation of the City of Muncie's ("City") zoning code. We affirm.

Issue

The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court's determination that the SPCA was in violation of the zoning ordinance was erroneous.

Facts

The parties submitted the following stipulation of the facts similar to the one filed with the trial court:

1. The City of Muncie, Indiana is a Municipal Corporation existing pursuant to the laws of Indiana and I.C. 34-4-1-1, et seq.

2. The Society For Prevention of Cruelty To Animals and Humane Society of Delaware County, Inc. is an Indiana Not for Profit Corporation, in good standing and existing under the laws of the State of Indiana.

3. On the 5th day of November, 1973 the City of Muncie, Indiana adopted the "City of Muncie Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance" for the regulation of land use inside the City pursuant to the provisions of I.C. 36-7-4-1, et seq. and I.C. XX-X-X-XXX.

4. At the time of the passage of the ordinance and continuing until the present time the Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals and Humane Society of Delaware County, Inc. was and is the owner, in fee simple, of real estate located at 2100 South Penn Street, Muncie, Indiana ...

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5. That when the area surrounding the real estate owned by the SPCA was rezoned "R-1 Residence Zone," the SPCA was lawfully using the real estate as an animal shelter.

6. As a result of the passage of the zoning ordinance and of the use of the property the real estate owned by the SPCA is a "valid nonconforming use" under the provisions of ARTICLE IX of the above cited ordinance.

7. At the time of the passage of the ordinance there was a building located on the real estate which was used for the housing of animals.

8. The SPCA is in possession of the real estate and has recently added wire holding pens and a gravel pad approximately 45 feet by 50 feet in size.

9. The holding pens are temporary holding pens, and the animals are not housed in the pens.

Appellant's Brief pp. 5-6 (appendix citations omitted).

On June 22, 2000, the City filed a verified complaint for Zoning Violation, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction against the SPCA alleging that the pad and pens violated the zoning ordinance. On November 2, 2001, the parties submitted the stipulation of facts to the trial court and conducted arguments. The trial court later entered an order granting the City's requests, which states in part:

[Findings]

8. That the "City of Muncie Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance," Article IX, Section 15, Nonconforming Uses and Structures, subparagraph C, Uses of Land, provides in pertinent part:

A nonconforming use of land shall not be enlarged, expanded nor extended to occupy a larger area of land than was occupied at the time of the enactment of the ordinance. A nonconforming use may be extended throughout any part of an existing structure that was arranged for such use prior to the enactment of this ordinance. Such use shall not be moved in whole or in part to another location on the lot or parcel of land other than that occupied by the use at the time of the enactment of this ordinance.

9. That at the time of the passage of the ordinance, there was a building located on the real estate which was used for the housing of animals.

10. That the SPCA is in possession of the real estate and has recently added temporary wire holding pens and a gravel pad approximately 45 feet by 50 feet in size.

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[Conclusions]

2. That at the time of the passage of the "City of Muncie Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance," there was located on the real estate, owned by the SPCA, a building used for the housing of animals. There is no evidence that any other structures existed on the real estate at the time of the passage of the ordinance.

3. That the addition of the pens, either temporary or permanent, and the gravel pad, is an expansion of the nonconforming use of the land.

4. That in construing the ordinance, the Court gives the words "their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, unless a contrary purpose is shown by the ordinance," and it is clear from the language of the statute, the language prevails and will be given effect.

5. That the addition of the gravel pad and the pens by the SPCA had caused it to occupy a larger area of land than was occupied at the time of the passage of the ordinance. The gravel pad and the pens are a violation of Article IX, Section 15, Subparagraph C of the City of Muncie Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.

6. That by adding the pad and the pens, the SPCA has moved the nonconforming use to another location on the real estate which was not occupied at the time of the passage of the ordinance, and, therefore, the gravel pad and pens are in violation of Article IX, Section 15, Subparagraph C of the City of Muncie Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.

7. That the Court concludes that the pad and pens are not accessory uses/structure permitted by the Zoning Ordinance and are not consistent with the requirements of accessory uses and structures under the Code, nor are they incidental and commonly associated with the operation of the principal use of the lot.

App. pp. 6-10. The SPCA now appeals.

Analysis

At the outset, we note that we generally review actions to enjoin zoning violations for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n v. Hair, 505 N.E.2d 116, 117 (Ind. Ct.App.1987)

. In cases where the trial court enters findings and conclusions in support of the judgment, the standard is two tiered. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n v. Schroeder, 727 N.E.2d 742, 748 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. However, as both the SPCA and the City acknowledge, the standard of review in this case is different because of the stipulation of facts, which included attached exhibits, submitted by the parties below. The parties did not submit additional evidence, so the trial court's decision was based entirely upon the stipulation. Where the decision is based upon entirely upon documentation or a stipulation by the parties, this court is in as good a position as the trial court to determine its force and effect. Williamson v. Rutana, 736 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Ind. Ct.App.2000); see also Fratus v. Marion Community Schools Bd. of Trustees, 749 N.E.2d 40, 43 (Ind.2001). Thus, this court's review of the trial court's decision is de novo. Williamson, 736 N.E.2d at 1249.

Our supreme court has stated:

The ultimate purpose of zoning ordinances is to confine certain classes of uses and structures to designated areas. Because nonconforming uses by definition detract from the fulfillment of that purpose, zoning ordinances properly seek to restrain them. In light of this important purpose, Indiana courts have refused to permit the expansion of or changes in nonconforming uses in a variety of factual situations. See, e.g., Stuckman v. Kosciusko County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 506 N.E.2d 1079 (Ind. 1987)

(nonconforming automobile graveyard existing on lots E-K could not be expanded on to lots A-D); Berkey, 607 N.E.2d at 732 (nonconforming junkyard could not be expanded beyond the land being so used at the time the restrictive ordinance was adopted); Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n v. Goodman, 588 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (nonconforming two-unit carriage house apartment building could not be expanded into three units); Taylor v. Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n, 436 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind.Ct. App.1982) (nonconforming use of building as a package liquor store did not authorize the change of its use to a tavern); Chizum v. Elkhart County Plan Comm'n, 147 Ind.App. 691, 263 N.E.2d 654 (1970) (poles and lights for night racing could not be erected at nonconforming daytime drag racing track); O'Banion v. State ex rel. Shively, 146 Ind.App. 223, 253 N.E.2d 739 (1969) (nonconforming sale of beer did not justify use of property for the sale of any other alcoholic beverage).

Ragucci v. Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n, 702 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ind.1998) (some citations omitted).

The use of land, or buildings, may be protected from existing zoning restrictions if the use is one, which existed and was lawful when the restriction became effective and which continued to exist since that time. Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n v. Goodman, 588 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). A "nonconforming use" is a use of property which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance, and which is allowed to continue after the effective date of the ordinance even though it does not comply with the applicable use restrictions. Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n v. Schroeder, 727 N.E.2d 742, 750 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). The parties agree that when the zoning ordinance went into effect in 1973, the animal shelter became a "valid nonconforming use" pursuant to Article IX of the ordinance. The question before us today is whether the addition of the gravel pad and the pens constituted an expansion of the nonconforming use that is proscribed by the ordinance.

Article IX, Section 15(C) of the zoning ordinance provides:

A nonconforming use of land shall not be enlarged, expanded nor extended to occupy a larger area of land than was occupied at the time of the enactment of the ordinance. A nonconforming use may be extended throughout any part of ...