Miami-Dade County v. Asad, No. 3D07-363 (Fla. App. 3/11/2009)
| Decision Date | 11 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D07-363,3D07-363 |
| Parties | Miami-Dade County and Sergeant Patricia Sedano, Appellants, v. Ahmed Asad, Noel Rivera, and Tony Garcia, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Miami-Dade County Attorney and Eric K. Gressman, Assistant County Attorney; Teri Guttman Valdes, for appellants.
De Fabio and Fenn and Leonard P. Fenn, for appellees.
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and SUAREZ and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
Appellants, Miami-Dade County ("County") and Sergeant Patricia Sedano ("Sergeant Sedano"), defendants below (collectively "the Defendants"), appeal from a final judgment of false arrest entered in favor of appellees Ahmed Asad, Tony Garcia, and Noel Rivera, plaintiffs below. We affirm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence where the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any danger of its prejudicial effect. The Defendants' motion for directed verdict as to the false arrest claim was properly denied because there was competent substantial evidence for the jury to consider the factual question of whether circumstances existed to support probable cause. Finally, the Defendants cannot demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial.
When Shalresia Tomlin's bond was revoked, Albert Scaletti, a bondsman, informed police that he planned to apprehend her and surrender her to police custody. Tomlin learned of her impending arrest and asked a friend, Daniel Walker, to drive her away without telling him she was hoping to avoid arrest. Scaletti located Tomlin and Walker on a rural road in Miami-Dade County, forced them to pull over at gunpoint, and with two or three other men, savagely beat Walker and arrested Tomlin.
Sergeant Sedano, the lead investigator for this incident, interviewed Walker to identify the attackers. Walker positively identified Scaletti, but could not identify the other men. Sedano requested the names of all the bondsmen insured by Scaletti's insurance company from the Department of Insurance, believing that they must work together. She then prepared photographic lineups using photos corresponding to the names provided by the Department of Insurance. The Plaintiffs' names were among the names provided, and even though both Walker and Tomlin failed to identify the other plaintiffs as participants in Walker's beating, Sergeant Sedano arrested them without warrant. Sergeant Sedano only spoke to witnesses who contacted her, failed to investigate, or even to note, any tips she received, and arbitrarily credited or ignored identifications of suspects. Following Sergeant Sedano's questionable investigation and filing of charges, all charges against the Plaintiffs were dismissed. The Plaintiffs then sued Miami-Dade County and Sergeant Sedano for violation of their civil rights, malicious prosecution and false arrest.
At trial below, the jury found that Sergeant Sedano had violated each Plaintiff's civil rights and maliciously prosecuted each, but also found that Sergeant Sedano was not liable for civil damages because these two violations were committed in good faith. The jury did find that Sergeant Sedano had no good faith defense to the false arrest claim, found her liable for false arrest, and awarded damages accordingly. Upon delivery of the verdict, the Defendants argued that the verdicts were inconsistent and requested that the trial court instruct the jury to redeliberate. The trial court denied the request, as well as the Defendants' subsequent motions for post-verdict relief.
The Defendants now seek to reverse on grounds that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, erred as a matter of law by denying their motion for directed verdict as to the false arrest claims, and erred by denying their motion for new trial. We disagree.
We first examine the Defendants' claim that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. We find that the trial court did not err as the evidence was relevant and probative. We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Sims v. Brown, 574 So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1991) (); H&H Elec., Inc. v. Lopez, 967 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). The Defendants argue that the trial court erred in failing to exclude the following evidence not relevant to the claim of false arrest: (1) the attorney's fees paid by the Plaintiffs in the criminal proceedings against them, (2) Asad's submission of alibi witnesses, and (3) the dismissal of criminal charges as to each Plaintiff. Defendants claim this evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial as to the claim of false arrest and should have been excluded. This argument fails, however, because there were two claims before the jury in addition to that of false arrest, namely, violation of civil rights and malicious prosecution. This evidence was relevant to the issue of malicious prosecution.1
Section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2003), provides that "relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Additionally, relevant evidence may be "admissible as to one party or for one purpose, but inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose." § 90.107, Fla. Stat. (2003). When such evidence is admitted, "the court, upon request, shall restrict [that] evidence to its proper scope and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted." § 90.107 (emphasis added). Thus, if the contested evidence was relevant to any of the three claims against the Defendants, it could properly be admitted under sections 90.403 and 90.107.
All three of the Defendants' examples of "irrelevant" evidence were relevant and had probative value in the claim of malicious prosecution, though perhaps not false arrest. Because of the limited admissibility of the contested evidence, the Defendants had the right to request a limiting instruction, but they failed to do so thereby waiving that right. We conclude that the record below demonstrates that the danger of unfair prejudice was insufficient to substantially outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence going to the claim of malicious prosecution. In the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm the trial court's evidentiary rulings.
Next, we address the Defendants' claim that the trial court erred by denying the motion for directed verdict on the claim of false arrest because there was evidence of probable cause to arrest. When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for directed verdict, appellate courts must view all the evidence in favor of the non-moving party. The grant of a directed verdict can be affirmed only where no proper view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001). By contrast, the denial of a motion for directed verdict must be sustained if it is supported by competent substantial evidence. Jones v. Rives, 680 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The record shows there was competent substantial evidence to support the denial. The question of whether Sergeant Sedano had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiffs was a question of fact for the jury because there were material factual disputes about the identification of the Plaintiffs and the reasonableness of Sergeant Sedano's investigation. Whether facts and circumstances exist to support probable cause is a pure question of fact that "must necessarily be submitted to the jury when the facts are in controversy; the court instructing them what the law is." City of Pensacola v. Owens, 369 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. 1979). It was the province of the jury to consider and weigh all the evidence regarding Sergeant Sedano's pre-arrest investigation, with instruction from the trial judge on the law, before deciding whether Sergeant Sedano had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiffs. "Determinations regarding the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses are peculiarly within the province of the finder of fact and will not be disturbed on appeal." M.A.B. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 630 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Dreyfuss v. Dreyfuss, 701 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). We will not set aside the jury's finding of fact on appeal by reversing the trial court's denial of the Defendants' motion for directed verdict. The trial court's decision was based on competent substantial evidence, so we must affirm.
We turn now to the Defendants' argument that the trial court erred by denying their motion for new trial. The standard of review for the denial of a motion for new trial is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Barkett v. Gomez, 908 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). If reasonable people could differ concerning the propriety of the trial judge's decision, then no abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The Defendants claim that the discovery of new evidence and inconsistent verdicts justify a new trial. However, whether new evidence has been discovered is questionable, as the Defendants have not demonstrated that the new evidence could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence. Dade Nat'l Bank of Miami v. Kay, 131 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
The Defendants also claim that the verdicts finding that Sergeant Sedano acted...
To continue reading
Request your trial