Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Stuckey

• Decision Date: 08 July 1940
• Docket Number: 15118.
• Parties: METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. STUCKEY.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

10 S.E.2d 3

194 S.C. 469

METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. STUCKEY.

No. 15118.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 8, 1940

Reynolds & Reynolds, of Sumter, for appellant.

C B. Elliott, of Columbia, and Marion Moise, of Sumter, for respondent.

J STROM THURMOND, Acting Associate Justice.

This case involves the dispossession of a tenant holding over after the alleged expiration of his lease under Section 8813 of the Code, as amended by Act No. 104, Acts of 1939, 41 St at Large, p. 151. It originated in a Magistrate's Court in Sumter County and resulted in a verdict for the respondent, the landlord, by direction of the Court.

The record discloses that a formal notice to show cause, dated January 8, 1940, based on the verified petition of the landlord, respondent herein, containing appropriated allegations, was issued by the magistrate and duly and personally served upon the defendant, appellant here commanding him to show cause why he should not be dispossessed and ejected from said premises. The petition or affidavit of respondent, in substance, alleged the execution of the written lease between the parties, that under the terms thereof the lease commenced January 1, 1939, and terminated December 31, 1939; that among other things the lessee agreed to deliver possession of the said premises upon the expiration of said lease, without any further notice and expressly waived all statutory and other requirements of notice to vacate; and that the tenant was holding over, had refused to deliver possession thereof to the landlord, although possession of said premises had been duly demanded and required. Pursuant to the notice to show cause the appellant filed his return, appeared before the Magistrate on the day noticed and objected to the jurisdiction of the magistrate upon the grounds fully set out in the record. The objection was overruled and the case went to trial by the magistrate and a jury. At the conclusion of the testimony appellant made a motion for a directed verdict, which motion was refused. The respondent then made a motion for a directed verdict in its favor, which was granted. Upon appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the judgment of the magistrate was affirmed in a formal order. From this order the appellant comes to this Court, upon several exceptions.

In his brief, counsel for appellant states that three issues only are involved in the exceptions, as follows:

"1. In an ejectment proceeding does a plea by the tenant, and testimony to the effect, that the lease agreement was obtained through fraud and deceit and fraudulently breached, oust the Magistrate of jurisdiction?

"2. Was the statutory demand made by landlord upon tenant?

"3. Were there issues of fact for the jury?"

The First Issue: It is stated just above, and no use to repeat here.

The Civil jurisdiction of Magistrates in this State is clearly defined:

"Magistrates shall have jurisdiction in such civil cases as the General Assembly may prescribe: Provided, Such jurisdiction shall not extend to cases where the value of property in controversy, or the amount claimed, exceeds one hundred dollars, or to cases where the title to real estate is in question, or to cases in chancery." Constitution of 1895, Article 5, Section 21.

"Magistrates shall have civil jurisdiction in the following actions: *** (9) An action for damages, fraud in the sale, purchase, or exchange of personal property, if the damages claimed do not exceed one hundred dollars. (10) In all matters between landlord and tenant, and the possession of land as provided in Article 2 of Chapter 171," Code of 1932, Section 257.

Article 2, Chapter 171 of the Code of 1932, contains Section 8813, which is the Section under which this proceeding was begun. Therefore, subsection 9 of Section 257 of the Code of 1932 has no application in this matter. This sub-section refers to actions brought for damages for fraud in the sale, purchase, or exchange of personal property and has no connection whatsoever with the type of action now before the Court. That this is a proper construction of sub-section 9 is more clearly shown by the fact that immediately following this sub-section is sub-section 10, which clearly gives the magistrate jurisdiction of this action.

Appellant contends, however, that "it then naturally follows that if the lease in question were fraudulently procured it was void". The fallacy in this contention is disclosed in the opinion of Chief Justice McIver in Levister v. Southern Railway Company, 56 S.C. 508, 35 S.E. 207, 209: "It is generally affirmed as a rule that fraud avoids all contracts. But it would be more correct to say fraud makes all contracts voidable; for it is at the option of the party to be affected by the fraud whether or not he will treat the contract as void and rescind it. The right to rescind, however, is subject to this restriction: That is, if, after discovery of the fraud, one party still avails himself of the benefit of the contract, or permits the other to proceed with the execution of it, he will thereby be held to have waived the tort and affirmed the contract."

And, likewise, Williston on Contracts (Revised Edition), Section 1528, states: "The doctrine of election of remedies is not peculiar to actions based upon fraud, but it is, perhaps, most frequently applied or discussed in connection therewith. The defrauded party has the alternative but inconsistent rights and remedies of affirmance of the transaction and recovery of damages for the deceit, or of disaffirmance and restitution where restitution is available."

Appellant testified that he had a collateral agreement with respondent whereby respondent would furnish certain supplies for the planting of his crop for the year 1939. Yet appellant admitted that in November, 1939, when the representative of the respondent came to see him, he delivered to respondent its share of the cotton grown on the farm for the year 1939, thus admitting an attornment to the landlord and unequivocally affirming the relation of landlord and tenant under the terms of the written instrument.

Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, 1910 Edition, Volume 1, page 460, states: "When the lessee has entered under the lease, the fact that the acceptance of the lease was procured by duress or fraud on the part of the lessor, or that the acceptance was under mistake on the part of the lessee, will not enable the lessee to defend an action by the lessor for possession on the ground that the lessor's title is defective. A contrary view would violate the well-recognized rule that one seeking to rescind a transaction for duress, fraud or mistake must put the other party in statu quo by returning what he has received thereunder, and would, in the case of fraud, involve in effect the imposition on the lessor of damages out of all proportion to the injury caused by the fraud, this being particularly productive of injustice when applied as against an innocent transferee of the reversion."

Furthermore, in the letter of appellant's counsel to respondent, dated December 4, 1939, the reason given for appellant's failure to deliver possession was that the notice "as required by the lease" had not been given the tenant and that the tenant had commenced farming operations for 1940. The phrase "as required by the lease" indicates that the appellant was claiming under the lease as tenant at the date of that letter, thus affirming the relation of landlord and tenant. It is worth noting that neither in the Magistrate's Court, nor before Judge Mann in the Circuit Court, nor here, does the appellant contend that sufficient notice was not given for possession under the terms of the lease, but rather took the position that the lease was void and that the magistrate had no jurisdiction. It was too late for the appellant to say that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist.

Appellant admits that there is no case in this jurisdiction directly sustaining his contention with respect to this issue, but contends that his position is supported by a necessary implication in the case of Bamberg Banking Company v. Matthews, 132 S.C. 130, 128 S.E. 718. But that decision is squarely against appellant, holding, as it does, that an allegation of fraud in the procurement of a lease does not oust the Magistrate's Court of Jurisdiction.

That the existence of the conventional relation of landlord and tenant is a prerequisite to the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction by the magistrate in such proceedings is clearly recognized and assumed in our decisions. Carlisle v. Prior, 48 S.C. 183, 26 S.E. 244; Lewis v. Cooley, 81 S.C. 461, 62 S.E. 868.

The written lease introduced in evidence was clear and explicit, and it was the duty of the magistrate to determine whether the relation of landlord and tenant existed. This Court has held on numerous occasions that the tenant cannot oust the magistrate of jurisdiction in such cases, even by the assertion of a superior title in himself, and it is but logical to hold, as the Bamberg Banking Company v. Matthews case, supra, declares, that an allegation of fraud in the procurement of the lease will not oust the jurisdiction of the magistrate.

"Necessarily, therefore, it is competent for the magistrate to determine as a fact whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists. Lewis v. Cooley, supra. Otherwise any tenant, by merely denying the landlord's title or by asserting superior title in himself or in another, could oust the magistrate of jurisdiction and frustrate the plain and salutary object of the statute." Stewart-Jones Co. v. Shehan, 127 S.C. 451, 121 S.E. 374, 376.

Furthermore, we do not find in the return of the appellant in the Magistrate's Court any allegations of fact constituting actionable fraud. ...