Meyer v. DynCorp Int'l
| Decision Date | 14 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: GJH-19-3412 |
| Parties | ANTHONY MEYER, Plaintiff, v. DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL, LLC Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Anthony Meyer brings this action against DynCorp International, LLC ("DynCorp" or "Defendant") alleging three violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq., as amended ("ADA"). Specifically, he alleges he was terminated on the basis of his disability ("Count I"), denied a reasonable accommodation ("Count II"), and that he was retaliated against for engaging in a protected activity ("Count III"). Now pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply, ECF No. 18. No hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied, and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Surreply is denied.
Plaintiff began working for Defendant on December 30, 2001. ECF No. 1 ¶ 18.2 He was initially assigned to work at the United States Naval Test Pilot School hangar, located at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, as an aircraft mechanic, id., ¶ 20, but after serving in the Air Force from 2006 to 2009, he was reassigned to avionics, and thereafter "adjusted, repaired and replaced the electrical systems on various aircraft," id., ¶¶ 21-22. In 2011, his work became focused on avionics for the TH-57C Sea Ranger ("TH-57C") helicopter, primarily the radio communications, navigation, and GPS systems. Id., ¶¶ 23-24. Plaintiff alleges he was well-regarded in his job, that throughout his nearly fifteen-year tenure with Defendant, he never received a negative performance review, and that he planned to work for Defendant until he retired. Id., ¶¶ 27-31.
On July 7, 2015, after experiencing severe head and neck pain, Plaintiff was rushed to the emergency room. Id., ¶ 32. His physician determined Plaintiff would need to take time off from work. Id., ¶ 33. Plaintiff informed Defendant, who said he was approved for twenty-six weeks of leave. Id. However, Amy DuLaney, Human Resources/Benefits Administrator for Defendant, sent Plaintiff a letter dated July 16, 2015 informing him that he would be required to "provide a full duty release certification" upon his return. Id., ¶ 34. On July 30, 2015, Plaintiff was formally diagnosed with cervical spine disease and osteophyte complex from the C3-C4 and C6-C7 vertebrae. Id., ¶ 35. On August 6, 2015, Plaintiff provided Defendant with a completed document entitled "Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health Condition (Family and Medical Leave Act)" detailing his medical restrictions, including climbing, crawling,bending, kneeling, lifting more than five pounds, reaching overhead, flexing or extending the neck, sitting or standing more than thirty minutes. Id., ¶¶ 38-39.
During his twenty-six-week medical leave, Plaintiff underwent various medical procedures and assessments, including CT scans, to diagnose his condition properly and determine the best method of treatment. Id., ¶ 42. Ultimately, Plaintiff's medical providers concluded that Plaintiff's condition could be treated with regular epidural injections in his neck, approximately twice a year. Id.
On December 2, 2015, Ms. DuLaney informed Plaintiff by email that his leave was set to exhaust on January 11, 2016. Id., ¶ 44. Plaintiff completed a medical evaluation on January 6, 2016, id., ¶ 45, and on January 8, 2016, he reported to Defendant's Human Resources Office to request a reasonable accommodation for his return to work, id., ¶ 63. He provided Mr. Ethrage Haggard, the Human Resources Director, a medical note dated January 7, 2016 stating that he could return to work but could not lift anything greater than or equal to twenty pounds and could not perform "overhead work at this time." Id., ¶ 46, 63. Plaintiff's medical providers had informed him that these restrictions were in place because he had recently received an epidural injection and that he would be able to work without restrictions in a month. Id., ¶ 47. Mr. Haggard told Plaintiff that Terry Swift, the group manager, was the only person who could authorize the issuance of a reasonable accommodation, but she was unavailable, and he should return on January 11 to meet with her. Id., ¶¶ 64-66. After meeting with Mr. Haggard, Plaintiff showed the medical note to Ray Taylor, production manager, and Dan Reyes, day shift supervisor, both of whom told him they did not see a problem with his work restrictions and reasonable accommodation request and looked forward to his return. Id., ¶¶ 67-68. In his position, Plaintiff was "rarely" required to perform overhead work or lift tools and equipmentgreater than or equal to twenty pounds. Id., ¶¶ 51-52. He could perform "nearly all his duties on the TH-57C by standing or sitting without raising his arms." Id., ¶ 57.
Plaintiff alleges that he returned on January 11 to meet with Mr. Swift and Ms. DuLaney, and he explained his request for a reasonable accommodation, including that it was temporary in nature and that he anticipated returning to work in a full duty status in one month. Id., ¶¶ 70-71. Mr. Swift and Ms. DuLaney stated that they would not provide Plaintiff any accommodations and that, because Plaintiff did not provide a full duty release as requested on July 16, 2015, Defendant was terminating his employment. Id., ¶ 72. Defendant's "Exit Interview Form," signed on January 21, 2016 and effective January 8, 2016, lists the reason for Plaintiff's termination as "[e]xhausting 26 weeks of LOA" Id., ¶ 76.
On or around February 2, 2016, Plaintiff's physician provided him with a medical note indicating that he could work four hours a day for two weeks "then if no exacerbations of pain with daily duties, he can then resume full time status." Id., ¶ 83. Plaintiff provided the note to Defendant, but Defendant would not reverse Plaintiff's termination. Id., ¶ 84. On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff's physicians cleared him to return to the workplace in a full-duty status. Id., ¶ 85.
On September 15, 2016, Mr. Meyer filed a complaint of discrimination with the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP"). Id., ¶ 12. OFCCP issued a Notice of Results of Investigation on December 26, 2018, finding "DynCorp discriminated against [Mr. Meyer] when it failed to engage in the interactive process in response to [Mr. Meyer]'s request for accommodation and subsequently terminated [Mr. Meyer]." Id., ¶ 14. After Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to resolve Plaintiff's OFCCP Complaint through conciliation, OFCCP issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right-to-Sue dated September 3, 2019. Id., ¶ 16. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant on November 26, 2019, allegingviolations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. ("the ADA"), including: (1) termination of employment on the basis of disability and perceived disability; (2) denial of reasonable accommodation; and (3) retaliation. Id., ¶¶ 86-125. Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint on February 7, 2020, arguing Plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to show he was a "qualified individual" or to show that Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its actions was pretextual. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a surreply, ECF No. 18, which Defendant has opposed, ECF No. 19.
Although not chronological, the first issue to be considered is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Surreply. "As a general rule, this Court will not allow parties to file sur-replies." See Nicholson v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. CIV.A. RDB-13-3711, 2015 WL 1565442, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2015) (citing Local Rule 105.2(a) (D. Md.)); see also Roach v. Navient Sols., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 343, 351 (D. Md. 2015) (). In MTB Services, the court stated that a "party moving for leave to file a surreply must show a need for a surreply." MTB Servs., Inc. v. Tuckman-Barbee Const. Co., No. 1:12-cv-02109-RDB, 2013 WL 1224484, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2013) (internal citation omitted). The court may permit a plaintiff to file a surreply if "a defendant raises new legal issues or new theories in its reply brief," id. , and "when the moving party would be unable to contest matters presented to the court for the first time in the opposing party's reply," Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F.Supp.2d 600, 605 (D. Md. 2003). However, "[a] motion for leave to file a surreply may be denied when the matter addressed in the reply is not new." Marshall v. Capital View Mut. Homes, No. RWT-12-3109, 2013 WL 3353752, at *3 (D. Md. July 2, 2013) (citation omitted).
Defendant's Reply did not assert new facts or allegations. See ECF No. 17. Plaintiff argues leave to file a surreply is nevertheless warranted because Defendant's Reply asserted two new legal arguments: "(1) the ADA does not require an employer, under any circumstances, to provide more than twenty-six (26) weeks of leave under the ADA and; (2) every task arguably related to the repairing [of] a helicopter is essential, without regard to the frequency or nature of the task." ECF No. 18 at 2. However, neither of these arguments is truly new or raised for the first time in the Reply. Instead, they represent extensions of prior arguments regarding (1) whether an additional month of medical leave constitutes a reasonable accommodation and (2) whether overhead work and heavy lifting are essential or marginal functions of an avionics mechanic position. Parties may not use surreplies to have the last word on legal questions disputed across the earlier briefs. Nor may they use any novel spin on a prior argument to justify continued rounds of briefing. See Dones v. Brenn...
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