Meza v. State, 12465

• Decision Date: 27 October 1976
• Docket Number: No. 12465,12465
• Citation: 543 S.W.2d 189
• Parties: Raul MEZA, Jr., Appellant. v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 189

543 S.W.2d 189

Raul MEZA, Jr., Appellant. v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 12465.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Austin.

Oct. 27, 1976.

Malcolm Greenstein, Austin, for appellant .

Robert O. Smith, Dist. Atty., Travis County, Alton Lynn Ellison, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Travis County, Austin, for appellee.

SHANNON, Justice.

This appeal is from the judgment of the juvenile court of Travis County waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction and transferring appellant, Raul Meza, Jr., to another district court for a criminal trial. We will affirm the judgment.

The State alleged that on December 31, 1975, Meza, age fifteen, committed aggravated robbery at a U--Tote--M store in Austin. The State alleged further that Meza while engaged in theft of personal property, shot the store manager.

By four points of error appellant seeks to reverse the judgment. Appellant's first complaint is that the court erred in overruling Meza's motion suggesting 'mental illness or defect.' By that motion Meza claimed that '. . . as a result of mental disease or defect he is mentally ill or suffers from a mental illness or defect.' Appellant requested the court to order an appropriate medical and psychiatric inquiry to assist in determining '. . . whether he is mentally ill or suffers from a mental illness or defect . . .'

Texas Family Code Ann. § 55.04 provides in part as follows:

'(a) No child who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings in juvenile court or to assist in his own defense shall be subjected to discretionary transfer to criminal court, adjudication, disposition, or modification of disposition as long as such incapacity endures.

'(b) If it appears to the juvenile court, on suggestion of a party or on the court's own notice, that a child alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may be unfit to proceed, the court shall order appropriate medical and psychiatric inquiry to assist in determining whether the child is unfit to proceed because of mental disease or defect.

'(c) The court or jury shall determine from the psychiatric and other evidence at a hearing separate from, but conducted in accordance with the requirements for, the adjudication hearing whether the child is fit or unfit to proceed.'

Appellant, by the terms of his motion, invoked the protection offered by § 55.04. The court erred in overruling the motion.

Appellant, however, did not discharge his burden of demonstrating that the error of the court amounted to such a denial of his rights as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 434. See D.L.C. v. States, 533 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Civ.App.1976, no writ). Pursuant to a previous court order, Dr. David Poole, a psychologist, had examined Meza. Dr. Poole's report was in evidence, and it contained nothing to indicate that Meza suffered from mental disease or defect. At trial appellant called Dr. Poole, but no effort was made to show that Meza was mentally ill. The State called Dr. Jaime Jaramillo, a psychiatrist, who had examined Meza. Jaramillo saw no symptoms of psychosis or schizophrenia in Meza and was of the view that Meza was fully oriented. Dr. Jaramillo testified further that he did not detect any hallucinations, delusions, or any sort of disorder in Meza.

The admission into evidence of his oral confession is the foundation for appellant's second point of error. Without the confession and the 'fruits' of the confession, appellant says there was not '. . . enough competent evidence to expect a grand jury to return an indictment.' Whether a grand jury might be expected to return an indictment is one factor to be considered by the court in a transfer hearing. Tex.Family Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(3). Specifically, appellant claims that before an oral confession of a child is admissible in evidence, Tex.Family Code Ann. § 51.09 (1975) requires that the child be given notice of his 'Miranda' rights by a magistrate prior to the time the confession is taken. ¹ Prior to confession, appellant was given notice of his rights by a policeman rather than by a magistrate. It should be added that appellant does not attack the admission of the confession upon the basis that § 51.09(b) (2) (1975) is unconstitutional.

Texas Family Code Ann. § 51.09(b)(1) (1975) requires that before the Written confession of a child is admissible in evidence, the child must be given notice of his rights by a magistrate before the confession is taken. Section 51.09(b) (2) (1975) refers to the admissibility of Oral confessions. That section provides simply that the confession of a child is admissible in evidence if '. . . it be made orally and the child makes a statement of facts or circumstances that are found to be true, which conduct tends to establish his guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or the instrument with which he states the offense was committed.'

Meza was afforded protections beyond those required by § 51.09(b)(2) (1975). He was given notice of his rights by the investigating officer prior to the time he made an oral confession as to his part in the robbery. The officer's statement to Meza included a warning that he, as a juvenile, could be certified and tried as an adult. Although Meza was of low average intelligence, the evidence was that he was capable of understanding the nature of the officer's warnings. In fact, Meza testified that he understood the warnings. Prior to confession, Meza was not held for any long period of time. He gave the confession freely and not after any lengthy period of interrogation. Nothing in the record suggests star-chamber methods in obtaining the confession. After confessing, Meza directed the officers to the location where he had hidden the extra rifle shells which he had carried during the robbery. Under the circumstances, and by the authority of § 51.09(b)(2) (1975), the court properly admitted appellant's oral confession.

Point of error three is that the court erred in finding that appellant was of sufficient maturity and sophistication that he should be treated as an adult. The 'sophistication and maturity' of the child is one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in determining whether or not to transfer the child to criminal district court for trial. Tex.Family Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(4).

Meza was not a sophisticated or mature child. Prior to hearing, the court obtained a diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense. § 54.02(d). Gretchen Runge, a physician and medical director of the Austin Evaluation Center, Inc., reported to the juvenile court that Meza's overall performance on psychological tests '. . . fell in the upper part of the range of borderline intelligence. Performance score was somewhat higher than verbal. Raul does poorly in language areas. Achievement testing indicates that his academic level is below grade level.'

Also, as a part of the diagnostic study, Meza was examined by David R. Poole, a psychologist. Part of Dr. Poole's report is as follows:

'TEST RESULTS

'Roy (Raul) is an attractive adolescent of average height and weight, with well-groomed, ear-length dark hair. He appeared for the (sic) session appearing suspicious, depression (sic), and had an air of underlying anger. He wore a T-shirt, and jeans to the session, and had...