Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Asad

• Decision Date: 25 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 3D07–363.,3D07–363.
• Citation: 78 So.3d 660
• Parties: MIAMI–DADE COUNTY and Sergeant Patricia Sedano, Appellants, v. Ahmed ASAD, Noel Rivera, and Tony Garcia, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

78 So.3d 660

MIAMI–DADE COUNTY and Sergeant Patricia Sedano, Appellants,

v.Ahmed ASAD, Noel Rivera, and Tony Garcia, Appellees.

No. 3D07–363.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 25, 2012.

R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Miami–Dade County Attorney, and Eric K. Gressman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant Miami–Dade County; Teri Guttman Valdes, for appellant Sergeant Patricia Sedano.

DeFabio & Fenn and Leonard P. Fenn, for appellees.

Before SUAREZ, CORTIÑAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

On Motion for Rehearing

ROTHENBERG, J.

The appellants, Miami–Dade County (“the County”) and Sergeant Patricia Sedano (“Sgt. Sedano”), the defendants below (collectively, “the Defendants”), appeal the final judgment of false arrest entered in favor of the appellees, Ahmed Asad, Tony Garcia, and Noel Rivera (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”). On March 11, 2009, this Court issued an opinion affirming (J. Rothenberg, dissenting). The Defendants seek rehearing, rehearing en banc, or certification to the Florida Supreme Court. Because we conclude that the Defendants' arguments are well taken, we grant rehearing, withdraw the previously filed opinion, and issue the following opinion in its stead.

The Plaintiffs were arrested for assault with a firearm and as principals to an armed burglary with a battery. Rivera was additionally arrested for doing business as a bondsman without a license. These arrests stemmed from the vicious beating of Daniel Walker, an innocent victim, during the execution of an arrest warrant for Shalresia Tomlin by seven or eight bondsmen. It is undisputed that Mr. Walker, who was unaware an arrest warrant had been issued against Ms. Tomlin, was providing transportation for Ms. Tomlin when the vehicle he was driving was stopped by the bondsmen. Walker was then pulled out of his vehicle and severely beaten by the bondsmen although he offered no resistance, presented no threat, and did not interfere with the execution of the warrant.

The Plaintiffs were arrested for their involvement in this attack, but the charges were ultimately dismissed. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a civil lawsuit against Sgt. Sedano, the arresting officer, and her employer, the County, asserting claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violation of the Plaintiffs' federal civil rights.

Prior to trial, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County as to the Plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims, but denied Sgt. Sedano's and the County's motions for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the Defendants moved for a directed verdict as to the Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims. The trial court denied the motion. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the Defendants as to the civil rights and the malicious prosecution claims, and in favor of the Plaintiffs as to the false arrest claims, awarding $94,800 to Garcia, $128,910 to Asad, and $83,432 to Rivera. The Defendants subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied; and the Defendants' appeal followed.

The Defendants contend the trial court erred in: (1) denying their pre-trial motions for summary judgment as to the malicious prosecution claims; (2) permitting the Plaintiffs to introduce evidence relevant to a claim of malicious prosecution (a claim the Plaintiffs knew they could not prove), but inadmissible and highly prejudicial as to the false arrest claims; (3) denying their motion for a directed verdict as to the malicious prosecution claims; (4) allowing the jury to consider inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence in deciding the false arrest claims; and (5) denying their motion for a new trial. We agree.

The Plaintiffs presented no evidence of malice, an essential element of the crime of malicious prosecution, and in fact, the Plaintiffs' own expert admitted at trial, and counsel for the Plaintiffs admit on appeal, that there was no evidence that Sgt. Sedano acted with malice, and therefore Sgt. Sedano was immune from liability as a matter of law. Thus, the trial court erred in denying the Defendants' motions for summary judgment and for a directed verdict as to the malicious prosecution claims. Additionally, since much of the evidence introduced at trial was only admissible to prove the malicious prosecution claims, and was also irrelevant, inadmissible, and prejudicial as to the false arrest claims, the trial court erred in: (1) failing to instruct the jury that it must not consider that evidence in reaching its verdict on the false arrest claims; and (2) not granting the Defendants a new trial, where counsel for the Plaintiffs made the inadmissible, highly prejudicial evidence a feature of the trial.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's evidentiary rulings are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See H & H Elec., Inc. v. Lopez, 967 So.2d 345, 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“We review discretionary issues involving the admission of evidence ... for abuse of discretion.”); Hayes v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 933 So.2d 124, 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that the trial court's ruling on admissibility of evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion). In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and must reverse “if there is ‘no evidence upon which the jury could legally base a verdict’ in favor of the non-moving party.” Posner v. Walker, 930 So.2d 659, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Floyd v. Video Barn, Inc., 538 So.2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)); see also Schreidell v. Shoter, 500 So.2d 228, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (“A directed verdict is proper only when the record conclusively shows an absence of facts or inferences from facts to support a jury verdict, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Therefore, no factual determination is required, and judgment must be entered for the movant as a matter of law.”) (citations omitted). The denial of the Defendants' motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“The standard of review for the denial of a motion for new trial is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion.”); Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc. v. Peeples, 475 So.2d 916, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“The standard for review of the denial of a motion for new trial is whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion.”).

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFFS TO PROCEED WITH THEIR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS AND IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT

The Defendants moved for summary judgment prior to trial and moved for a directed verdict during trial as to the Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims. The trial court denied both motions and permitted: (1) the Plaintiffs to introduce evidence admissible as to the malicious prosecution claims, but inadmissible as to the false arrest claims; (2) the jury to improperly consider this evidence in deciding the false arrest claims; and (3) the jury to improperly assign and calculate damages on the false arrest claims based on evidence inadmissible as to those claims. These errors denied the Defendants their right to a fair trial.

A. The Plaintiffs presented no evidence of malice, an essential element of malicious prosecution

The law in Florida is well settled that a malicious prosecution action requires the plaintiff to prove all of the following six elements: (1) a criminal or civil judicial proceeding was commenced against the plaintiff; (2) the proceeding was instigated by the defendant in the malicious prosecution action; (3) the proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (4) the proceeding was instigated with malice; (5) the defendant lacked probable cause; and (6) the plaintiff was damaged. Kalt v. Dollar Rent–A–Car, 422 So.2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see also Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So.2d 49, 51 (Fla.1974). “The absence of any one of these elements will defeat a malicious prosecution action.” Kalt, 422 So.2d at 1032 (emphasis added). Malice is a fact to be proven by the plaintiff as it is “a necessary ingredient of the charge of malicious prosecution” and it is not synonymous with want of probable cause. White v. Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n, 143 Fla. 518, 197 So. 125, 126 (1940) (emphasis added). “Malice is not only an essential element of malicious prosecution but it is the gist of this cause of action.” Wilson v. O'Neal, 118 So.2d 101, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960) (emphasis added).

The Plaintiffs presented absolutely no evidence of malice. In fact, the Plaintiffs' own expert, Philip Sweeting, admitted that Sgt. Sedano acted without malice. The Plaintiffs were not surprised by Mr. Sweeting's testimony because he unequivocally testified in his videotaped testimony, prior to trial, that there was no malice. Thus, the Plaintiffs should not, in good faith, have pursued their malicious prosecution claims, and the trial court erred in denying the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and their subsequent motion for a directed verdict as to the malicious prosecution claims.

B. Sgt. Sedano was insulated from a malicious prosecution claim as a matter of law

It is undisputed that Sgt. Sedano contacted and consulted with the State Attorney's Office prior to making any arrests in this case. The Assistant State Attorney with whom Sgt. Sedano conferred concluded that Sgt. Sedano had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiffs. Moreover, Sgt. Sedano relied on the advice of the Assistant State Attorney, and the State Attorney's Office made all of the charging decisions. The Plaintiffs' counsel, who represented the Plaintiffs at trial and in this appeal, admits in his answer brief that “[t]he State Attorney's charging decision insulated Sgt. Sedano from liability for malicious prosecution.” The...