Meyer v. Cohen
| Decision Date | 18 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-91-2572,1-91-2572 |
| Citation | 197 Ill.Dec. 953,260 Ill.App.3d 351,632 N.E.2d 22 |
| Parties | , 197 Ill.Dec. 953 Terri MEYER, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellee, v. Susan COHEN, d/b/a 1415 North Astor Street Building, Defendant/Counterplaintiff/Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James J. Graney, Aurora, for appellant.
Katz, Randall & Weinberg, Chicago (Pamela J. Leichtling, of counsel), for appellee.
Defendant-counterplaintiff Susan Cohen owns and operates an apartment complex, located at 1415 North Astor Street in Chicago, which contains eight units. When plaintiff-counterdefendant Terri Meyer leased one of the units on July 15, 1989, Cohen was also residing in one of the apartments, Cohen's son Curtiss was living in a third unit, another tenant was leasing a fourth apartment, and a fifth unit was rendered temporarily uninhabitable due to fire damage; the three remaining units were vacant at that time.
The lease between Meyer and Cohen was for a one-year period beginning August 1, 1989; the rent was to be $2,415 per month, and required a security deposit in the amount of $4,800 which Meyer complied with. Furthermore, paragraph 3 of the lease provided that the lessee was required to leave the premises in substantially the same condition as that in which she found it.
On March 14, 1990, four and one-half months before the lease was to expire, Meyer hand-delivered a letter to Cohen in which she informed her that she had accepted employment in another State and that she would therefore "be vacating" her apartment on March 16. The letter also stated that she had enlisted a real estate broker in a "ferven[t]" attempt to find a new tenant. Cohen stated that Meyer reassured her on March 16 that she had in fact retained the services of a broker, and therefore, Cohen should "[not] worry, the apartment will be rented."
On March 21, Cohen received a letter from Meyer's attorney, Bernard Katz, dated March 14, which informed her that Meyer was terminating the lease effective March 16, for the reason that Cohen had violated section 5-12-170 of the City of Chicago Residential and Landlord Tenant Ordinance (Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. (1990), sec. 5-12-170) (ordinance) by not attaching a summary of the ordinance to the lease; the letter also demanded that Cohen return her security deposit. Cohen thereafter received an identical letter from Katz, the only difference being that the subsequent letter stated that the lease would be terminated as of March 23 instead of March 16. Cohen responded to the second letter, asking for a clarification from Katz and also informing him that the lease was still in effect, that there remained an outstanding rent balance, and that she had not yet received the keys to Meyer's apartment as required by the lease.
In response to her letter, Cohen received on April 2 a third letter from Katz, dated March 28, which reiterated Meyer's intent to terminate the lease. The correspondence stated that "in the event that there is any confusion with regard to the effective date of the termination of the Lease, the Lease is terminated as of March 31, 1990." Although the letter also stated that the keys to Meyer's apartment were enclosed, they were not included; Cohen did not receive them until April 6, in a subsequent letter dated April 4.
On May 1, Cohen sent a letter to Katz which listed generally the property damage to the unit occupied by Meyer, the cost of which she intended to deduct from Meyer's security deposit; she also indicated in her letter that she felt the lease was still in effect until the expiration date of July 31, 1990. The itemized list of damages, also required by section 5-12-080(d) of the ordinance, however, was not sent to Katz until May 4. The May 4 correspondence stated that the total amount of property damage to the unit was $6,390, and it also informed Katz that Meyer would be held responsible for the rent for the months of April and May.
Meyer responded by filing a complaint in circuit court on May 16, 1990, which prayed for damages twice her $4,800 security deposit, plus interest, and attorney fees for Cohen's failure to return her security deposit within 45 days after Meyer vacated the premises as required by section 5-2-080(d) of the ordinance. (Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. (1990), sec. 5-2-080(d).) Cohen denied the allegations of the complaint in her answer and counterclaimed for $6,390, plus attorney fees and costs, for the property damage allegedly caused to the apartment by Meyer.
On November, 20, 1990, Judge Carlson D. Klitz granted Meyer's motion for summary judgment on both her original complaint and the counterclaim, entered judgment in her favor in the amount of $9,600 plus 5% interest, and awarded her $6,484.40 in attorney fees. However, after considering Cohen's motion to reconsider, Judge Klitz vacated the summary judgment on her counterclaim and set that cause for trial. After a bench trial on the counterclaim, Judge Thomas Brownfield entered judgment in favor of Cohen in the amount of $2,500; he refused, however, to award attorney fees to Cohen, having found that she was not entitled to such relief under the ordinance.
Cohen thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging Judge Klitz's grant of summary judgment on Meyer's complaint, his award of attorney fees to Meyer, and Judge Brownfield's refusal to grant her attorney fees after finding in her favor on the counterclaim.
Cohen first asserts that Judge Klitz improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Meyer for the reason that the ordinance does not apply to the lease between the parties inasmuch as her apartment complex was an "owner-occupied building containing six units or less." (Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. (1990), sec. 5-12-020(a).) Therefore, she contends, Meyer was not entitled to terminate the lease as a result of Cohen's failure to comply with section 5-12-170 of the ordinance which mandates that landlords attach a copy of the ordinance to a tenant's lease. 1
Section 5-12-020 provides in pertinent part that:
The ordinance further defines the term "dwelling unit" as:
"[A] structure or the part of a structure that is used as a home, residence or sleeping place by one or more persons who maintain a household together with the common areas, land and appurtenant buildings thereto, and all housing services, privileges, furnishings and facilities supplied in connection with the use or occupancy thereof, including garage and parking facilities." Municipal Ordinance of Chicago, Ill. (1990), sec. 5-12-30(a).
Cohen argues that in order to qualify as a "dwelling unit" for purposes of the ordinance, a unit must be occupied at the time that the lease is signed for the reason that the phrase "is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place" means that the city council intended that a unit must actually, and not possibly, be occupied at the time the rental agreement is signed. Consequently, she maintains, the provisions of the ordinance do not apply to her because only four of the seven available units were inhabited at the time Meyer's lease was signed. Meyer responds that a "dwelling unit" simply means the number of units available for rent in a particular building and that Cohen's proposed construction of that term is absurd.
Our supreme court has commanded that "when interpreting a statute, the primary rule, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature." (Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar (1990), 138 Ill.2d 178, 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 291, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661.) Our inquiry begins with the language of the statute, but it also entails consideration of "the reason and the necessity of the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objects and purposes to be obtained." (People v. Garrett (1990), 136 Ill.2d 318, 329, 144 Ill.Dec. 234, 239, 555 N.E.2d 353, 358.) The intent of the legislature is best evidenced by the language of the statute, and where the enactment is clear and unambiguous, we are not at liberty to depart from its plain meaning. (Kraft, 138 Ill.2d at 189, 149 Ill.Dec. at 291, 561 N.E.2d at 661.) However, statutes are also to be construed in a manner which avoids absurd or unjust results (Croissant v. Joliet Park District (1990), 141 Ill.2d 449, 455, 152 Ill.Dec. 561, 564, 566 N.E.2d 248, 251); and our supreme court has stated in that regard:
We cannot accept Cohen's construction of the term "dwelling unit" for several reasons. First, her "actual occupancy" interpretation clearly contradicts one of the city council's express purposes for enacting the ordinance: "to establish the rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant in the rental of dwelling units." (Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. (1990), sec. 5-12-010 (emphasis added).) Were we to adopt Cohen's construction of the ordinance, landlords would be unsure whether they are subject to the...
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