Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hale

• Decision Date: 14 September 1933
• Docket Number: 9271.
• Citation: 170 S.E. 875,177 Ga. 632
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. HALE. [*]
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

170 S.E. 875

177 Ga. 632

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. HALE. ^[*]

No. 9271.

Supreme Court of Georgia

September 14, 1933

Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 1933.

Syllabus by the Court.

Knowledge of soliciting agent or examining physician that insured had had disease waived life policy provision requiring insured to recite disease in waiver signed by insurer's secretary notwithstanding policy provision that agent could not waive forfeiture.

Where life insurer waived insured's recitation of previous illness, insurer's liability on policy was not limited to return of premiums paid thereon.

The questions propounded by the Court of Appeals answered in the opinion.

Certified Questions from Court of Appeals.

Suit by W. B. Hale, administrator, against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error to the Court of Appeals, which certifies questions.

Questions answered.

GILBERT J., dissenting.

Barry Wright, of Rome, for plaintiff in error.

Henderson Lanham, of Rome, for defendant in error.

BECK Presiding Justice.

This case came before this court on two questions certified by the Court of Appeals, as follows:

"1. Where a policy of life insurance, issued after a medical examination but without a written application, provides that 'if the insured is not alive or is not in sound health on the date hereof, *** or has within two years before the date hereof been attended by a physician for any serious disease or complaint, or before said date has had any pulmonary disease, or chronic bronchitis, or cancer, or disease of the heart, liver, or kidneys *** unless such previous disease is specifically recited in the "Space for Endorsements" on page 4 in a waiver signed by the secretary or an assistant secretary, *** the company may declare this policy void, and the liability of the company in the case of any such declaration in the case of any claim under this policy shall be limited to the return of the premiums paid on the policy,' and where such policy further provides that 'it constitutes the entire agreement between the company and the insured and the holder and owner thereof,' and where it further provides that 'its terms cannot be changed, or its conditions varied, except by the express agreement of the company evidenced by the signature of its president or secretary, and that therefore agents (which term includes also managers, superintendents, and assistant managers) are not authorized and have no power to make, alter, or discharge contracts, to waive forfeitures or to receive premiums on policies more than thirty one days in arrears,' will actual knowledge on the part of the agent of the company soliciting the insurance, or on the part of the physician examining the insured on behalf of the company, or the knowledge on the part of both such persons, acquired prior to the issuance of the policy but not communicated to any general agent or officer of the company, that the insured had in fact been attended by a physician and had one of the diseases specifically mentioned in the quoted provisions of the policy within two years prior to the date thereof, be imputed to the company will the company by virtue of having issued the policy with such knowledge on the part of its agents or physician or both, be deemed to have waived such condition or be estopped to claim a forfeiture on account of the breach thereof?

"2. If the foregoing question should be answered in the affirmative, would the liability of the insurance company in a suit on such a policy, even though it should be deemed to have waived such condition of the policy, or though it should be estopped to claim a forfeiture on account of the breach thereof, be limited to the return of the premiums paid on the policy?"

1. The first question must be answered in the affirmative, upon the authority of principles applicable to the question already laid down by this court. In the case of Mechanics', etc., Insurance Co. v. Mutual Real Estate, etc., Ass'n, 98 Ga. 262, 25 S.E. 457, 458, it was said: "'Conditions which enter into the validity of a contract of insurance at its inception may be waived by the agent, and are waived if so intended, although they remain in the policy when delivered;' and limitations therein upon the authority of the agent to waive such conditions otherwise than in writing attached to or indorsed upon the policy are treated as referring to waivers made subsequently to the issuance of the policy. See 1 May, Ins. § 143, and authorities cited." This principle was restated and reaffirmed in the case of Johnson v. Ætna Insurance Co., 123 Ga. 404, 51 S.E. 339, 107 Am.St.Rep. 92,

where it was held: "Limitations in an insurance policy upon the authority of the agent of the company to waive the conditions of the contract of insurance are to be treated as referring to waivers made subsequently to the issuance of the policy." In the opinion, after quoting from the Mechanics', etc, Insurance Co. Case the language we have just set forth, it was said: "The language quoted fits the present case like a glove, and upon the soundness of the principle announced must depend the decision of this case. A careful study convinces us that the logic of that case is unanswerable. An insurance company receives an application for a policy. One of the rules of the company is that insurance will not be issued upon a building situated on land not owned by the applicant. But the company, through its agent, knows that the applicant owns the building which he wishes to have insured, but does not own the land on which it is situated and, with this knowledge, nevertheless issues a policy on the building. Certainly, after leading the...