Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ray
Decision Date | 09 April 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 5028.,5028. |
Citation | 105 S.W.2d 377 |
Parties | METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. RAY. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Leake, Henry & Young, Hawkins Golden, and Harry M. Stanfield, all of Dallas, and Keeney & Moseley, of Texarkana, for plaintiff in error.
Wm. V. Brown, of Texarkana, for defendant in error.
This suit was filed by defendant in error, Florine Ray, the surviving wife of Lillian Ray, deceased, to recover upon a contract of insurance evidenced by a group policy issued upon the application of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, and a certificate of insurance issued thereunder upon the application of Lillian Ray, as employee of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, whereby plaintiff in error, defendant below, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, as insurer, promised to pay Florine Ray as beneficiary the sum of $1,000 upon the death of insured, Lillian Ray, if "caused directly and independently of all other causes by violent and accidental means."
The insurer defended the suit upon the ground that the death of Lillian Ray was not caused by "accidental means" in that, it is alleged by defendant, Lillian Ray at the time of his death was attempting to burglarize a box car belonging to the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. It was the contention of insurer, defendant below, that justifiable homicide, though not among the risks expressly excepted in the policy, is, as a matter of law, a death not caused by "accidental means."
On trial of the case it was shown without dispute that Lillian Ray met instant death on the night of December 19, 1934, just off the right of way of the railroad yards of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company in the city of Texarkana, Tex., as the result of being shot in the back of the head by and while running from a special officer of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company.
The defendant introduced testimony of circumstances tending to show that immediately before he was killed, Lillian Ray had attempted to burglarize a box car belonging to the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. The trial court submitted the issue, accompanied by definitions, to the jury — and the jury answered — as follows:
Upon the verdict of the jury and the undisputed facts of the case the court entered judgment for plaintiff. From an order of the court overruling its motion for new trial, the defendant has appealed by writ of error.
By its first proposition plaintiff in error attacks the action of the trial court in refusing its motion for a directed verdict and in refusing its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, and presents the contention that the verdict of the jury is without support in the evidence, in that, it is contended, the uncontradicted testimony shows that Lillian Ray immediately before he was shot and killed was attempting to burglarize a box car. The testimony bearing upon the issue is as follows: E. B. Murrell, for defendant below, testified:
That at the time he shot and killed Lillian Ray, about seven p. m., December 19, 1934, he, witness, was employed by and as a special officer of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company — holding a Texas Ranger commission; that a part of his duties was to patrol the yards of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company.
Witness further testified that he did not know Lillian Ray at the time, but later learned his name; that Lillian Ray was not in the employ of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company at that time; that he was an employee of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company in the capacity of trucker at its warehouse. Witness further testified that when he got back to the box car in question the seal was broken. He did not state when or how long after the killing he examined the box car, nor when, if at any time, he had examined the car previous to the killing. On cross-examination the witness testified that people go through the railroad yards at the place in question, where the box car was located, at all hours of the night; that it is not unusual to see people going through there at 7 o'clock; that a lot of people work in town and walk through there every morning and night; that lots of people after supper go to the picture shows and on legitimate business through the yards.
Claude Murrell, witness for defendant, testified that he was not an officer, but that he was with his brother, E. B. Murrell, at the time E. B. Murrell killed Lillian Ray; that witness was standing at one end of the box car of cinders and his brother was at the other end; that the tobacco car was out in front of them; that he was a little further from the tobacco car than his brother.
It will be noted that the facts testified to are circumstantial in character of evidence, from which it is sought to establish the ultimate facts that the negroes had (1) broken a seal of the car, and (2) with the intention of entering and stealing tobacco therefrom — the offense of attempt to commit burglary. The circumstances which will amount to sufficient proof of an ultimate fact is not a matter of general definition. "The only...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward
...1936, writ dism'd); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Shaw, 197 S.W. 316 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston 1917, writ dism'd); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ray, 105 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1937, no writ); Stevenson v. Reliable Life Insurance Co., 427 S.W.2d 945 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 196......
-
Key Life Ins. Co. of South Carolina v. Taylor, 7148
...to do so, and then admit liability before it could become liable for penalty and attorney's fees. As it was said in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ray, 105 S.W.2d 377 (Texarkana Tex.Civ.App., 1937, no writ), in a case in which suit was filed first, then demand given, that the insurance compa......
-
American Casualty & Life Co. v. McCracken
...83 S.W.2d 698; American National Insurance Co. v. Garrison, Tex. Civ.App., 97 S.W.2d 534, writ dismissed; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ray, Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 377; Continental Casualty Co. v. Willis, 4 Cir., 28 F. 2d 707, 709, 61 A.L.R. 1069; Seaboard Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 13......