Meyer v. California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., 79-4536
| Decision Date | 30 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-4536,79-4536 |
| Citation | 662 F.2d 637 |
| Parties | 27 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1175, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,285 Louise T. MEYER and David C. Meyer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CALIFORNIA AND HAWAIIAN SUGAR COMPANY, Robert O. Nagle, Donald W. Hare, Donald T. Hanson and Donald Martin, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Robin B. Johansen, Rosen & Remcho, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Donald Connors, Jr., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
Before MARKEY, * Chief Judge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and HUG and POOLE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Louise and David Meyer appeal the summary judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in favor of defendant C&H Sugar Co. For reasons stated below, we affirm that judgment.
As of November 1977, Louise Meyer, a 57 year old woman, held the position of Administrative Assistant in the Personnel Department of California and Hawaiian Sugar Company ("C&H"). Meyer had worked for C&H for over 18 years. At the time of her discharge, she had significant responsibility for the administration of C&H's affirmative action program. During the summer of 1977, C&H had begun formulating a plan for posting job openings in its San Francisco office to improve promotion opportunities for all employees, including minorities. Meyer's supervisor, defendant Donald Hanson, asked for her thoughts on this matter.
About November 8, 1977, Meyer began to prepare a memorandum on this subject. After preparing and discarding several drafts, she placed a final version on Hanson's desk. She claims that the only copy of the final version was destroyed approximately one week later, and that Hanson did not criticize any of its contents when he read it on or about November 9.
The first version of the memorandum which she had discarded provided in part:
I worry quite a bit about some of our minorities specifia the Philippines and lord knows these the Pakistanis and Indi better to remain inexplicit about which ones but those who come from a poor very corrupt states countries. You'll probably aware that a college xxxxx xxxxx diploma is 'proof' to Immigration authorities that these people can earn a xxxx living here and, in fact, insures the treasured 'green card'. I would suspect that some of these can be bought and, in any event what is a B.S. in animal husbandry from upper Mongolia Tasmania worth xx on the job. I worry because it's happened that we are opening the door for to demands that these college degrees make it proper all sorts of professional jobs be given to these employees, some of whom are been e weak and had to be carried whi as less than marginal employees they while they picked up rudiments of business language and customs. This could be hard on our nonminority employees who also have been waiting in line for promotion and whose interests we should xxx respect too. 1
Erlinda Felina, a minority employee, found two draft memoranda (the second is virtually identical to the first), either in Meyer's wastebasket or in the women's washroom. After discussing the contents of the memorandum, Felina and other minority employees called on defendant Nagle, President of C&H, to express their displeasure and concern. A series of top level C&H management meetings ensued.
After discussions with defendants Hare, Cavallina, and other members of C&H management, Nagle called Meyer to his office on November 15, 1977. She confirmed that she had written the memorandum and, according to Nagle's understanding, that the attitudes expressed were hers. Nagle then asked for her resignation.
Although Meyer complied readily with Nagle's request, she later felt dissatisfied with the treatment C&H had accorded her. She and her husband then brought this action charging age and sex discrimination, violation of the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, retaliation, violation of Section 1985, invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, wrongful discharge, intentional interference with advantageous relations, and loss of consortium. After completion of discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for C&H on all claims.
To overcome defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs must offer facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The burden of establishing a prima facie case is not onerous, Burdine, supra, at 1094; and the elements essential to it should not be reduced to rigidly applied formulae. McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, n.13, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 n.13. The plaintiff is required only to eliminate the most common reasons for her rejection, or, as in this case, discharge. Burdine, supra.
It was undisputed that Meyer was in a class protected against employment discrimination, and that she was discharged despite the fact that she had performed her tasks in a manner satisfactory to C&H for more than 18 years prior to the incident that precipitated her discharge. Moreover, it does not appear that Meyer was discharged because C&H contemplated eliminating her duties from its payroll. We hold that, having established these facts, Meyer had satisfied her initial burden and raised a rebuttable presumption that C&H unlawfully discriminated against her.
It was therefore incumbent upon C&H to rebut that presumption by producing evidence that Meyer was discharged for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. On this record, such a reason is immediately apparent: C&H obviously concluded that Meyer's conduct had rendered useless her further services as an assistant in C&H's Personnel Department. In fact, C&H was genuinely concerned that Meyer's memos would expose it to action by the EEOC unless it took action appropriate to indicate that...
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