Meziane v. Munson Twp. Bd. of Trs.
| Decision Date | 02 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2020-G-0251,2020-G-0251 |
| Citation | 162 N.E.3d 103,2020 Ohio 5142 |
| Parties | Anissa Venessa MEZIANE, Appellee, v. MUNSON TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Dennis J. Ibold, Ibold & O'Brien, 401 South Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Appellee).
Susan T. Wieland, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Appellant).
{¶1} Munson Township Board of Trustees appeals from the April 21, 2020 decision and judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, granting the administrative appeal of Anissa Venessa Meziane ("Ms. Meziane") and reversing a decision of the Munson Township Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA"). At issue on appeal is whether Ms. Meziane had standing to appeal the BZA's decision to the Court of Common Pleas. Concluding she did have standing to appeal, we affirm the decision and judgment of the lower court.
{¶2} Cynthia Gray ("Ms. Gray") owns property on Bass Lake Road, which is in a Geauga County district that requires a minimum of five acres per dwelling unit. Ms. Gray applied for an area variance to split her six-acre property into two sections; one section would have a 100-foot frontage, which also necessitates an area variance from the required 200-foot frontage. A hearing before the BZA was held on February 21, 2019. Of 23 other property owners who were notified of the hearing, Ms. Meziane was the only one to appear. She appeared in person, without counsel, and testified in opposition to the variance. Upon receiving a 4 to 1 vote, the BZA approved Ms. Gray's variance request, allowing her to split her six-acre property into one 3.5 acre lot and one 2.5 acre lot.
{¶3} Ms. Meziane appealed this decision to the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas. The Board of Trustees opposed, arguing Ms. Meziane lacked standing to appeal. The lower court held that Ms. Meziane had established standing and reversed the BZA's decision on the merits. "After presuming the BZA's decision was reasonable and valid, giving deference to the BZA's resolution of evidentiary conflicts, recognizing no one factor is determinative, and reviewing the transcript," the lower court found and determined that
{¶4} From this judgment, filed April 21, 2020, the Board of Trustees asserts one assignment of error for our review:
{¶5} "The trial court erred by finding that appellee, as an affected property owner, had standing to appeal the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals when appellee stated on the record that she would not fight the granting of the variance."
{¶6} On appeal, the Board of Trustees challenges the lower court's decision only as to its conclusion that Ms. Meziane had standing to appeal the BZA decision. The issue of standing to assert a claim or to notice an appeal is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State , 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶23.
{¶7} In the context of an administrative decision, the right to appeal must be conferred by statute. The party seeking to appeal has the burden of establishing the right to do so. Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177, 743 N.E.2d 894 (2001).
{¶8} Appeals to the board of zoning appeals are governed by R.C. 519.15 : "[a]ppeals to the board of zoning appeals may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any officer of the township affected by any decision of the administrative officer."
{¶9} Appeals from the board of zoning appeals are governed by R.C. 2506.01 : "every final order, adjudication, or decision * * * may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located[.]" R.C. 2506.01(A). "As used in this chapter, ‘final order, adjudication, or decision’ means an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person[.]" R.C. 2506.01(C). "The appeal provided in this section is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by law." R.C. 2506.01(B).
{¶10} R.C. 2506.01 does not provide for who may appeal from the decision of a board of zoning appeals to a court of common pleas. The common-law doctrine of standing provides that " ‘[a]ppeal lies only on behalf of a party aggrieved by the final order appealed from.’ " Midwest Fireworks, supra , at 177, 743 N.E.2d 894, quoting Ohio Contract Carriers Assoc., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. , 140 Ohio St. 160, 42 N.E.2d 758 (1942), syllabus.
{¶11} Id. , quoting Ohio Contract Carriers, supra , at 161, 42 N.E.2d 758, quoting 2 American Jurisprudence, Appeal and Error, Section 50, at 942 (1936). "Thus, in order to have standing to appeal, a person must be ‘able to demonstrate a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation which has been prejudiced’ by the judgment appealed from." Id. , quoting Willoughby Hills v. C.C. Bar's Sahara, Inc. , 64 Ohio St.3d 24, 26, 591 N.E.2d 1203 (1992).
{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a series of cases, has addressed standing in the context of board of zoning appeals under R.C. 2506.01. The Court first recognized that the right to appeal is not necessarily limited to the property owner whose requested variance is denied. Roper v. Richfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 173 Ohio St. 168, 173, 180 N.E.2d 591 (1962) ().
{¶13} "Adjacent or contiguous property owners who oppose and participate in the administrative proceedings concerning the issuance of a variance are equally entitled to seek appellate review under R.C. 2506.01." Willoughby Hills, supra , at 26, 591 N.E.2d 1203, citing Roper , supra , at syllabus. However, this private property owner only has "standing to complain of harm which is unique to himself," "as distinguished from the public at large." Id. at 27, 591 N.E.2d 1203. These common law rules are often centralized to a statement that, if a private property owner "actively participated" in the administrative proceedings, then it has standing to appeal from the BZA's decision and argue it is "directly affected" by the zoning variance. Id. at 26-27, 591 N.E.2d 1203 ; Schomaeker v. First Natl. Bank of Ottawa , 66 Ohio St.2d 304, 311-312, 421 N.E.2d 530 (1981) ; see also Midwest Fireworks, supra , at 178, 743 N.E.2d 894 and In re Petition for Incorporation of the Village of Holiday City , 70 Ohio St.3d 365, 371, 639 N.E.2d 42 (1994).
{¶14} Additionally, Ohio appellate courts have not limited third-party standing under R.C. 2506.01 to adjacent or contiguous property owners, stating that courts " ‘ "must look beyond physical proximity to demonstrate if the order constitutes a determination of the rights, duties, privileges, benefits or legal relationships of a specified person." ’ " Safest Neighborhood Assoc. v. Athens Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 4th Dist. Athens, 2013-Ohio-5610, 5 N.E.3d 694, ¶26, quoting Jenkins v. Gallipolis, 128 Ohio App.3d 376, 382, 715 N.E.2d 196 (4th Dist.1998), quoting Am. Aggregates Corp. v. Columbus , 66 Ohio App.3d 318, 322, 584 N.E.2d 26 (10th Dist.1990) ; see also R.C. 519.15 () (emphasis added).
{¶15} Here, the Board of Trustees contends Ms. Meziane did not demonstrate that she is "directly affected" by the zoning variance granted to Ms. Gray's property. As stated above, we review this issue de novo.
{¶16} As of February 21, 2019, when the BZA hearing was held, Ms. Gray had owned her property for approximately one year. Ms. Meziane had owned the property across the street for approximately two years. The minutes of the BZA hearing state as follows, in relevant part:
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