Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Collazo

• Decision Date: 09 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75--649,75--649
• Citation: 329 So.2d 333
• Parties: 1 Media L. Rep. 2361 The MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. Agustin COLLAZO, and the City of Miami, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 333

329 So.2d 333

1 Media L. Rep. 2361

The MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. Agustin COLLAZO, and the City of Miami, Appellees.

No. 75--649.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 9, 1976.

Rehearing Denied April 22, 1976.

Paul & Thomson, Parker D. Thomson, Sanford L. Bohrer, Heller & Kaplan, Miami, for appellants.

Rentz, McClellan & Haggard, Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Knight, Underwood, Gillis, Karcher, Reinert & Gordon, Miami, John U. Lloyd, City Atty., Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellants, The Miami Herald Publishing Company and Joe Oglesby, bring this appeal from an order of the trial court denying their petition for reconsideration of an order sealing the terms of a settlement agreement. The order also denied appellee The Miami News' motion to make public the terms of the final judgment. Due to its community of interest with appellants, appellee The Miami News will be considered for the purposes of this appeal as an appellant.

On November 19, 1973, appellee Agustin Collazo was shot by a City of Miami police officer during the course of a burglary investigation. As a result of the shooting, Collazo became paralyzed from the neck down. On January 1, 1974, he filed suit against The City of Miami alleging that police misconduct and improper police training caused his injuries. By amendment, the City's primary and excess insurance carriers were also joined as defendants.

A jury trial commenced on December 9, 1974, and on December 11, 1974, the case was settled. Prior to entering into a formal settlement, it was agreed by counsel for all parties that the terms of the settlement would not be made known to the press or to the public.

The settlement terms were reported in closed proceedings with only the parties, their counsel, and the court present. These proceedings were reported, in pertinent part, as follows:

'(The following proceedings were had without the presence of the jury.)

'. . . MR. KNIGHT: Come now the attorneys for their respective clients in open court, and move the Court for an order of dismissal with prejudice.

'Each party to bear their own costs. Grounds therefor counsel submit to the Court being that the parties have amicably disposed of their respective claims under the following terms and conditions:

'1) That the primary carrier for the City of Miami to-wit: Appalachian Insurance Company will tender its full and complete coverage in the sum of $_ _.

'2) That the excess carrier, Midland Insurance Company will tender to the plaintiff the sum of $_ _.

'And, in addition thereto, will satisfy the Jackson Memorial lien to the extent of an amount no greater than $_ _.

'In the event, however, that that lien can be satisfied at a lesser amount that is to his benefit.

'THE COURT: So stipulated, Gentlemen?

'Mr. McCLELLAN: So stipulated.

'MR. KARCHER: So stipulated.

'But will the Court further instruct counsel so that they may in turn instruct their respective clients or the parties involved thereto, that this is to be a sealed settlement and that the terms and conditions of such settlement are not to be voluntarily disclosed to any media or to any other organization without specific stipulation of the Court? . . .'

'. . . THE COURT: Let the record also reflect that I have instructed the clerk of the court, the court reporter, and my bailiff that they are not to divulge any of this information at anytime to anyone and you, sir, Mr. Interpreter, you also are not at anytime, to anyone divulge any such information. Do you understand that, sir?

'THE INTERPRETER: Yes . . .'

'. . . (The jury returned to the courtroom at 2:22 p.m.)

'THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlement of the Jury, it must be obvious to you that something has taken place in the interim period, otherwise you would have been called in long before this.

'I have just concluded a conference with the attorneys in my chambers where a question of settlement in this case was discussed.

'Following that discussion an agreement was reached by all parties concerned. This courtroom was then cleared for the purpose of the attorneys talking to their respective clients about the settlement involved. In that it was thought that this should be called a sealed verdict and that the amount of money involved was no one's business but those of the parties involved themselves, that was the reason this was done.

'A settlement agreement was reached satisfactorily to all of the parties concerned, and in view of those circumstances your services are no longer required in this case. . . .'

On December 26, 1974, appellee Collazo's counsel filed a satisfaction of judgment stating that the 'sealed judgment as heretofore entered on the 11th day of December 1974 in Chambers for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($10.00) and other good and valuable considerations' had been satisfied.

Thereafter, appellants who had been publishing news articles in their respective newspapers concerning the filing of this action, the trial, and appellee Collazo, filed petitions for reconsideration of the trial court's order sealing the terms of the settlement agreement and the final judgment. On March 25, 1975, the trial court entered an order denying appellant's petitions. Basically, both petitions sought to make public the terms of the settlement agreement. From this order, appellants appeal.

Appellants contend that the trial court, by ordering a portion of the proceedings before it sealed from the press and the public, acted in excess of its jurisdiction, abused its discretion, and denied them their constitutional right to gather and publish the news. Appellee The Miami News concurs with the points raised on appeal by appellants and further contends that it has a fundamental constitutional right to have access to all judicial proceedings and the public has no less right.

Appellees Collazo and the City of Miami contend that the parties to civil litigation have a right to settle such litigation on terms that are acceptable to the respective parties without being forced to divulge the terms of the settlement to appellants.

The record shows that the City of Miami has insurance coverage with two carriers for the type of claim made here by appellee Collazo. Premium payments are made from the general operating funds of the City, which funds are obtained through various sources, e.g. real estate taxes paid by taxpayers of the City, including appellants. The premium payable for the City's police primary insurance policy was increased in November, 1974, from $60,000 to $150,000 per year. The insurance carrier asserted that this adjustment was required by reason of the claims experience of the City.

The present insurance contracts, relevant to this appeal, terminate in November, 1975. Prior to their termination, the City will request bids for continued insurance coverage. The premium which the City will have to pay commencing in November, 1975, for this kind of insurance will be determined by its claims experience, including the settlement in this action.

Judicial powers possessed by a trial court are classified either as inherent powers, stemming from its existence as a court, or as powers which depend upon constitutional or statutory authorization for their exercise. Every court has the inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, subject to valid existing laws and constitutional provisions. These powers, however, must be invoked in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. See, e.g., Petition of Florida Bar, Fla.1952, 61 So.2d 646; and 8 Fla.Jur., Courts §§ 40 and 41. Our first determination in the case Sub judice, will be whether the trial court exceeded such discretion in sealing the terms of the settlement agreement and in denying appellants' petitions for reconsideration of the order sealing the terms of the agreement. In making this determination, it will be helpful to briefly consider the particular interests of the affected parties.

We should note that the questions presented by this appeal do not directly involve freedom of the press. However, pragmatically it must be recognized that if the press is excluded from a judicial proceeding or denied access to the result of such a proceeding it is unable to print and disseminate information which it deems newsworthy. As stated in Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1012 (1973), at page 1013, '. . . In a larger sense, freedom of the press loses some of its effectiveness when the press is denied access to information, and such a restriction should therefore be allowed only where other fundamental interests require it . . .'

What is directly involved here is the power and authority of the trial court to conduct a civil trial, involving a governmental entity as one of the parties, i.e., the City of Miami, and, based solely upon the expressed desires of the litigants, deny access to the press, i.e., appellants, of the terms of the settlement agreement concluding such litigation. We note that the trial below was open to the press and the public from its inception and only the terms of the settlement agreement, i.e., the dollar amounts actually awarded to appellee Collazo, were sealed.

As set forth in State Ex Rel. Gore Newspaper Company v. Tyson, Fla.App.1975, 313 So.2d 777, at 782, a trial court in controlling its proceedings has the inherent power to preserve order and decorum in the court room, to protect the rights of the parties and witnesses, and generally to further the administration of justice. In furtherance of this power, there are numerous cases recognizing the power of the court to exclude the press and the public. A review and analysis of these cases, civil or criminal, reflect the existence of cogent reasons for such exclusion, all primarily concerned with guaranteeing the parties a fair and impartial trial. Additionally, the...