Roach v. Navient Solutions, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 December 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. JKB-15-1974
• Citation: 165 F.Supp.3d 343
• Parties: Sierra Roach, Plaintiff v. Navient Solutions, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

165 F.Supp.3d 343

Sierra Roach, Plaintiff

v.Navient Solutions, Inc., Defendant.

CIVIL NO. JKB-15-1974

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed December 10, 2015

Sierra Roach, Owings Mills, MD, pro se.

Timothy J. McEvoy, Cameron McEvoy PLLC, Fairfax, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

James K. Bredar

, United States District Judge

Sierra Roach (“Plaintiff”) brought this pro se action against Navient Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”), formerly known as Sallie Mae, Inc. (“SMI”) (“Defendant”), seeking damages under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 227

, and under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. Now pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action. (ECF No. 7.)¹ The issues have been briefed (ECF Nos. 8, 13 & 16), and no hearing is required, Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons explained below, Defendant's Motion to Compel will be GRANTED.

I. Background and Procedural Posture

Defendant, a student-loan servicer, avers that it has a contractual relationship with Plaintiff with respect to five private student loans, the funds of which were disbursed to Bowie State University on Plaintiff's behalf between September 2007 and September 2010. (ECF No. 8–1 at 2.) The original principal balances of these loans totaled $68,894. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) It appears that the loans became delinquent in or around December 2013. (ECF No. 16–2 at 43.)

Each loan is associated with a promissory note² containing, inter alia , an arbitration agreement providing that “either party may elect to arbitrate—and require the other party to arbitrate—any Claim under the [agreement's] terms and conditions.” (ECF No. 8–1 at 9, 16, 25, 34, 45.) Among those parties authorized to compel arbitration are the lender and any subsequent holder of the note; SMI and its parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates; and any predecessors, successors, and assigns of these entities. (Id. ) The arbitration agreements are broadly written: each agreement spans “any legal claim, dispute or controversy...that arises from or relates in any way to [the] Note,” including, without limitation, “disputes concerning the validity, enforceability, arbitrability or scope of [the] Arbitration Agreement or [the] Note” and disputes involving alleged violations of “statute, regulation or common law.” (Id. at 10, 17, 26, 35, 46.) The agreements state that they are made pursuant to transactions involving interstate commerce and governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA” or “the Act”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.

(Id. )

On June 16, 2014, Plaintiff allegedly contacted Defendant to “dispute the payment claims associated with [her] alleged debt.” (ECF No. 1–4 at 2.) Plaintiff stated that she had “not certified nor authenticated signature [sic ] or been a willing participant to any endorsements”; that she was “not the party listed [on the] account[s]”; and that her “personal information has been unlawfully used.” (Id. ) Plaintiff revoked any prior consent to call her cell phone through an automated dialing system or prerecorded dialer, and she demanded that Defendant complete a lengthy “Notice of Interrogatives [sic ]” concerning the status of her alleged debt. (Id. at 2-3; ECF No. 1–2.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that Defendant continued to call her cellular phone via an automated system, ostensibly for debt-collection purposes. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.)³

Plaintiff further alleges that her credit reports with the three major reporting bureaus—Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion—contained inaccurate information relating to the student loans serviced by Defendant. (Id. at 5.) She apparently initiated a formal dispute pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i

; thereafter, she claims that Defendant “deleted all for [sic ] trade lines with Transunion [sic ] and Experian, but verified the four tradelines with Equifax.” (Id. )⁴ As a result, Plaintiff perceives that Defendant has injured her by “continuing to... report inaccurate, unverifiable derogatory information to [her] Equifax credit file.” (Id. )

Plaintiff filed the present action on July 6, 2015, seeking damages under the TCPA and the FCRA. (Id. at 8.) Defendant promptly responded with a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Action. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff opposed Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 13), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 16). The Motion is now ripe for decision.

II. Legal Framework

The FAA stipulates that, in any contract involving interstate commerce, a provision through which the parties agree to arbitrate their disputes shall be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2

. The Act provides “two parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referable to arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage in arbitration, § 4.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 22, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), superseded on other grounds as stated in

Bradford

–

Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Comput

er

Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir.1997). The Act “reflects an 'emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”' KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 23, 25, 181 L.Ed.2d 323 (2011) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc. , 473 U.S. 614, 631, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) ). Accordingly, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” Moses H. Cone , 460 U.S. at 24–25, 103 S.Ct. 927, and the Court must not deny a party's request to arbitrate “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute,” Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan , 628 Fed.Appx. 842, 845–46 (4th Cir.2015) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. , 363 U.S. 574, 582–83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ).

Despite this presumption favoring alternative dispute resolution, arbitrability is at bottom a question of contract interpretation: a party cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute if it has not contractually agreed to do so. Thus, “a litigant can compel arbitration under the FAA if he can demonstrate '(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the relationship of the transaction...to interstate or foreign commerce, and (4) the failure... of the [opposing party] to arbitrate the dispute.” Grant – Fletcher v. Collecto, Inc. , Civ. No. RDB–13–3505, 2014 WL 1877410, at *5 (D.Md. May 9, 2014)

(alteration in original) (quoting Whiteside v. Teltech Corp. , 940 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.1991) ). State contract law determines the validity of an arbitration agreement. Hill v. PeopleSoft USA, Inc. , 412 F.3d 540, 543 (4th Cir.2005).⁵ The “party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.” Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph , 531 U.S. 79, 91, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000).⁶

As discussed below, Plaintiff disputes NSI's authority to enforce the arbitration agreements in the promissory notes. She also asserts that she does not recall executing the loan applications or receiving the funds. “When a party moves to compel arbitration and the validity of the purported arbitration agreement between the parties is disputed, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment.” Whitten v. Apria Healthcare Grp., Inc. , Civ. No. PWG–14–cv–3193, 2015 WL 2227928, at *2 (D.Md. May 11, 2015)

; accord

Kennedy v. ADF MidAtlantic, LLC, Civ. No. JKB–15–0346, 2015 WL 6596918, at *1 (D.Md. Oct. 27, 2015) ; Rose v. New Day Fin., LLC , 816 F.Supp.2d 245, 251 (D.Md.2011). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court will grant judgment to a movant who shows that (1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing predecessor to current Rule 56(a) ). No genuine issue of material fact exists if the opposing party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case as to which she would have the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party's] position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)

. The facts themselves, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ; Iko v. Shreve , 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir.2008). Even so, the opponent may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of her pleading but must instead, by affidavit or other evidentiary showing , set out specific facts showing a genuine dispute for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge with such facts as would be admissible in evidence and must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify to the matters stated therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

III. Plaintiff's Opposition Theory

The Court preliminarily notes that three of the four Whiteside

arbitrability requirements are plainly satisfied here: there is a dispute between the parties; the underlying transactions relate to interstate commerce;⁷ and Plaintiff has opposed arbitration. See 940 F.2d at 102. The parties' disagreement hinges on the second Whiteside requirement, i.e. , the existence of a valid written agreement encompassing...