Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Reynolds, Civil 3693

Decision Date28 September 1936
Docket NumberCivil 3693
Citation60 P.2d 1070,48 Ariz. 205
PartiesMETROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. ELSIE REYNOLDS, Appellee
CourtArizona Supreme Court

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. J. C. Niles, Judge. Judgment affirmed.

Messrs Armstrong, Kramer, Morrison & Roche, for Appellant.

Messrs Silverthorne & Van Spanckeren, for Appellee.

OPINION

ROSS, J.

This is an action to recover disability benefits provided for by supplementary contracts or riders attached to two policies of life insurance issued by the defendant to Robert C. Reynolds on October 7, 1925. They provide, in substance, that upon proof that the insured, while under sixty years of age, has "become totally and permanently disabled, as the result of bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of said Policy, so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any occupation and performing any work for compensation or profit, and that such disability has already continued uninterruptedly for a period of at least three months," the defendant will, during the continuance of such disability, waive the payment of further premiums and pay to the insured a stipulated monthly income.

The plaintiff, Elsie Reynolds, is the wife, beneficiary, and guardian of the insured and has brought this action as beneficiary, alleging, in substance, that the insured, Robert C. Reynolds, during 1934 became totally and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease so that he was prevented from performing work for compensation, and had so continued to the filing of the action.

The defense interposed was that the insured had become disabled as a result of bodily injury or disease occurring and originating prior to the issuance of the policies and that the claim was therefore not a risk covered by the policies.

At the trial on this issue, there being no other issue in dispute, it was stipulated that on or about April 30, 1934, the insured was adjudged insane and had since been confined in the state insane asylum, and that he was totally and permanently disabled by reason of his insanity.

The plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that she had known the insured since September, 1920; that she became his wife on January 28, 1927; that he was part owner of a clothing and dry goods store in Glendale, Arizona, known as "The Toggery," and that he had been the active manager thereof as long as she knew him, that is, from September, 1920, until about April 10, 1934.

The certificate of the attending physician, Dr. J. M. Pearson indorsed on the proof of claim for compensation, stated that the nature of the insured's sickness was general paralysis, and that was his final diagnosis; that his symptoms were mental deterioration, changes in personality, changes in reflexes, etc.; and that his treatment of insured extended from January 15, 1934, to April 23, 1934.

When the plaintiff offered the policies in evidence, the defendant objected on the ground that the complaint failed to show that the insured's disability was the result of a bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of the policies, which, it is contended, was necessary under the terms of the policies.

At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for an instructed verdict on the ground that the evidence failed to show that the insured's total and permanent disability was the result of bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the issuance of the policy. This motion was denied.

Defendant thereupon, to support its defense, introduced evidence that the insured's symptoms, as described by Dr. Pearson, showed that his general paralysis was caused by syphilis, and that it was is not disputed by plaintiff, the question being when the disabling disease occurred and originated, whether before or after the policies were issued.

Defendant offered to prove by Dr. Willard Smith that he treated the insured for the disease of syphilis in June, 1913, and for some twelve years thereafter or until in the spring of 1925. This offer was objected to on the ground that it was privileged, the knowledge being obtained while the witness was the insured's physician.

A like offer of the testimony of the two attending physicians at the insane asylum, to the effect that the insured's disease was of long standing, was ruled out for the same reason.

Defendant offered in evidence a written instrument, undated, signed by the insured and by the plaintiff as the "wife and beneficiary," authorizing and requesting any hospital or any physician or any surgeon to give the defendant "all facts and particulars desired with reference to my disability and operation performed on or about any Previous History 19 --; including an examination of the Hospital Case History, and written records of Attending Physician's and Attending Surgeon's diagnosis," and agreeing to exempt them from liability for doing so. This offer was, upon objection that it was immaterial and irrelevant and also without date, ruled out.

At the close of the whole case both parties moved for an instructed verdict. The court overruled the defendant's motion and granted plaintiff's.

The assignments question the correctness of the court's action in holding, in effect, that the complaint stated a cause of action even though it does not allege that the insured's disability was the result of a bodily injury or disease occurring and originating after the date of the policies, and in admitting in evidence the policies over defendant's objection.

Also the rulings rejecting the testimony of Dr. Smith and the two doctors at the insane asylum.

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10 cases
  • Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 21 October 1980
    ...cases. Under these cases, there is no coverage until a disease is diagnosable as such. 17 Thus, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 48 Ariz. 205, 60 P.2d 1070 (1936), a court found coverage for insanity which manifested itself during the policy period even though it was caused by syp......
  • Mutual Hospital Ins., Inc. v. Klapper
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 30 October 1972
    ...(Emphasis supplied.) See also: National Casualty Co. v. Hudson (1945) 32 Ala.App. 69, 21 So.2d 568; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds (1936) 48 Ariz. 205, 60 P.2d 1070; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Allison (1929) 179 Ark. 65, 14 S.W.2d 229; Fohl v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1942) 54 Cal.App......
  • HSK v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 31 August 2015
    ...(explaining that the burden of proof under Texas law is on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds,48 Ariz. 205, 60 P.2d 1070, 1072 (1936) (assigning to the defendant the burden of proving that plaintiff's disability arose before the effective date o......
  • Marek v. Amba Marketing Systems, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 11 January 1989
    ...that a condition is in existence for this purpose when it becomes active or manifests itself. See e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 48 Ariz. 205, 60 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1936). "A majority of the cases recognize that a sickness should be deemed to have its inception at the time it f......
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