Meyrose v. Adams

• Citation: 12 Mo.App. 329
• Parties: FERD MEYROSE ET AL., Appellants, v. MCGREGOR ADAMS ET AL., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 06 June 1882
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

12 Mo.App. 329

FERD MEYROSE ET AL., Appellants,

v.MCGREGOR ADAMS ET AL., Respondents.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Jun. 6, 1882.

1. An action will lie for libel of letters patent.

2. A plea that the libel is only a repetition of the words of another is no defence to an action for libel.

3. That the publication charged as libellous sets forth that the statement was made upon information, is immaterial.

4. In an action for libel of letters patent, falsehood, malice, and injury to the plaintiff must be alleged and proved.

5. A petition which states that the defendant sent to the plaintiff's customers a circular letter stating that the plaintiff had no right to make and sell the articles in which he dealt, and which charges that such statement was false and malicious, and made with the intent to injure the plaintiff, and that by reason thereof, the plaintiff's customers had ceased to buy from him, thereby injuring and damaging him in his trade and business and property rights, states a good cause of action.

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, ADAMS, J.

Reversed and remanded.

E. J. O'BRIEN, for the appellants: The petition alleges the publication of false statements in regard to the articles manufactured by the plaintiffs, to their injury.-- Snow v. Judson, 38 Barb. 210; Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385; White v. Merritt, 3 Seld. 352; Gallagher v. Burnel, 6 Cow. 346.

NOBLE & ORRICK and GEORGE R. LOCKWOOD, for the respondents: To make words actionable they must be such that special damage may be the fair and natural result of them.-- Kelly v. Partington, 3 Nev. & M. 116; 5 Barn. & Adol. 645; Towns. on Slan. & L. 206; Lawless v. Angle, 4 Q. B. P. 262.

BAKEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The petition alleges that plaintiffs were engaged as copartners in St. Louis, in the manufacture and sale of lanterns, doing an extensive and profitable business; that defendant Adams was the owner of letters patent of the United States granted to one Irwin, for improvements in lanterns, and that he conveyed to plaintiffs the right and license to manufacture and sell this patented improvement during the life of the patents; that these improvements were known as “hinge-top lanterns;” that Adams had associated with him, as agents and licensees, his co-defendants Raymond and Buck; “that said defendants, intending to injure the plaintiffs in their title to manufacture and sell said patented improvements, and to defraud them of their legitimate rights in the premises, to the great damage and detriment of plaintiffs, did write, or cause to be written, published, and circulated among plaintiffs' patrons and customers for said lantern, so patented as aforesaid, and while plaintiffs' right in the premises was existing and unimpaired, the following false and injurious statement of and concerning the plaintiffs, to wit:--

CHICAGO, September 29, 1880.

GENTLEMEN: Referring to my last circular letter concerning letters patent Nos. 47,551 and 50,591, granted to John H. Irwin for hinged-top, loose-globed lanterns, and reiterating the advice therein given; notice has been served upon me that the license, heretofore granted by the owner of said patents to the firm of F. Meyrose & Co., of St. Louis, have been revoked, and that the purchase hereafter of any lanterns embodying the improvements in said letters patent described, and claimed from or manufactured by said firm, will subject the purchaser and user to claims under said patents.

In other respects, the list of licenses contained in said circular letter remains correct until further notice.

Yours, truly,

J. H. RAYMOND, Secretary, etc.”

The petition then goes on to state that, by reason of said false publication, plaintiffs have been injured in their rights of property and patents, and deprived of a valuable trade, their customers, by reason of the threats of prosecution contained in the circular, having refused to buy from plaintiffs and having been induced to believe that plaintiffs had no right to manufacture and sell the patented lantern. Then follows a list of customers of plaintiffs who are alleged to have ceased to trade with plaintiffs in these goods by reason of this publication of the circular. It is further alleged that defendants, well knowing that the statements in the circular were untrue in every respect as to plaintiffs' rights in said patented improvements, and designing to injure and destroy the title of plaintiffs and their business, wantonly and maliciously published and circulated these statements.

This action, in its nature, is not properly for words spoken, or for a libel, written or published, but an action in the nature of an action of trespass on the case for special damages sustained by reason of the speaking or the publication of the slander of the plaintiffs' title. “The cause of action is denominated slander of title, by a sort of figure of speech, in which the title is personified, and made subject to many of the rules applicable to personal slander when the words themselves are not actionable.” Kendall v. Stone, 1 Seld. 18. It is the special damage that gives the cause of action; and it is essential that the statement should be both false and malicious,--that is, that it be made with the intent to injure the plaintiff. Falsehood, malice, and injury to the plaintiff, must all be alleged and proved. And the necessity for these allegations does not depend upon the medium through which the slander is conveyed, whether in words, writing, or print, because the nature of the action is one for special damage actually sustained, and...