Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bell
Decision Date | 14 November 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 5:95CV08.,5:95CV08. |
Parties | METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Patricia BELL, Gloria B. Townsend-Clement, Kelly Townsend, and Adam Townsend. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Lauren N. Pierce, Paul Ridley, Carolyn Ruth Konicek, and John M. Clement, Dallas, TX, for plaintiff.
Charles L. Attaway, Texarkana, TX, for defendant.
Kelly Townsend, Fair Oaks, CA, pro se.
Before the Court are 1) Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's ("Metlife") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 2) Defendant Patricia Bell's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 3) Gloria Townsend-Clement, Kelly Townsend and Adam Townsend's ("the Townsends") Motion for Summary Judgment. After considering said motions and the responses thereto, the Court finds that Patricia Bell's motion and Metlife's motion are well taken.
This is an interpleader action filed by Metlife. All four of the defendants have filed claims to proceeds from a life insurance policy (the "policy") covering the deceased Harold O. Townsend. The policy is a Federal Group Life Insurance ("FEGLI") policy and is thereby covered by the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act ("FEGLIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 8701 et seq. Metlife is the underwriter to the policy and is seeking to determine the proper beneficiary so that it can proceed to distribute the proceeds according to law.
It is undisputed that Patricia Bell is the sole designated beneficiary in the policy. Nonetheless, the Townsends claim entitlement to the proceeds due to several equitable considerations. Gloria Townsend-Clement is a former wife of Harold Townsend with the marriage having dissolved in early 1988. Harold Townsend died on December 25, 1992. On June 7, 1993, a California state court declared that the policy was overlooked as a community property asset during the divorce and ordered that Gloria Townsend-Clement receive one half of the policy proceeds. Kelly and Adam Townsend, the children of Harold Townsend and Gloria Townsend-Clement, also claim entitlement to at least part of the proceeds by virtue of California law providing for intestate succession. All parties have filed motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant can demonstrate that the evidence, including pleadings, affidavits and other evidence available to the Court establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).
5 U.S.C. § 8705 (emphasis added). Reiterating and reinforcing part of the above-cited language, the Code of Federal Regulations declares that 5 C.F.R. § 870.902(e). Any such "change or cancellation of beneficiary in a last will or testament, or in any other document not witnessed and filed as required by this part, shall not have any force or effect." 5 C.F.R. § 870.902(b). The collective language of the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations dictates that Patricia Bell is unquestionably the "beneficiary." Further, the above language is unambiguous and offers no basis to apply it other than as it is written.
Notwithstanding, the Townsends argue that California law should control and that the proceeds should be paid to them or placed in a constructive trust for their benefit in accordance with California law. The question now becomes whether a direct payment and a constructive trust imposed under state law are preempted. FEGLIA includes...
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