Meyers v. Ferndale Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 04 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 98280-5,98280-5
• Citation: 481 P.3d 1084
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Bonnie I. MEYERS, as personal representative of the estate of Gabriel Lewis Anderson, a deceased minor, age 15, and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the estate; and Brandi K. Sestrom and Joshua Anderson, individually, Respondents, v. FERNDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, Petitioner, and William Klein and Jane Doe Klein, and the marital community comprised thereof, Defendants.

481 P.3d 1084

Bonnie I. MEYERS, as personal representative of the estate of Gabriel Lewis Anderson, a deceased minor, age 15, and on behalf of the beneficiaries of the estate; and Brandi K. Sestrom and Joshua Anderson, individually, Respondents,

v.FERNDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, Petitioner,andWilliam Klein and Jane Doe Klein, and the marital community comprised thereof, Defendants.

No. 98280-5

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued October 22, 2020

Filed: March 4, 2021

Bret S. Simmons, Jill Smith, Simmons Sweeney Smith PS, 1223 Commercial St., Bellingham, WA, 98225-4306, for Petitioner(s).

Philip Albert Talmadge, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, 2775 Harbor Ave. Sw, Third Floor Ste. C, Aaron Paul Orheim, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, 2775 Harbor Ave. Sw Unit C, Seattle, WA, 98126-2138, John Robert Connelly Jr., Marta Lynn O'Brien, Jackson Robert Pahlke, Attorney at Law, Connelly Law Offices, 2301 N. 30th St., Tacoma, WA, 98403-3322, for Respondent(s).

Valerie Davis McOmie, Attorney at Law, 4549 Nw Aspen St., Camas, WA, 98607-8302, Daniel Edward Huntington, Richter-Wimberley PS, 422 W. Riverside Ave. Ste. 1300, Spokane, WA, 99201-0305, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Association for Justice Foundation.

Mark Dietzler, Law Offices of Mark Dietzler, Po Box 7218, London, KY, 40742-7218, Lisa Ann Liekhus, Law Offices of Mark Dietzler, 1001 4th Ave. Ste. 3300, Seattle, WA, 98154-1125, for Other Parties.

JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1 This case involves a wrongful death claim brought on behalf of a student against the school district. Gabriel Anderson, a student of the Ferndale School District (Ferndale), was killed by a vehicle while on an off campus walk with his physical education (PE) class. Anderson's estate alleged negligence by Ferndale. The trial court dismissed the claim, granting Ferndale summary judgment based on a lack of duty. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that there were sufficient factual issues on duty and proximate causation. Ferndale challenges the Court of Appeals’ analysis of proximate cause. We are asked to decide whether Ferndale is entitled to summary judgment dismissal based on proximate causation. While the Court of Appeals erred in analyzing legal causation, it properly concluded that material issues of fact exist concerning proximate causation. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse summary judgment dismissal of the negligence claim against Ferndale. Meyers v. Ferndale Sch. Dist ., 12 Wash. App. 2d 254, 457 P.3d 483, review granted , 195 Wash.2d 1023, 466 P.3d 769 (2020).

FACTS

¶ 2 Anderson was a student at Windward High School, which is part of the Ferndale School District. On June 10, 2015, Evan Ritchie, the PE teacher, decided to take his class on an off campus walk along West Smith Road. Before the PE walk, Ritchie explained the basic logistics to his students, including the route and which side of the road to walk on. The class was composed of approximately 25 students. Anderson was part of this class.

¶ 3 The students walked along the raised sidewalk on the north side of West Smith Road. The sidewalk was separated from traffic by a fog line and eight-foot shoulders. The group reached the end of the sidewalk, turned around, and proceeded back to school. They crossed the street to the south side of West Smith Road. The group did not cross at a marked crosswalk. On this side of the road, the group had their backs to oncoming traffic. Ritchie was positioned at the back of the group in a "sweep" position. 1 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 16. Students were spread apart, as far as 200 meters away from Ritchie. Ritchie was walking beside Anderson as they approached the intersection of Graveline Road.

¶ 4 A vehicle traveling eastbound on West Smith Road left the roadway and crossed onto the sidewalk. The driver, William Klein, had evidently fallen asleep at the wheel, lost control of his vehicle, and within approximately one second of leaving the roadway, struck Anderson and three other students. Tragically, Anderson and one other student died on impact. Two other students were severely injured.

¶ 5 Windward High School is a small choice school located along West Smith Road. West Smith Road is a two-lane roadway with varying speed limits. The section where the accident occurred had a 40 m.p.h. speed limit. The campus was a former elementary school with limited athletic facilities, which included a small track and field. Due to the facility limitations, Ritchie sometimes took his PE classes on off campus walks as part of the regular curriculum. He used the same route taken on June 10 approximately 30 times before. The walks generally took 30-40 minutes and were not usually planned in advance. The principal, Tim Kiegley, confirmed that Ritchie had asked him for permission to take students on these walks before, and they had discussed general safety and the appropriate route. The parties dispute whether Kiegley had notice of the walk on that particular day.

¶ 6 Ferndale has two policies regarding off campus field trips and excursions: "Policy No. 2320" and "Policy No. 2320 P-1." Policy No. 2320, titled "Field Trips, Excursions and Outdoor Education," recognizes that "[t]he superintendent will develop procedures for the operation of a field trip or an outdoor education activity which will ensure that the safety of the student is protected and that parent permission is obtained before the student leaves the school." 1 CP at 317. Ferndale policy does not provide a definition for "field trip." The corresponding Policy No. 2320 P-1 provides specific procedures for field trips. Teachers must request permission from the principal at least a month prior to the event, send parents a notice and permission form, arrange transportation, make plans to keep the group together, and provide a list of participating students and chaperones. Once the teacher completes these tasks, the principal must review and provide approval at least three weeks before the event and ensure that parents are notified and permission slips are submitted. Ritchie and Kiegley did not consider these off campus walks as field trips. As a result, they did not follow these procedures, nor did they notify or obtain permission from parents or guardians.

¶ 7 The wrongful death claim was filed by the personal representative of Anderson's estate, Bonnie Meyers, alleging negligence by Klein and Ferndale.¹ Ferndale moved for summary judgment, arguing that Anderson's death was not foreseeable and that Meyers could not establish proximate cause. The trial court considered declarations and reports submitted by both parties, including declarations and deposition testimony from Ritchie, Kiegley, Meyers, accident reconstruction experts, former Ferndale teachers, and former school district officials. The trial court granted Ferndale's motion and dismissed the claims. The trial court concluded that under these facts, the accident was simply unforeseeable and, as such, did not fall within Ferndale's duty to its students. The trial court did not reach proximate causation.

¶ 8 Meyers appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that there were questions of fact for the jury on both duty and proximate cause. On duty, the court determined that there was a question of fact as to whether Anderson's death was reasonably foreseeable. Additionally, the Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of proximate cause. The Court of Appeals found genuine issues of material fact and rejected the argument that Ferndale was not the legal cause of Anderson's injuries and subsequent death. Ferndale petitioned for discretionary review solely on the proximate cause issue.²

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Lowman v. Wilbur , 178 Wash.2d 165, 168, 309 P.3d 387 (2013). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, so the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We view the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co. , 148 Wash.2d 788, 794, 64 P.3d 22 (2003).

¶ 10 To prevail in this negligence claim, Meyers " ‘must show (1) the existence of a duty to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) the breach as the proximate cause of the injury.’ " N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist. , 186 Wash.2d 422, 429, 378 P.3d 162 (2016) (quoting Crowe v. Gaston , 134 Wash.2d 509, 514, 951 P.2d 1118 (1998) ). To prevail on summary judgment, Ferndale must establish that viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Meyers, Meyers fails to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to Ferndale's negligence.

¶ 11 In the briefing filed in this court, the parties do not dispute that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to duty and, instead, focus the arguments primarily on proximate causation.³ Although duty is a separate inquiry, some brief background on duty remains useful here because the duty analysis informs the proximate cause analysis.

¶ 12 The analysis in Hendrickson v. Moses Lake School District , 192 Wash.2d 269, 276-77, 428 P.3d 1197 (2018), is helpful in resolving the issue here. In Hendrickson , we analyzed that school districts owe a unique duty of care based on the custodial and involuntary nature of their relationship with students. Teachers are effectively substituted for parents when students are in the custody of the school because students are involuntarily subject to school rules, discipline, direction, and activities. We compared the duty of care for parties with special relationships and those without special relationships as set out in sections 314 and 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. Law Inst. 1965). Section 314 describes that most parties operate in a limited pool of risk and are required to take affirmative action to protect only from harm that is within their direct control. Whereas, based on...