Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County

• Decision Date: 29 January 1981
• Docket Number: 55991,Nos. 56008,s. 56008
• Citation: 394 So.2d 981
• Parties: MIAMI DOLPHINS, LTD., Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, etc., Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 981

394 So.2d 981

MIAMI DOLPHINS, LTD., Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, etc., Appellee.

Nos. 56008, 55991.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 29, 1981.

Rehearing Denied April 1, 1981.

Dan Paul of Paul & Thomson, Miami, for appellant.

Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty., Vicki Jay, Asst. County Atty., and Stuart Simon, Miami, for appellee.

ADKINS, Justice.

These are consolidated appeals from a final declaratory judgment of the Circuit Court of Dade County specifically passing upon the constitutionality of section 125.0104, Florida Statutes (1977), and a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972); Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii).

On April 4, 1978, the Dade Metropolitan County Commission (hereinafter referred to as the commission), pursuant to section 125.0104, Florida Statutes (1977), known as the "Local Option Tourist Development Act" (hereinafter referred to as the act), created a Tourist Development Council which in turn developed and submitted to the commission a tourist development tax expenditure plan. The plan was adopted by the commission, subject to voter approval at an October 5, 1978, election. Following the commission's actions certain Dade County residents filed an action in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County seeking to enjoin the referendum on the plan, and, on September 8, 1978, an injunction was granted. No appeal was taken from the circuit court's order of September 8.

On October 4, 1978, the commission, by ordinance (hereinafter referred to as the ordinance), adopted another tourist development tax expenditure plan (hereinafter referred to as the plan), similar to the prior one, and placed it on the ballot for a November 7, 1978, election. The plan proposed a "tourist room tax at the rate of two percent on hotel, motel, and similar accommodations rented for a term of six months or less." The revenues of the tax were to be used, among other things, to "modernize and improve and the present Orange Bowl Football Stadium."

A group of Dade County citizens, joined by the intervenor/appellant, Miami Dolphins (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), filed an action against Metropolitan Dade County (hereinafter referred to as the county or appellee), for injunctive and declaratory relief seeking to prevent a referendum on the plan. On October 27, 1978, the circuit court issued an order enjoining the referendum and declaring the ballot question invalid because of its failure to meet statutory requirements, its vagueness, and its misleading nature. The circuit court deferred passing on constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs.

The county appealed the order of October 27 to the Third District Court of Appeal, and on November 2, 1978, that court issued an order, with an opinion to follow, reversing the circuit court. The opinion, ¹ filed on December 12, 1978, held that the ballot question as framed did not violate statutory requirements, that it was not misleading, and that "the other contentions raised by the plaintiffs," i. e., the constitutional objections, were insufficient as a basis for enjoining the holding of a tourist tax referendum. In the meantime, the plan had been placed on the November 7 ballot and been approved by the voters.

Following the Third District Court of Appeal's ruling on the matter, the circuit court, on December 22, 1978, issued a final declaratory judgment finding the act constitutional both facially and as applied and the ordinance implementing the plan lawful and in compliance with the act.

It is initially contended that no valid tourist development plan was adopted and so the ordinance fails to comply with the requirements of the act. The city of Miami, which owns the Orange Bowl, and the appellant are parties to an agreement governing the latter's use of the stadium for professional football games. The agreement requires the Dolphins' consent for any renovation or construction planned for the Orange Bowl. At the time the plan was adopted, no agreement existed between the city, the county, or the Dolphins permitting the county to implement its proposed renovations. Thus, argues appellant, the plan contained in the ordinance was legally defective and invalid. Appellant reasons that since "a condition precedent to the passage of the ordinance and the referendum is the adoption of a valid tourist development tax plan," the requirements of the act have not been met.

The plan in the case sub judice does, however, comply with the requirements of the act. Section 125.0104(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), provides as follows:

The plan shall set forth the anticipated net tourist development tax revenue to be derived by the county for the 24 months following the levy of the tax; the tax district in which the tourist development tax is proposed; and a list, in the order of priority, of the proposed uses of the said tax revenue by specific project or special use as the same are authorized under subsection (5). The plan shall include the approximate cost or expense allocation for each specific project or special use.

The statute does not require that the plan submitted to the board include evidence that each proposal contained therein is feasible and permissible. The plan adopted by the commission complied with each of the requirements enunciated in section 125.0104(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and the absence of an agreement between the city and the county on the proposed renovation does not effect its validity.

Appellant also argues that the plan improperly attempts to transfer a function from a municipality to a county without complying with article VIII, section 4, of the Florida Constitution, which provides as follows:

Transfer of powers. By law or by resolution of the governing bodies of each of the governments affected, any function or power of a county, municipality or special district may be transferred to or contracted to be performed by another county, municipality or special district, after approval by vote of the electors of the transferor and approval by vote of the electors of the transferee, or as otherwise provided by law.

According to the appellant, the plans for renovation of the Orange Bowl would require transferring the jurisdiction thereover from the city to the county, would be accomplished without a vote by the electors of the transferor city, and therefore would be unconstitutional. In support of its argument, appellant cites this Court's decision in Sarasota County v. Town of Longboat Key, 355 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1978).

In Sarasota, four cities challenged an ordinance adopted by the Sarasota County Commission proposing a referendum on certain amendments to the county charter. The amendments, which were to be voted on by the residents of Sarasota County, would transfer the responsibility for five distinct governmental functions (air and water pollution control, parks and recreation, roads and bridges, planning and zoning, and police), from four Sarasota County cities to the county. The trial court granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the referendum on the grounds that the ordinance violated article VIII, section 3, of the Florida Constitution and was unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, this Court held that the ordinance did not violate article VIII, section 3, of the Constitution and was not unconstitutionally vague, but affirmed the trial court's order on the grounds that the ordinance violated article VIII, section 4, of the Constitution.

A plain reading of Article VIII, Section 4 reflects that a transfer of governmental powers requires distinctive procedures for the initiation of a transfer, that is, "by law or by resolution of the governing bodies of each of the governments affected." We think it clear from the specificity of the procedure in Section 4 that the "by law" reference connotes the need for a separate legislative act addressed to a specific transfer, in the same manner that two or more resolutions of the affected governments would address a specific transfer.

Id. at 1201 (footnote omitted).

The holding in Sarasota does not, however, compel a similar holding here. In Sarasota, the county sought to transfer certain functions or powers to itself from the cities. Had the ordinance been voted on and approved, the county would have acquired full responsibility for five functions previously exercised by the city. No longer would the cities involved have had any control over those functions, which would have become the responsibility of the county alone. Such is not the case here.

The ordinance here does not seek to transfer jurisdiction over the Orange Bowl, nor even jurisdiction over the maintenance thereof, from the city of Miami to Dade County. It simply allocates certain tax revenues for the renovation of the stadium. The county has indicated that it will offer the money to the city and does not intend to exercise control over the project.

The plan does not require that the city transfer any jurisdiction over the stadium to the county. It is simply being asked to accept a grant of funds to be used for a particular purpose. Clearly the ordinances in Sarasota and here have entirely different purposes and effects, and while that in Sarasota violated article VIII, section 4, with its improper attempt to transfer powers, the one here attempts nothing of the kind. The ruling in Sarasota, therefore, does not apply here.

Further, any questions raised concerning whether the county can give the money to the city to use for renovations rather than insisting upon retaining control itself over the project are laid to rest by the provisions of section 125.0104(5)(a), Florida Statutes. Under that section the county may implement its renovation plans "through service contracts and leases with persons who maintain and operate adequate existing facilities." The county need not acquire control over the Orange Bowl in order to...