Meyer, Matter of
| Decision Date | 20 June 1986 |
| Citation | 504 N.Y.S.2d 358,132 Misc.2d 415 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Jennifer MEYER, * and Jessica Meyer,* Children Under 18 Years of Age Alleged to be Abused and Neglected. |
| Court | New York Family Court |
Lenore Gittis, The Legal Aid Society by Gerard Lavelle, Brooklyn, law guardian.
Hoffinger, Friedland, Dobrish, Bernfeld & Hosen by Howard Slotnick, Robert Z. Dobrish, New York City, for respondent.
The respondent father in this child protective proceeding moves for the admission into evidence of expert testimony regarding certain polygraph examinations. The motion is opposed by both the petitioner, The Brooklyn Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and the children's Law Guardian.
Is expert testimony in reference to the results of polygraph examinations admissible in child protective proceedings?
The respondent, an estranged husband, is accused of sexually abusing his two young daughters during his visitations with them. The children were unable to testify under oath and their hearsay statements were admitted under the hearsay exception of Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi). The testimony was adequately corroborated and a prima facie motion was denied.
This is a particularly complicated case. The Court has already heard six medical witnesses and expects to hear several more. The experts have disagreed and it is unlikely that medical testimony will be dispositive of the issues sub judice. Additionally, the testimony of the children, their parents and their extended family must be judged against the background of the marital dispute between their parents.
Without a concession as to the admissibility of the polygraph evidence, the parties agreed that the following submitted facts would be proved if a "Daniels hearing" had been held. (See People v. Daniels, 102 Misc.2d 540, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832). The respondent and two others who were accused by the children of participating in their abuse were administered polygraph examinations by competent and experienced examiners using proper equipment and procedures. All three will testify prior to the polygraph evidence being offered.
It was agreed that there has been no significant change in polygraph technology since the leading polygraph decisions in this state. (See People v. Stuewe, 103 A.D.2d 1042, 478 N.Y.S.2d 434, lv. den. 63 N.Y.2d 680, 468 N.Y.S.2d 1054; People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188; People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 255 N.E.2d 696.) The polygraphers would offer testimony that the tests as administered by them have a 90% probability of accuracy. Richard Issac, a Professor of Mathematics at the City University of New York, who specializes in statistics, would offer testimony that, presuming a 90% accuracy of each test, the probability of all three tests being inaccurate is one in 1,000 and, presuming an 80% accuracy, the probability of inaccuracy is eight in 1,000.
In 21 states polygraph evidence is not admissible in any circumstance. In 22 states polygraph examinations are admissible only on stipulation. Four states, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan and New Mexico generally admit polygraph evidence; and one state, Idaho, admits polygraph evidence only in child protective proceedings. (See Matter of X., 110 Idaho 44, 714 P.2d 13 [Sup.Ct., Idaho] ).
In New York, polygraph evidence has generally been excluded. (People v. Leone, supra; People v. Tarsia, supra; People v. Stuewe, supra. ) However, the exclusion has not been absolute. Our appellate courts have endorsed the use of polygraph evidence in administrative hearings before them for review. (May v. Shaw, 79 A.D.2d 970, 434 N.Y.S.2d 284; Matter of McGinigle v. Town of Greenburgh, 59 A.D.2d 908, 399 N.Y.S.2d 250; rev'd, 48 N.Y.2d 951, 425 N.Y.S.2d 61, 401 N.E.2d 184.) Additionally, several trial courts have admitted polygraph evidence on stipulation or under special circumstances. (Matter of Stenzel, 71 Misc.2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839; People v. Daniels, supra, Zinn v. Bernice Construction,
Inc., 99 Misc.2d 510, 416 N.Y.S.2d 752; Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc.2d 316, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386.)
The exclusory rule in this state evolved in criminal cases. Those cases differ from child protective proceedings in two significant ways. The first is that a case against a criminal defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence stringently tested by a strict application of the rules of evidence. The case against a respondent in a child protective proceeding need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence presented (Family Court Act § 1046(b)(i)), and the traditional rules of evidence are significantly relaxed. (See Family Court Act § 1046.)
Indeed, in many child protective proceedings, including this one, the most damaging evidence a respondent must face is hearsay or unsworn testimony of the subject child admitted under Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi). Although the child's testimony must be corroborated by other evidence (Family Court Act § 1046(a)(vi)), the quantum of corroboration is relatively low and substantially lower than required in the criminal courts. (See Family Court Act §§ 1012(e)(iii), 1046(a)(vi), and compare Cindy J.J., 105 A.D.2d 189, 404 N.Y.S.2d 249, Matter of Michael G., 129 Misc.2d 186, 492 N.Y.S.2d 993; Matter of Janet C., 130 Misc.2d 1043, 498 N.Y.S.2d 960; with People v. Watson, 45 N.Y.2d 867, 410 N.Y.S.2d 1352, 382 N.E.2d 1352, People v. Ahlers, 98 A.D.2d 821, 470 N.Y.S.2d 483.)
The second difference is that the criminal cases are jury trials while child protective proceedings are tried without a jury. The Court of Appeals in Leone, supra, the leading case on polygraph evidence, in excluding the evidence, emphasized the danger that evidence of a polygraph test, commonly known as a "lie detector," will be given undue weight by a jury. There is considerably less danger of undue weight during a bench trial.
The mere fact that a case is tried without a jury is not a basis for the admission of evidence, such as hearsay, which is otherwise inadmissible. (Matter of Leon R.R., 48 N.Y.2d 117, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863, 397 N.E.2d 374; Dann v. Sands, 38 A.D.2d 661, 327 N.Y.S.2d 222, appeal dismissed on other grounds, 30 N.Y.2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 696, 287 N.E.2d 387.) Polygraph expert testimony, in contrast to hearsay, is not inadmissible per se. The admissibility of expert testimony, without a specific proscription by statute or appellate ruling, is left to the discretion of the trial court. (DeLong v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 307, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 457 N.E.2d 717, Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 45 N.Y.2d 97, 408 N.Y.S.2d 10, 379 N.E.2d 1140.)
A careful reading of the applicable statutes and case law discloses no prohibition to the admission of polygraph evidence in a child protective proceeding. We note that the Leone court, supra, specifically applied its ruling to "criminal law." Furthermore, the Appellate Division, Second Department in Matter of Eric G., 99 A.D.2d 835, 472 N.Y.S.2d 434, appears to have intentionally left the door open to the admission of polygraph evidence in an appropriate case.
After reading the considerable factual material submitted pursuant to stipulation, including the affidavits of the two polygraphers and Professor Issac and the article, Validity and Reliability of Detection of Deceptors by Drs. Raskin, Barland and Podlesny (6 Polygraph 1, pp. 1-40), and the discussion of the science of polygraphy in People v. Daniels, supra, and People v. Vinson, 104 Misc.2d 664, 428 N.Y.S.2d 832, I find that under the circumstances of this case, the polygraph experts will be able to testify with a considerable degree of accuracy as to the results of the polygraph examinations.
The statistical analysis is of limited value. It is entirely possible, under the particular facts of this case, that the two non-party polygraph exam takers may be telling While not dispositional of the issues of the proceeding, the polygraph evidence being...
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... ... If a preponderance, then, is sufficient in at least some criminal cases and in Article 10 cases, is it necessary--or, as Petitioner claims, is "some" evidence of general acceptance and/or reliability of scientific evidence enough? ... In Matter of Meyer, 132 Misc.2d 415, 504 N.Y.S.2d 358, a child abuse proceeding under Article 10 of the Family Court Act, the respondent was permitted to introduce results of a polygraph test which purportedly supported his claim of innocence. The Court acknowledged that polygraph evidence was generally deemed ... ...
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