Meyering v. Miller
| Decision Date | 13 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | 30772 |
| Citation | 51 S.W.2d 65,330 Mo. 885 |
| Parties | Harry J. Meyering, Appellant, v. Victor J. Miller, Mayor of the City of St. Louis; Louis Nolte, Comptroller of the City of St. Louis; William Buechner, Treasurer of the City of St. Louis; Edmund R. Kinsey, President of the Board of Public Service of the City of St. Louis, and the City of St. Louis |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. John T Fitzsimmons, Judge.
Affirmed.
Frank C. O'Malley for appellant.
(1) The purchase of land in a section of the city remote from the existing hospitals and the erection thereon of a new hospital distinct from and unconnected with existing hospitals or institutions by use of the proceeds of the bonds authorized by Proposition Twelve, would constitute a diversion and misappropriation of public funds. Meyers v. Kansas City, 18 S.W.2d 900; State ex rel. v. Kansas City, 259 S.W. 1060; 25 C. J. 227. (2) Proposition Twelve should be strictly construed as to limit the use of the proceeds of the bonds to such purposes as are expressed in the proposition. Meyers v. Kansas City, 18 S.W.2d 900; St. Louis v. Kaime, 180 Mo. 309; Maryville v. Farmers Trust Co., 45 S.W.2d 103. (3) The interpretation of Proposition Twelve so as to permit the city to acquire land and erect a new hospital remote from existing hospitals or institutions would be reading into Proposition Twelve powers not conveyed or expressed, and would place a construction upon it which, if expressly contained therein would make the proposition void, as submitting to the voters a double purpose. Hart v. Board of Education, 252 S.W. 441; State ex rel. City of Joplin v. Wilder, 217 Mo. 261; Willis v. School District of Sedalia, 253 S.W. 741; Levinworth v. Wilson, 69 Kan. 78.
Julius T. Muench and Oliver Senti for respondents.
(1) The funds provided by Proposition Twelve of the Bond Issue Ordinance may be lawfully used for extensions of the city's public hospital system. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Smith, 302 Mo. 594, 259 S.W. 1060. (a) The report of a legislative committee on a bill referred to it may be regarded as an exposition of the legislative intent where otherwise the meaning of a statute is obscure. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 65 L.Ed. 349; 36 Cyc. 1139. (2) The purposes for which the proceeds of municipal bonds may be used may be stated in general language. Hart v. Board of Education of Nevada School District, 229 Mo. 36, 252 S.W. 441. (3) A proposition to authorize the issuance of municipal bonds, when so construed as to make the proceeds available both for the erection of additions to existing hospitals and the erection of a new hospital, is not a dual proposition. Hart v. Board of Education of Nevada School District, 229 Mo. 36, 252 S.W. 441.
Hyde, C. Ferguson and Sturgis, CC., concur.
This is an action by appellant, a resident taxpayer of the city of St. Louis, to enjoin the city and its officers from using the proceeds of bonds for the erection of a hospital and the acquisition of land therefor by condemnation. Nothing is before us except the pleadings appellant having demurred to respondents' joint answer and return to the petition and to the order to show cause why a temporary injunction should not be issued. The court overruled the demurrer and appellant declined to plead further. The court, thereupon, entered judgment dismissing appellant's bill and he has appealed therefrom.
The question here is the construction of the ordinance, which submitted the bond issue to the voters of the city and set forth the purposes for which the proceeds of the bonds should be used. The part of the ordinance involved herein is as follows:
"Proposition Twelve -- For the acquisition of land and the construction of additions to and extensions and equipment of public hospitals and institutions for the care of delinquents and the indigent tubercular, insane, feeble-minded, infirm, and sick patients, four million, five hundred thousand dollars ($ 4,500,000)."
The official ballot provided for was as follows:
Appellant's petition sets out that the city of St. Louis maintained two city hospitals, one of which was maintained for the care of negroes; that the city proposes to erect a new hospital for negroes upon a location more than four miles from either of the present hospitals; and that it has commenced suit for condemnation of land at such location for this purpose. The petition further alleges that this will be a misappropriation and misapplication of the funds voted at the bond election; that the cost of building and operating a new hospital will be much greater than if the same were built as an addition to either of the present hospitals; and that this is a damage to plaintiff and each and every taxpayer. Respondents' answer and return admits the enactment of the various ordinances mentioned in the petition; and that the erection, and equipment, and the operating expenses of the proposed hospital will cost, the extra amounts specified in the petition, more than if it was built as an addition to one of the city's existing hospitals. The answer also stated that the separate projects submitted were not itemized in detail but that a Special Committee of the Board of Aldermen, prior to the passage of the ordinance submitting the bond issue, made an itemized report; that this report was adopted by the Board; that printed copies of this report were widely circulated among the electors of the city prior to the election; and that it was given great publicity by speakers, civic organizations and newspapers. The part of this report which dealt with Proposition Twelve was as follows:
The answer, also, sets up other facts, concerning the hospitals and institutions maintained by the city, and such as are deemed material will be mentioned later in the opinion.
Appellant's contention is that the proposition, set out in the ordinance and on the ballot, only authorizes additions or extensions increasing the size of the existing individual hospitals and institutions referred to and the acquisition of land for that purpose; and that it does not authorize the building of a new hospital, on a new location, separate and apart from any existing hospital. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the proposition refers to the system of public hospitals and institutions, maintained by the city, and that it contemplates, not only additions to the buildings and institutions then existing, but also extensions of the system of public hospitals and other institutions by establishing necessary new institutions, located separate and apart from the old ones.
An analysis of Proposition Twelve discloses that it enumerates the following purposes: Acquisition of land (for public hospitals and institutions for the care of delinquents and the indigent tubercular, insane, feeble-minded, infirm and sick patients); construction of additions to public hospitals and institutions (above referred to); and extensions and equipment of public hospitals and institutions (above referred to). The real question in this case is the meaning of this third purpose, namely: "Extensions and equipment of public hospitals and institutions." (For the above purposes.) The words "addition" and "extension" and their synonyms "increase" and "augmentation" are often used interchangeably. It is, however, clear that they were used in this proposition with different intended meanings. The proposition here limits the word "additions," by the words preceding and following it, since it reads "construction of additions to." It is not, however, limited to additions to present buildings since the words "hospital and institutions" are used rather than "buildings" at such institutions. The word "addition" implies physical contact; some thing added to another. [1 C. J. 1190.] Unquestionably, by stating in the proposition, the purpose of "construction of additions to public hospitals and institutions," the contruction either of additional buildings or additions to buildings at existing public hospitals and institutions so as to increase their capacity, was meant.
It has been said that the word "extension" "is not a word of art, and having no legal or technical significance may mean whatever the parties intended." [25 C. J. 227.] "Extension" is defined by Webster's Dictionary as the act of extending or state of being extended; a stretching out; by the Century Dictionary as a stretching or expanding; and by Funk and Wagnalls Dictionary as...
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