Meyer v. Tenvoorde Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 12 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 6-88-0404. |
| Parties | Vincent J. MEYER, Plaintiff, v. TENVOORDE MOTOR CO., a Minnesota Corporation, John Tenvoorde and David Tenvoorde, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Terence M. Fruth, Fruth & Anthony, P.A., Minneapolis, Minn., for Meyer.
Michael J. Ford, Quinlivan, Sherwood, Spellacy & Tarvestad, P.A., St. Cloud, Minn., for Tenvoordes.
The court heard oral argument on the defendants' motion for summary judgment on May 26, 1989. Having considered the record and the submissions of counsel, the court grants summary judgment against Meyer's claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants' motion is denied on all other counts.
Vincent Meyer worked for Tenvoorde Motor Company from 1953 until late 1987. He was 58 years old when terminated, and was the dealership's new car sales manager. On December 1, 1987, John Tenvoorde, the general manager, told Meyer that he was being terminated because the company needed "new blood." Tenvoorde did not tell Meyer that he was being terminated for performance reasons. Tenvoorde later indicated that Meyer's performance had been substandard.
Meyer contends that he was replaced in response to pressure from Ford Motor Company to make changes at the dealership. Meyer's replacement, Ronald Henne, was hired in January 1988. He was 41 years old. Ford had recommended Henne to the dealership.
Meyer suffered severe stress-related depression following his termination. He began looking for a new job in July 1988. At that time he was forced to tell two prospective employers that he had been terminated for unsatisfactory performance. He began working as a salesperson at Miller Auto Center in St. Cloud on July 11, 1988.
In seeking summary judgment, the Tenvoordes bear the burden of demonstrating "that the record does not disclose a genuine dispute on a material fact." City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988). If the record bears out the movant's contention, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
The judge's function at the summary judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this determination, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 853 F.2d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
The Tenvoordes contend that Meyer was released for performance problems and point to the improvement in sales since Meyer's departure. They also argue that if Ford pressured the dealership to replace Meyer, Ford's motives for doing so are irrelevant to Meyer's claims against the Tenvoordes.
To resist the motion for summary judgment, Meyer must establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Matson v. Cargill, Inc., 618 F.Supp. 278, 281 (D.Minn. 1985). Meyer contends that John Tenvoorde's statement that the company needed "new blood" is direct evidence of discrimination. He also contends that he can make out a prima facie case under the format established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To do so, he must prove that he was in a protected class, that he met applicable job qualifications, that he was discharged, and that his employer sought a replacement to do the same work. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1165 (8th Cir.1985).
The only element in dispute, for purposes of this motion, is Meyer's job performance. Based on his prior commendations and John Tenvoorde's comments to Meyer when he fired Meyer, this element is at least in dispute. Similarly, there remains a factual dispute over whether the defendants' allegations of poor performance were pretextual.
The defendants also submit that sales, profits, and inventory control have improved since Henne took over. Based on evidence presented by Meyer, these improvements appear to be due to the resolution of problems which were not within Meyer's realm of responsibility. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to Meyer, the improvements provide no basis for evaluating Meyer's performance.
As to the defendant's argument that Ford's motive is irrelevant to the consideration of age discrimination claims against the Tenvoordes, the court is not convinced. Ford's motive is potentially relevant to the key issue of whether age was a determining factor in the decision to release Meyer.
Whether he pursues his claim based on direct evidence or under the outline of McDonnell Douglas, Meyer has demonstrated material factual disputes sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has "not read an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into employment contracts." Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn.1986). The court rejected this theory of recovery on policy grounds, concluding that such a change in employment laws is best left to the legislature. Accordingly, the court holds that Meyer has no claim under Minnesota law for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Meyer claims that the defendants defamed him by communicating to his former clients and others that he had retired, and by compelling him to communicate to prospective employers that he had been terminated for unsatisfactory performance.
To prove defamation, Meyer must show that the statements at issue were false, were communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, and tended to harm his reputation and to lower him in the estimation of the community. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980).
The defendants contend that by telling others that Meyer had retired, they were merely stating an opinion. Gernander v. Winona State Univ., 428 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Minn.Ct.App.1988) (citing Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986)). The statement is quite specific and the fact of Meyer's retirement is readily verifiable. Indeed, it is somewhat insincere for Meyer's former employer to suggest that it had no factual knowledge of his retirement. The court finds that this is a statement of fact, and that its alleged defamatory nature is a disputed fact.
As to Meyer's second claim of defamation, that he was compelled to self-publish the reason for his termination, the defendants contend that this statement was conditionally privileged.
The conditional privilege accorded to former employers communicating with prospective employers applies in compelled self-publication cases. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn.1986). The statement must be made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose. Id. The parties dispute whether the claim of poor performance had any basis in fact. Accepting Meyer's contention that allegations of poor performance were an after-the-fact pretext for his firing, the defendants could not have made the statement in good faith. The court finds, therefore, that the defendants' claim of conditional privilege is a matter in dispute.
Meyer must prove that the conduct at issue was extreme and outrageous, that it was intentional or reckless, that it caused emotional distress, and that the distress was severe. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983). The conduct must be "so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community." Id. at 439 (citation omitted). In addition, the mental distress must be "so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." Id.
Meyer bases this claim on the extraordinary length of his service and devotion to the dealership, on his termination without warning, and on the fact that John Tenvoorde had liquor on his breath when he fired Meyer.
Abrupt discharge without warning does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Corum v. Farm Credit Services, 628 F.Supp. 707, 719 (D.Minn. 1986) (). As in Corum, the manner in which Meyer was fired was distasteful, but he has not put forth facts which place his termination beyond the bounds of decency.
Further, the distress alleged by Meyer is not unlike that suffered by many laid-off employees, and therefore not so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. Eklund, 351 N.W.2d at 379.
Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn.1980).
In Stadler, the plaintiffs were parents who witnessed the defendant's truck strike their child. The parents were never in any physical danger. The issue before the court was whether bystanders who witness negligently-caused injury to another and who suffer emotional distress with physical manifestations may recover, even though they were never within the zone of danger. Id. The court refused to adopt the "relational proximity" doctrine of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 740-41, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 80, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (1968). The court held, instead, that liability for this tort should not be extended beyond the zone of...
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