Meyers v. Tri-State Auto. Co.

• Citation: 140 N.W. 184,121 Minn. 68
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 07 March 1913
• Parties: MEYERS v. TRI-STATE AUTOMOBILE CO.

121 Minn. 68

140 N.W. 184

MEYERS

v.TRI-STATE AUTOMOBILE CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 7, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Homer B. Dibell, Judge.

Action by J. Edward Meyers against the Tri-State Automobile Company. Verdict for plaintiff. From an order denying motion for judgment or for new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

The driver of an automobile drove over an embankment on the left side of the road. It was broad daylight. The road was hard, dry, and smooth, and wide enough for two vehicles. There was no obstruction, and no other vehicle on the road. The car was in good condition. There was evidence that he had at times before been driving carelessly and too near the edge of the road. It was a hot day, and the driver's explanation was that he was taken with a period of dizziness which came on suddenly, and lasted but a moment. Held, that the question of his negligence was for the jury, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain their finding that he was negligent.

Where a dealer in automobiles and owner of a garage lets a car for hire and furnishes a driver, and the hirer exercises no control or supervision over the driver, except to direct him where to go, and what route to take and to caution him against improper driving, the owner is responsible for the negligence of the driver, and the hirer may recover from the owner in damages for an injury caused by the driver's negligence. Edmund A. Prendergast, Henry C. Flannery, and Brown & Guesmer, all of Minneapolis, for appellant.

Larrabee & Davies and Jay W. Crane, all of Minneapolis, for respondent.

HALLAM, J.

Plaintiff and one Walker hired of defendant an automobile, with a driver, to take a country trip. Defendant was a dealer in automobiles, and did not ordinarily let its vehicles for hire. The car used on this occasion was a two-seated five passenger car. It was in good condition. The driver was a generally competent driver. Plaintiff sat in the rear seat with some ladies. Walker sat in the front seat beside the driver. He directed the driver where to go, and what road to take, and cautioned him not to make fast time. There was evidence that at some time during the drive the driver was warned not to drive so near the edge of the road. Further than that no one of the party exercised any direction over him. They drove to Osceola, Wis. On the return trip the car ran over an embankment, and overturned, causing plaintiff the injury complained of. The jury found for plaintiff. Defendant appeals from an order denying an alternative motion for judgment or for a new trial.

Two questions are raised on this appeal. Defendant contends: (1) There is no evidence that the driver was negligent. (2) If he was negligent, defendant is not responsible therefor.

[1] 1. There was ample evidence of the negligence of the driver. He was traveling at a moderate rate of speed on a hard, smooth, dry, road, wide enough for two automobiles to pass each other. It was broad daylight, on a bright, hot day. The car and its machinery were in good condition. The driver permitted the car to roll over an embankment on the left side of the road. There was evidence that he had been driving carelessly at times, that he had been cautioned before about going near the edge of the road and also about going too fast. The driver's explanation of the cause of the accident is not very satisfactory. He said: It was a ‘sort of a period of dizziness, which I don't suppose I would ever realize to find out what it was if Mr. Walker hadn't called my attention to it, but I don't remember anything outside of the last. I remember I was looking ahead at the road, and from that time on until the accident occurred it was blank to me. I don't know how far. It might have been 30 feet. It might have been five feet.’ He admitted that he had been all right immediately before and that he was all right immediately after the occurrence. Defendant contends that he must have been overcome by exhaustion and heat. Clearly the evidence did not establish any such theory as a matter of law. Taking all the evidence together, it was clearly sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury that the driver was negligent.

[2] 2. Defendant contends that it is not liable to plaintiff for the negligence of the driver; that its only duty was to use reasonable care in the selection of a driver. This is not the ordinary rule where one person is injured by the negligence of the servant of another. The general rule in tort actions is that: ‘The principal is liable for the acts and negligence of the agent in the course of his employment. * * * So long as he stands in the relation of principal or master to the wrongdoer, the owner is responsible for his acts.’ Hunt, J., in Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 657 (21 L. Ed. 220), and that in any given case ‘that person is undoubtedly liable who stood in the relation of master to the wrongdoer, he who had selected him as his servant from the knowledge of or belief in his skill and care, and who could remove him for misconduct and whose orders he was bound to receive and obey.’ Parke, B., in Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 497. The rule of respondeat superior ‘is founded upon public policy and convenience; for in no other way could there be any safety to third persons in their dealings with the principal through the instrumentality of agents. In every such case the principal holds out his agent as competent, and fit to be trusted; and thereby in effect he warrants his fidelity and good conduct in all matters within the scope of the agency.’ Story, Agency, § 452.

In other words, the rule of respondeat superior is one of general application in case of master and servant. If it does not apply in this case, then either the relation of master and servant did not exist between the defendant and the driver, or else this case is an exception to the general rule. The relation of master and servant did exist. Defendant's counsel do not in terms contend otherwise, but they do contend that plaintiff and Walker assumed full control of the machine and the driver. If this were true, then the driver ceased to be the servant of the defendant, and became the servant of the hirer of the automobile, for the right of control is the test in determining where the relation of master and servant exists. Follman v. Mankato, 35 Minn. 527,29 N. W. 317,59 Am. Rep. 340, citing Bennett v. New Jersey, etc., Co., 36 N. J. Law, 225, 13 Am. Rep. 435. See, also, Wood, Master and Servant, § 317.

Of course, the general master may lend his servant to another, and while the servant is engaged in the business of the other, and in all respects subject to his direction and control, he becomes the servant of the new master. The test in such case is whether such person is in control as a proprietor so that he can at any time stop the work or continue it and determine the way in which it shall be done, not merely in reference to the result to be reached, but in reference to the method of reaching the result as well. Shepard v. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 110, 90 N. E. 392, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 442, 134 Am. St. Rep. 648. In Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416, 63 N. E. 922, Holmes, C. J., in discussing this subject said: ‘There is a general consensus of authority that, although a driver may be ordered by those who have dealt with his master to go to this place or that, to take this or that burden, to hurry or to take his time, nevertheless in respect to the manner of his driving and the control of his horse he remains subject to no orders, but those of the man who pays him. Therefore he can make no one else liable.’

In this case there is no evidence that plaintiff or even Walker did assume control. Plaintiff exercised no supervision or direction whatever, and Walker did so only in directing the driver where to go and what route to take. Their cautions not to drive fast, and not to drive near the edge of the road, cannot be considered an exercise of control. Neither of these men ever exercised the slightest control over the operation of the automobile or over its mechanism. So far as appears, neither of them had sufficient knowledge or training to do so, and it was never contemplated that they should. The management of an automobile can properly be trusted only to a skilled expert. The law does not permit such a vehicle to be operated except by a licensed chauffeur of approved competency. The danger, of injury to the property of the owner, of injury to the chauffeur, his servant, and of injury to the persons and property of others, is such as to make it of the highest importance that care should be exercised in the operation of the machine, and that its control and management should not be given over to the unexperienced hirer. We cannot hold under the facts existing in this case that there was any such relinquishment of control by the owner. Shepard v. Jacobs, 204 Mass. 110, 90 N. E. 392, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 442, 134 Am. St. Rep. 648. The driver of defendant's automobile did not in this case become the servant of plaintiff. The relation of master and servant did exist between defendant and the driver. There is no occasion to make an exception here to the general rule of respondeat superior and the general rule of liability of the master for negligence of the servant should apply.

These propositions are amply sustained by authority.

In Gerretson v. Rambler Garage Co., 149 Wis. 528, 136 N. W. 186,40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 457, it was held that a chauffeur sent by the owner of a garage to operate an automobile leased for a pleasure ride, and who obeys the directions of the lessee merely as to routes, is the servant of the owner of the garage, and the latter will be liable for injury inflicted upon occupants of the car through the chauffeur's negligence.

In Johnson v. Coey, 237 Ill. 88, 86 N. E. 678,21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 81, plaintiff and others were riding in an automobile which they had...