Meyers v. Becker

• Decision Date: 05 April 2023
• Docket Number: 1:23-CV-173 (DNH/CFH)
• Parties: KENNETH T. MEYERS, Plaintiff, v. DONNA BECKER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

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KENNETH T. MEYERS, Plaintiff, v. DONNA BECKER, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-CV-173 (DNH/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

April 5, 2023

Kenneth T. Meyers

Plaintiff pro se

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Background

Plaintiff pro se Kenneth T. Meyers (“plaintiff”) commenced this action on February 8, 2023, by filing a complaint. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). He did not pay the Court's filing fee or submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and the Court administratively closed the action. See Dkt. No. 3. Plaintiff filed an IFP motion on February 23, 2023, and the Court reopened the case. See Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8. The undersigned has reviewed plaintiff's IFP application and determines that he financially qualifies to proceed IFP for the purpose of filing.^[1]

II. Initial Review

A. Legal Standard

Section 1915^[2] of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It is a court's responsibility to determine that a plaintiff may properly maintain his complaint before permitting him to proceed with his action.

Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the court must construe his [or her] submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This does not mean the Court is required to accept unsupported allegations that are devoid of sufficient facts or claims. Although detailed allegations are not required at the pleading stage, the complaint must still include enough facts to provide the defendants with notice of the claims against them and the grounds on which these claims are based. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Pro se litigants are “not exempt . . . from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law[.]” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).

Ultimately, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Pleading guidelines are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). Specifically, Rule 8 provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “The purpose . . . is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rule 8 also requires the pleading to include “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction” and “a demand for the relief sought . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1), (3). Although “[n]o technical form is required,” the Federal Rules make clear that each allegation contained in the pleading “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at 8(d)(1).

Further, Rule 10 provides in pertinent part that:

[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence - and each defense other than a denial - must be stated in a separate count or defense.

FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). This serves the purpose of “providing] an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Flores, 189 F.R.D. at 55 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint that fails to comply with the pleading requirements “presents far too [] heavy [a] burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.” Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). The Second Circuit has held that “[w]hen a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). However, “[dismissal . . . is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. (citation omitted). If dismissal is warranted and the plaintiff is pro se, the court generally affords the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995).

B. Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff submitted his complaint on a civil rights form against Donna Becker, the Commissioner of the Schoharie County Department of Social Services (“DSS”); and Bryanna Folk, who appears to be the mother of his children. See Compl. at 1-3. Plaintiff alleges that “Bryanna Folk falsely accused me of multiple accusations and lies to Schoharie County Department of Social Services to receive welfare assistance. Donna Becker without proof wrote said accusations on paper to verify. Donna Becker states that said accusations from Bryanna Folk are true.” Id. at 3. He contends that “Donna Becker has no right to what she is doing. Bryanna Folk has manipulated Schoharie County DSS.” Id. Further, plaintiff alleges that “Donna Becker states that it is true to her own knowledge that I am a violent person. That I use illegal substances. Donna Becker duly sworn on a statement on the 14^th day of October 2022 and lied on said statement.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that “Bryanna Folk wrote false statements and continues to do so. She had my children taken from me and she states that she will do whatever it takes to keep my newborn son from me and my six year old step daughter.” Id. Plaintiff checked a box to indicate that he was bringing the complaint against federal official as “a Bivens claim[,]” he references the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he seeks $100,000 for his “mental anguish.” Id. at 4-5.

C. Analysis

1. Claims Against Bryanna Folk

“Federal jurisdiction is limited, and specified by statute. . . . Federal courts exercise jurisdiction in cases that present a federal question, or in cases of diversity jurisdiction[.]” Zido v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 498 F.Supp.2d 512, 513 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332). As for diversity jurisdiction, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between [] citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “Diversity jurisdiction requires that ‘all of the adverse parties in a suit . . . be completely diverse with regard to citizenship.'” Handelsman v. Bedford Village Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 930 (2d Cir. 1998)). “[A] party's citizenship depends on his [or her] domicile. Domicile has been described as the place where a person has ‘his [or her] true fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he [or she] is absent, he [or she] has the intention of returning.'” Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff lists his and Bryanna Folk's addresses as being in New York. See Compl. at 2. Plaintiff lists his current address as Schoharie County Jail. See Id. Attached to his complaint, plaintiff provided an affidavit that was submitted in a Schoharie County Supreme Court case against Donna Becker and Bryanna Folk in which he stated that he has resided in New York for the past ten years. See Dkt. No. 12 at 2. Based on the information provided, as both parties appear to be domiciled in the same state, plaintiff has not established diversity jurisdiction.

Next plaintiff references the Fourteenth Amendment and fills out his complaint on a civil rights form. See Compl. at 1,4. However, stating a constitutional amendment does not establish federal question jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § “1983 allows a plaintiff to assert a claim for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, if the defendant was acting under color of state law when he deprived plaintiff of his rights.” Gonzalez v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d 181, 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “For a defendant to be determined to be acting under color of state law, he [or she] must ‘fairly be said to be a state actor.'” Id. (quoting American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). “A private person can be subject to liability under this statute ‘if he or she willfully collaborated with an official state actor in the deprivation of the federal right.'” Id. (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty....