Meyer v. Joint Council 53 Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 107

• Decision Date: 05 January 1965
• Parties: Charles MEYER, Joseph McCullough, Francis McGrath, Walter Wolf, John Lodise, David Kigen, v. JOINT COUNCIL 53 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 107 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 470 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 331 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 312 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, John Backhus, Edward Bettisfore, Raymond Cohen, Peter Schultz, William Gormley, Frank Abrimont, David Fekay. Appeal of LOCAL 107 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA and Edward Battisfore.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 382

206 A.2d 382

416 Pa. 401

Charles MEYER, Joseph McCullough, Francis McGrath, Walter

Wolf, John Lodise, David Kigen, v. JOINT COUNCIL 53 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,

CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 107

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,

Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 470 International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and

Helpers of America, Local 331 International Brotherhood of

Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,

Local 312 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, John

Backhus, Edward Bettisfore, Raymond Cohen, Peter Schultz,

William Gormley, Frank Abrimont, David Fekay.

Appeal of LOCAL 107 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,

CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA

and Edward Battisfore.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 5, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1965.

Richard H. Markowitz, Philadelphia, for appellants in No. 272.

Edward Greer, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Edward Davis, Philadelphia, for appellants in No. 269.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

ROBERTS, Justice.

Plaintiffs, six individuals, filed a complaint in trespass against seven individuals and five unincorporated labor organizations seeking damages for libel. The alleged defamation appeared in a printed tabloid called 'Teamsters Extra' ¹ which was specially issued during a campaign preceding a National Labor Relations board [NLRB] representation election. ²

The complaint alleged that defendants, with willful and malicious intent to injure plaintiffs, published articles, sketches, and pictures in the 'Teamsters Extra' which contained malicious and defamatory material. Among the statements was one which proclaimed that the top officers, members of the executive board, and active leaders of Voice have been individually convicted of one or more of a list of crimes. On the list were such crimes as burglary, manslaughter rape, sodomy, and corrupting the morals of a minor. ³

Defendants filed preliminary objections which challenged jurisdiction. These were dismissed by the court below. On this appeal attacking the lower court's ruling, defendants have raised the question of whether the jurisdiction of our state courts is preempted by provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Certain of the defendants have raised an additional question concerning exhaustion of internal union remedies.

I

We consider, first, the claim of federal preemption. The landmark case involving preemption in the labor field is San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), which held that a state court lacked jurisdiction to award damages for conduct constituting a tortious unfair labor practice under state law. In that case, the tortious activity consisted of peaceful union picketing designed to compel employers to execute a contract which would provide that only union members, or workers who applied for union membership within 30 days, would remain in their employ. ⁴ Recognizing a congressional purpose, as expressed in relevant legislation, to foster the development of a uniform national labor policy through administrative regulation by the NLRB, the Supreme Court of the United States based its holding on the general principle that both state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the Board when the activity involved is arguably subject to Section 7 ⁵ or Section 8 ⁶ of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Supreme Court further noted that previous cases permitting state courts to award damages for tortious activities marked by violence and imminent threats to public order were based on the principle that 'the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.' Id. at 247, 79 S.Ct. at 781. The Court found no such interest to be involved in the Garmon case.

We assume, as defendants contend, that the activities of the defendants in the present case are arguably subject to Section 7 ⁷ or 8 ⁸ of the Act. But even assuming this, we still reach the conclusion that our state courts are not precluded from exercising jurisdiction over libel actions arising from labor activities. ⁹ Following the principles set forth in Garmon, the question we must determine is whether there is a compelling state interest, especially in the maintenance of domestic peace, upon which state jurisdiction over a libel suit can be predicated. ¹⁰ We believe that such an interest does exist.

In determining that there is such an interest which permits the court below to exercise jurisdiction, we find persuasive the language used in Garmon and by the same author in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952). In Garmon the Court explained the important policies which permit state jurisdiction even where the activities involved are arguably subject to NLRB jurisdiction:

'[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy, has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. * * * Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.' Id. at 243, 79 S.Ct. at 779.

Writing for the majority in Beauharnais, Justice Frankfurter (the writer of Garmon) said in reference to an Illinois statute:

'Moreover, the [Illinois] Supreme Court's characterization of the words prohibited by the statute as those 'liable to cause violence and disorder' paraphrases the traditional justification for punishing libels criminally, namely their 'tendency to cause breach of the peace.'' Id. at 254, 72 S.Ct. at 729.

Justice Frankfurter went on to reiterate that:

"There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument."' Id. at 255-57, 72 S.Ct. at 730-31. ¹¹

The clear and historically concerned interest of the state in providing a peaceful forum to which individuals whose reputations have been damaged by false and injurious statements can bring their claims should not be frustrated in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent. ¹² Our review of legislative history reveals no such express intent, nor can we find any such implicit necessity. We should especially protect the significant state interest where the 'slight social value' of the utterances 'as a step to truth' is so clearly outweighed by countervailing, meaningful social interests. ¹³

Nor would the forum provided by the NLRB adequately protect the state interest involved since libelous utterances may frequently be regarded as immaterial or insignificant in relation to the labor issues involved, and, therefore, may not motivate the NLRB to set aside an election. A deepseated state interest should not be withdrawn from state jurisdiction by virtue of such extremely peripheral labor activity. ¹⁴

We have said that the activity involved in this case is peripheral to the labor dispute. In fact, in entertaining suits for libel, our courts deal with an interest completely different from that with which the NLRB deals. The NLRB is not interested in protecting reputation, or in deterring violence. Its concern is with insuring that an employee's right of free choice is not interfered with by coercion, falsehood or emotion. ¹⁵ On the other hand, the state jurisdiction is not directed at regulation of labor relations as such. The state concern is with injury to reputation and the discouragement of violent reprisals. ¹⁶ The fact that a labor dispute is involved in this case is really a fortuitous circumstance. ¹⁷ In our view, these factors are quite significant. ¹⁸

The right of an individual to be protected against injury inflicted by false and damaging statements is so fundamentally within the traditional province of state concern and responsibility that extended emphasis and discussion appear unnecessary. Surely, state administration of justice should not be denied on the basis of an inference or an assumption. Less than convincing congressional direction is insufficient to deprive the state of its important jurisdiction to offer a peaceful forum for redress.

We are unable to find any congressional action or intention, express or implied, which limits the power of the state to make effective its long expressed public policy of according litigants a peaceful forum for protection against libel. Especially is this true where, as here, the allegation is made that the libel was deliberate, malicious and made with actual intent to harm.

It is also intriguing to note the consequences of the rule for which the defendants contend. Since the NLRB can offer no satisfactory redress to...