Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's U. Local 46 v. McCulloch

• Decision Date: 18 July 1963
• Docket Number: No. 17459.,17459.
• Citation: 322 F.2d 993,116 US App. DC 243
• Parties: MIAMI NEWSPAPER PRINTING PRESSMEN'S UNION LOCAL 46, Appellant, v. Frank W. McCULLOCH, et al., individually and as Chairman and Members of and constituting the National Labor Relations Board, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

116 US App. DC 243, 322 F.2d 993 (1963)

MIAMI NEWSPAPER PRINTING PRESSMEN'S UNION LOCAL 46, Appellant, v. Frank W. McCULLOCH, et al., individually and as Chairman and Members of and constituting the National Labor Relations Board, Appellees.

No. 17459.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued June 13, 1963.

Decided July 18, 1963.

Mr. Neal Rutledge, Miami, Fla., with whom Messrs. Herbert S. Thatcher and David S. Barr, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Stephen B. Goldberg, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, of the bar of the Supreme Court of California, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Messrs. Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, at the time the brief was filed, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. General Counsel, and James C. Paras, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, were on the brief, for appellees. Mr. Hans Lehmann, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, also entered an appearance for appellees.

Before WILBUR K. MILLER, BASTIAN and McGOWAN, Circuit Judges.

McGOWAN, Circuit Judge.

This case arises out of a labor dispute between Local 46 of the Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union and the Miami Herald Publishing Company, publisher of the "Miami Herald" in the City of Miami, Florida. Petitioner desired certification by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining agent for the employees of the Miami Herald. In a challenge to the Board's failure to certify an election, pursuant to Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) (61 Stat. 144, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159), the Union sued the Board and its individual members for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Union appeals from an order of that court dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity.

Important issues are presented concerning application of the doctrine of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958), which engrafted an exception upon the otherwise exclusive means of judicial review of Board orders provided by Sections 10(e) (f) of the Act (61 Stat. 147, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) (f)). The exception is made operative when the Board acts "in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act," and when such action causes the "deprivation * * * of a `right' assured * * * by Congress." This Court must decide (1) whether the exception applies to a failure by the Board to perform an allegedly mandatory act, and, if so, (2) whether the present case is within the exception. An understanding of these issues requires a somewhat detailed statement of the factual background.

I

On August 1, 1961, the Union began a concededly lawful economic strike against the Herald. While the strike was in progress, the Board's Regional Director, pursuant to a petition for certification filed by the Union, directed that an election be held on July 25, 1962.¹ The Herald then requested review, as authorized by Section 3(b), by the Board of the order directing the election. By telegraphic order on July 20, the Board, acting through only one of its members, denied the request, stating that it raised "no substantial issue of fact or law warranting a review."

Thereafter, on July 24, the Herald brought an action in the United States District Court in Florida, to enjoin the scheduled election. The contention was that the denial of the request to review the direction of election was invalid because passed upon by only one Board member, in contrast with Section 3(b) which authorizes delegation by the Board "to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise." The court declined to enjoin the election, which was held as scheduled, but it ordered the ballots impounded pending final determination of the proceeding before it.

Pending the court's hearing on the merits, the Board, on August 22, 1962, vacated the July 20 order denying the Herald's request for review, granted the request, and set aside the July 25 election. On August 24, the Board requested briefs from both the Union and the Herald on the merits of the Regional Director's direction of election. Subsequently, the Florida court, over the objections of both the Union and the Herald,² dismissed the Herald's action as moot, since the desired relief had been granted by the Board.

On November 8, 1962, the Board affirmed the earlier direction of election by its Regional Director, thus finding that the Herald was incorrect in its challenge. However, rather than reinstating the July 25 election, the Board directed the Regional Director to conduct a re-run election, which thereafter was set for December 5, 1962. In its decision, the Board reserved the question of voting eligibility of replaced economic strikers who had been on strike longer than twelve months, stating that it would determine that question "should the votes of the economic strikers be sufficient in number to affect the results of the election * * *;" and the Regional Director was ordered to make appropriate challenges to ballots of economic strikers. This question was presented by that part of Section 9(c) (3) which provides:

"Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike."³

It is the italicized portion of this section which gives rise to the problems with which this case is concerned: The Union began its strike on August 1, 1961; thus, the twelve-month period to which Section 9(c) (3) refers ended on July 31, 1962. Prior to the re-run election, the Union instituted the action from which this appeal was taken, to require the Board to certify the July 25 election, pursuant to the allegedly mandatory requirement of Section 9(c) (1) that if the Board finds that a "question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." Since the Board found that the July 25 election had been properly directed, the argument is that it was required to certify the results thereof.

The District Court did not reach the merits of the Union's arguments. It found that it lacked jurisdiction because the Union "* * * failed to establish that the representation determinations complained of violated either a mandatory provision of the National Labor Relations Act or constitute a deprivation of due process under the Constitution of the United States." Rather, it affirmatively found that the Board's actions were merely an exercise of its "broad discretionary authority under the Act," and therefore not subject to District Court review. The court held further that, since the Board had not yet passed on the voting rights of the economic strikers, the "action is at this time premature."

The second election was held on December 5. Pending the hearing on the Union's appeal from the dismissal of its action, this Court ordered that the ballots of both elections be impounded, because "this appeal presents very close and serious questions."

There is no dispute as between the Union and the Board concerning any of the happenings heretofore outlined, nor their sequence in time. There is disagreement as to the principles of law properly applicable. Indeed, both parties have been quite candid in stating the motivations behind their respective positions. The results of neither election have been determined. The Union readily admits that it has little hope of emerging victorious in the December 5 election, even if it had the benefit of the votes of the economic strikers who participated. This is so because not all of the original strikers who were able to vote on July 25 were available at the later election, due to the necessity of finding employment in other areas. For its part, the Board concedes its reason for refusing to certify the early election to be its serious doubt of the validity of its own procedures, specifically its use of the single-member Board to pass upon the Herald's request for review of the direction of election. Having in mind the practical aspects of labor relations, the Board anticipated that the Herald would refuse to bargain on the basis of the July election, on the ground that it was invalid; that, upon subsequent judicial review of a probable unfair labor practice charge, a court of appeals might uphold the Herald's position; that a new election would then be ordered; and that, as a result, labor relations would remain unsettled for an extended period of time. To obviate this possibility, the Board sought to hold a second election which would be free of the possible infirmity of the first.

II

The general rule that Board orders are judicially reviewable only under Section 10 of the Act is subject to two major exceptions: (1) If Board action results in a denial of a constitutional right, Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir., 1949), or (2) if the Board acts "in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act," (Leedom v. Kyne, supra), then a federal court has jurisdiction of a suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1337⁴ to challenge such action. We find in this case no denial of a constitutional right,⁵ and proceed to consideration of the second exception.

In the case of Leedom v. Kyne, the Board had ruled that the appropriate bargaining unit should include a small group of non-professional employees in a larger group of professionals, without obtaining the consent of the latter. Section 9(b) grants the Board wide discretion in determining the appropriate unit, "Provided, That it shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate * * * if such unit includes both professional employees and...