Meus v. State
| Decision Date | 28 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D06-4278.,2D06-4278. |
| Citation | 968 So.2d 706 |
| Parties | Jean Claude MEUS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
John H. Trevena, Largo, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Dana Christenson, pro se, Tampa, Amicus Curiae.
Jean Claude Meus appeals the postconviction court's summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. For the reasons that we explain below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
Late in the afternoon of May 11, 2001, Mr. Meus left Immokalee driving north in a semi-tractor trailer rig that was loaded with tomatoes. Later that evening, Mr. Meus was traveling east on State Road 64 in Hardee County. Nona Moore, a Hardee County resident, was also on the road that evening. Ms. Moore was driving a minivan, and she was accompanied by her three young daughters. At approximately 9:30 p.m., both Mr. Meus and Ms. Moore arrived at an intersection near Wauchula known as "Seven Mile Point." Because of its unusual configuration, this intersection — where Wauchula's East Main Street meets State Road 64 — could be considered hazardous.
At that point, Mr. Meus' rig veered off State Road 64, reentered the roadway, and overturned onto Ms. Moore's minivan. Ms. Moore and one of her daughters were crushed to death, and the two surviving daughters were trapped in the van. Because of the weight of the trailer and its load, it took a long time for rescue personnel to extricate the two surviving children from the wreckage. In the aftermath of this horrible crash, numerous law enforcement officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel arrived at the scene to assist with the rescue operations.
More than one year after the event, the State charged Mr. Meus with two counts of vehicular homicide for the deaths of Ms. Moore and her daughter. Mr. Meus was tried in 2003, and a jury convicted him on both counts. The trial court sentenced Mr. Meus to concurrent fifteen-year prison terms on each count. Mr. Meus took a direct appeal, and this court affirmed his judgments and sentences. Meus v. State, 892 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (table decision). Next, Mr. Meus filed a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After that petition was denied, Mr. Meus filed his postconviction motion. The postconviction court denied the motion without granting Mr. Meus an evidentiary hearing, and Mr. Meus filed this appeal.1
At trial, the State did not present any evidence that Mr. Meus' ability to operate his rig safely was impaired by the use of alcohol or drugs. Instead, the State's theory of the case was that Mr. Meus fell asleep at the wheel because he was sleep-deprived. In support of this theory, the State presented evidence demonstrating that Mr. Meus had been driving for almost ten hours in a twenty-four-hour period. However, the State's case was entirely circumstantial. Mr. Meus denied that he had fallen asleep before the crash, and the State had no direct evidence that he did.
The trial developed into a battle of experts. Sergeant Owen T. Keen, a traffic homicide investigator employed by the Florida Highway Patrol, testified for the State. Sergeant Keen was called to the scene to investigate immediately after the crash. He took photographs, made various measurements, and prepared diagrams reconstructing the event. Sergeant Keen suggested that Mr. Meus fell asleep as he approached the intersection and drove off the roadway. According to the sergeant, Mr. Meus was awakened abruptly after he went off the side of the road. At that point, Mr. Meus overcorrected when he pulled the rig back onto the highway. Thus, when Mr. Meus reentered State Road 64, he was still heading east, but he was traveling in the westbound lane. Mr. Meus then saw a vehicle that he thought was in his lane, and he swerved to the right to avoid the oncoming vehicle. Sergeant Keen opined that these maneuvers caused the rig to overturn and crush Ms. Moore's minivan.
However, Mr. Meus did not admit that he had fallen asleep while driving. At the scene, he gave a statement to Sergeant Keen. The sergeant recounted Mr. Meus' statement during his trial testimony as follows:
[Mr. Meus was] travelling [sic] eastbound on State Road 64 and as he was approaching the intersection where the stop sign is located at 636 [East Main Street] that there was a vehicle that was making a turn onto 64 that had been travelling [sic] eastbound, and turning back westbound to go the direction he just came from. He described this vehicle as a truck, probably [an] extended cab truck or a white vehicle or possibly a van. And as he, as this vehicle made the turn onto 64 heading back towards Zolfo Springs, the lights were on bright and they blinded him, which caused him to swerve to the right quickly to avoid hitting him because it was in his lane travelling [sic] back towards Zolfo. And as he swerved to the right, this is when he lost control of the vehicle and overturned until he came to the final rest.
Thus Mr. Meus said that the cause of the accident was the sudden appearance of an oncoming vehicle in his lane of travel, not falling asleep at the wheel. The alleged oncoming vehicle described by Mr. Meus did not stop at the scene of the crash, and it was apparently never found or identified.
Mr. Meus did not testify at trial. The theory of the defense was based on Mr. Meus' postcrash statement to Sergeant Keen. Mr. Meus presented the testimony of Victor Fisher, an accident reconstruction expert and a former traffic homicide investigator for the Florida Highway Patrol. Mr. Fisher's testimony supported the defense theory concerning how the crash occurred. Mr. Fisher also disputed many of Sergeant Keen's findings and conclusions.
Mr. Meus filed his postconviction motion in December 2005. He subsequently amended the motion and filed two supplements to it. As a result of this process of amendment and supplementation, the motion ultimately raised multiple claims. After a thorough review of the postconviction court's order and the two-volume record, we conclude that the postconviction court erred in failing to grant Mr. Meus an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for omitting to interview and call as a witness Juan Otero of the Zolfo Springs Fire Department. Mr. Otero was one of the first emergency personnel to arrive at the scene of the crash. The remaining claims were either facially insufficient or were adequately refuted by the portions of the record that the postconviction court attached to its order.
We have not overlooked Mr. Meus' claim — raised for the first time in his initial brief filed in this court — that the judge who denied the postconviction motion should have recused himself after receiving and reviewing ex parte communications that the judge deemed inappropriate. Although it appears to us that the postconviction court handled this matter properly, Mr. Meus waived the issue by failing to raise it in the postconviction court before seeking relief here.
The test for establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a two-pronged one:
(1) The claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards.
(2) The clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To establish the second prong, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In this context, "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
Mr. Meus was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel if he alleged specific facts which are not conclusively rebutted in the record and which demonstrate a deficiency in trial counsel's performance that prejudiced the outcome of his trial. See Floyd v. State, 808 So.2d 175, 182 (Fla.2002) (citing Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 516 (Fla.1999)). Upon review of the postconviction court's summary denial of Mr. Meus' motion without an evidentiary hearing, we must accept Mr. Meus' factual allegations as true to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. Id. (citing Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Fla.2000)). Our review of the postconviction court's summary denial of Mr. Meus' postconviction motion is under the de novo standard. See Willacy v. State, 967 So.2d 131, 138-39 (Fla.2007).
We emphasize that the postconviction court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Meus' claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that we discuss below. Although we accept the unrefuted factual allegations of Mr. Meus' claim as true for the purposes of our review, the reader should bear in mind that Mr. Meus' trial counsel has not yet had an opportunity to address these allegations.
We turn now to an examination of Mr. Meus' claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for omitting to interview and to call Juan Otero, the Zolfo Springs volunteer firefighter, as a witness at trial. It is well settled that in order for a defendant to state a facially sufficient claim for failure to call a witness at trial, the defendant must allege: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Russell v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.
...not allege that thewitnesses were available to testify at trial. Such allegation is not facially sufficient. See Meus v, State, 968 So. 2d 706, 710-711 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("It is well settled that in order for a defendant to state a facially sufficient claim for failure to call a witness at......
-
Formisano v. Gaston
...regulations; and (5) was transporting an unauthorized passenger. [¶ 23] The next case cited by Formisano is Meus v. State of Florida, 968 So.2d 706 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2d Dist.2007), a vehicular homicide case apparently based upon sleep deprivation, where the court remanded for an evidentiary ......
-
Ayala v. Sec'y
...raise that claim, the Court notes that is was not preserved for appeal and thus, has been procedurally defaulted. See Meus v. State, 968 So. 2d 706, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (issues not raised in the post-conviction court and raised for the first time in an initial brief are waived). The Cour......
-
Sanchez v. State
...summarily denied. We review the order summarily denying Mr. Sanchez's motion for postconviction relief de novo. See Meus v. State , 968 So.2d 706, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). To plead a facially sufficient claim for relief, Mr. Sanchez was required to allege facts establishing that his trial co......