Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co., Inc., 78-2903-L-1

• Decision Date: 27 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 78-2903-L-1,78-2903-L-1
• Citation: 652 P.2d 852,60 Or.App. 70
• Parties: John MEYER, Appellant, v. 4-D INSULATION COMPANY, INC., an Oregon corporation, dba Quality Insulation Co., Respondent. ; CA A21804.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 852

652 P.2d 852

60 Or.App. 70

John MEYER, Appellant, v. 4-D INSULATION COMPANY, INC., an Oregon corporation, dba Quality Insulation Co., Respondent.

No. 78-2903-L-1; CA A21804.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Submitted on Record and Briefs

April 9, 1982.

Decided Oct. 27, 1982.

Frank R. Alley, III, and Heffernan, Fowler, Alley & McNair, Medford, filed the briefs for appellant.

Gregory A. Parker, Ashland, filed the brief for respondent.

Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN and ROSSMAN, JJ.

WARREN, Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action in circuit court for damages to real property caused by a fire allegedly resulting from defendant's negligence in installing insulation in direct contact with the fluepipe of a woodstove in plaintiff's residence. The trial court dismissed the action. On appeal, plaintiff assigns error to the trial court's (1) striking plaintiff's allegation of mental distress from the third amended complaint and (2) dismissing the fourth amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In his third amended complaint, ¹ plaintiff sought to recover $1,200 for smoke, heat and water damage to his house and furnishings arising out of defendant's alleged negligence and $5,000 for "inconvenience, annoyance and discomfort," which plaintiff characterizes as damages for mental distress. On defendant's motion, the trial court struck the latter allegation. Plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint seeking only the $1200 for property damage. On defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the action on the ground that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction when the amount claimed is less than $3,000.

The first assignment presents the narrow issue whether pleaded damages for mental distress are recoverable in an action alleging only damage to property caused by negligence. This question is one of first impression in this state, although it has arisen elsewhere. See, e.g., Kuhr Bros. Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga.App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954) (mental pain and suffering not recoverable damages in action for faulty installation of furnace causing home fire, where the injury complained of was not a personal tort but an injury to property, without a showing of malicious, wilful or wanton conduct); Sahuc v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 320 F.2d 18, 21 (5th Cir. 1963) (Louisiana case law permits recovery of mental anguish damages in negligence cases involving fright or nervous shock from being present in or near an accident, but owner of house damaged by fire proved no fright).

In actions specifically brought for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "extreme and outrageous" conduct is required. Mooney v. Johnson Cattle, 291 Or. 709, 726, 634 P.2d 1333 (1981); Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969). In It is true that in some of those cases the rule applied is that the mental distress must be the "direct, natural and proximate result" of the wrongful act, Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., supra, 166 Or. at 506, 113 P.2d 438, or the "common and predictable" result of the defendant's conduct, Mooney v. Johnson Cattle, supra, 291 Or. at 718, 634 P.2d 1333. Sole reliance on that rule begs the question regarding the actions in which such damages have been recognized and allowed by Oregon courts. Such damages have been allowed on an ad hoc basis, but not on the basis of the "common and predictable result" rule advanced by plaintiff.

                other actions, the general rule where damages for mental distress alone are sought is that some physical injury is required.  See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 at 327 (October 5, 1982);  Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District, 280 Or. 307, 309, 570 P.2d 1169 (1977).  The rule for which plaintiff contends is that damages for mental distress are recoverable for negligent damage to any property as long as (1) there is an independent basis of liability and (2) the damages are the "common and predictable" result of the type of conduct involved.  A correct statement of the first part of that proposition, as demonstrated by the case law, is that recovery of damages for mental distress absent physical injury is allowed where there is an independent basis of liability in certain cases.   The cases have made reference not only to the quality of the tortfeasor's conduct, 2 as in certain intentional [60 Or.App. 74] torts, but also to the kind of interest invaded, as in private nuisance and invasion of privacy.  The cases can be grouped into four main categories, although they cannot be said to form a definite pattern:  (1) certain intentional torts, including trespass to land, Douglas v. Humble Oil, 251 Or. 310, 445 P.2d 590 (1968);  Senn v. Bunick, 40 Or.App. 33, 594 P.2d 837, rev. den. 287 Or. 149 (1979);  but see Melton v. Allen, 282 Or. 731, 580 P.2d 1019 (1978) (emotional distress damages disallowed in trespass to automobile);  intentional interference with contractual relations, Mooney v. Johnson Cattle, supra;  conversion, Fredeen v. Stride, 269 Or. 369, 525 P.2d 166 (1974) and Douglas v. Humble Oil, supra;  racial discrimination, William v. Joyce, 4 Or.App. 482, 504, 479 P.2d 513 (1971);  (2) private nuisance, Macca v. Gen. Telephone Co. of N.W., 262 Or. 414, 495 P.2d 1193 (1972);  and Edwards v. Talent Irrigation District, supra;  (3) invasion of privacy, Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941);  Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967);  and (4) miscellaneous cases:  unlawful disinterment of spouse's remains, Hovis v. City of Burns, 243 Or. 607, 415 P.2d 29 (1966);  infringement of right to child custody resulting from attorney's failure to deliver client's passport into "escrow" to prevent client from taking child out of the country, McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 788-89, 562 P.2d 540 (1977)
                

It is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which damage to any property does not directly, naturally and predictably result in some emotional upset. Unless some other line is drawn, as we believe there must be as a policy matter, neither the quality of a defendant's conduct nor the predictability of distress as a result of property damage alone or together form a basis for an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress. Rather, it is the kind of interest invaded that, as a policy matter, is believed to be of sufficient importance to merit protection from emotional impact, that is critical. Regardless of the language used to describe when such damages are recoverable, the Oregon cases allowing such damages all involve an interference with Plaintiff contends (and the dissent argues) that this case is governed by Macca and Edwards. Those cases do not support recovery of damages for mental distress in this case. In Macca, the plaintiff was subjected to repeated telephone calls occasioned by a telephone company's negligent listing of her telephone number under the name of a florist shop. The court characterized the invasion as a private nuisance:

the person beyond the inconvenience and distress always resulting from interference with property.

"We conclude that the erroneous listing of plaintiff's telephone number and the numerous telephone calls to plaintiff resulted in an invasion of plaintiff's right to enjoy her property without unreasonable interference. As such it is governed by the law relating to a private nuisance, and plaintiff is entitled to recover for mental distress resulting from defendant's negligent act." 262 Or. at 418, 495 P.2d 1193.

This language relates the right to mental distress damages to the fact that the action was for a private nuisance. The court explained that nuisance may arise from intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct on the defendant's part, or from operation of an abnormally dangerous activity. 262 Or. at 419, 495 P.2d 1193. Thus, the right to damages for mental distress was predicated on the kind of interest invaded, rather than on a particular level of culpability. The court elaborated on the kinds of invasions that may be included in a private nuisance action:

" * * * The gist of the action is the invasion of the individual's interest in the use and enjoyment of land. Raymond v. Southern Pacific Co., [259 Or 629, 634, 488 P2d 460 (1971) ]. It includes the disturbance of the comfort or convenience of the occupant of the land. Prosser, [Torts] 592, § 89 [ (4th ed 1971) ]; York et ux v. Stallings et al, 217 Or 13, 21, 341 P2d 529 (1959). Dean Prosser gives as examples of the latter unpleasant odors, smoke or dust, loud noises, and repeated telephone calls."

Macca thus turned on the fact that the invasion was an ongoing interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs' residence. In contrast, plaintiff here alleges no such ongoing interference, but merely property damage to a house. That, without more, is not the kind of interference with use and enjoyment of property that constitutes a nuisance.

A footnote in Macca appears to explain the rule in broader terms:

"Allowing recovery for mental suffering and anguish unaccompanied by physical injuries under the circumstances of the present case is in accord with previous decisions of this court. Where an independent basis of liability exists, irrespective of whether there existed physical injuries, recovery has been uniformly allowed for mental suffering and anguish. Douglas v. Humble Oil, 251 Or 310, 445 P2d 590 (1968) (conversion); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Or 398, 430 P2d 990, 33 ALR3d 149 (1967) and Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or 482, 113 P2d 438, 133 ALR 1 (1941) (invasion of privacy); Williams v. Joyce, 91 Adv Sh 1481, 4 Or App 482, 479 P2d 513 (1971) (racial discrimination); Hovis v. City of Burns, 243 Or 607, 415 P2d 29 (1966) (wrongful disinterment of remains of plaintiff's husband); Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or 54, 485 P2d 28 (1971) ('outrageous' conduct by physician in treating a patient, citing 1 Restatement of Torts 2d, § 46, comment j.) For a general discussion...