Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp.
Decision Date | 15 March 1940 |
Docket Number | Nos. 68,69.,s. 68 |
Citation | 290 N.W. 833,292 Mich. 373 |
Parties | MICHIGAN CENTRAL R. CO. v. GARFIELD PETROLEUM CORPORATION et al. SAME v. CARPENTER et al. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by the Michigan Central Railroad Company against the Garfield Petroleum Corporation and another, and by the Michigan Central Railroad Company against Alice Carpenter and others, to quiet title to lands. From decrees for defendants, plaintiff appeals; cases consolidated on appeal.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Gladwin County, in Chancery; Neil E. Reid, judge.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
Clark & Henry, of Bay City (John J. Danhof and Harold H. McLean, both of Detroit, of counsel), for appellant.
Francis H. Dodds, of Mt. Pleasant, and Hubert J. Gaffney, of Bay City, for appellees.
The above cases were consolidated on appeal.
In 1885, the Saginaw Bay & Northwestern Railroad Company entered upon the lands in controversy, cleared the timber from a right of way, and constructed tracks thereupon. The clearing was 100 feet wide, fenced in on both sides. In 1901, the original entrant deeded the property to the Jackson, Lansing, & Saginaw Railroad Company, and this company in turn conveyed it to the Michigan Central Railroad Company in 1916. During all of this time, the tracks have been maintained and trains operated over the right of way. No question is raised by defendants but what the property has been used and occupied by the railroads for the prescriptive period. The defendants are owners of lands adjoining the strip claimed by plaintiff. Two parcels are in controversy-one a strip 965 feet in length, and the other 1,434.6 feet in length. Each is 100 feet wide. Plaintiff filed a bill to quiet title, and asked that the court decree it to be the owner in fee simple of such lands because of adverse possession. The trial court denied the prayer of plaintiff, but decreed that it was ‘the owner of, with the right to use the surface of aforesaid described strip of land;’ and further adjudged that plaintiff had no right, title, or interest in and to the coal, oil, gas, or other minerals beneath such surface. From such decree, plaintiff appeals.
The only question to be determined in this case is whether a railroad company secures, by adverse possession, an absolute fee in land, over which it lays tracks and operates trains, continuing such user for the prescriptive period. The question is before this court for the first time. Plaintiff claims that it secures an absolute fee to such land by adverse possession; defendants claim that they retain absolute title in the mineral rights, and that plaintiff has only a right of user, similar to an easement.
It is not open to doubt that railroads may acquire titles and interests in lands by adverse possession, and may take an absolute fee by grant. Quinn v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376. But innumerable cases are concerned with the question of what the extent of such interest is, when acquired by adverse possession. In many of the adjudications, the question of what interest a railroad secures by condemnation is discussed; and in determining the extent of interest acquired by user, analogies are drawn to the interests acquired by right of eminent domain. But, because many of such cases depend largely upon provisions of the different statutes and State Constitutions, governing various aspects of the question, they are not helpful in arriving at a determination in the case before us, since our statutory and constitutional provisions are dissimilar, in this respect, to those of other States.
At the outset, it is pertinent to refer to one of the arguments advanced by plaintiff in which it is said:
An observation with regard to this contention may be useful in the elucidation of the question: We are of the opinion that railroad corporations are, in a marked degree, to be treated differently from other persons and corporations in regard to the acquisition of land by adverse possession. Property of individuals taken by railroad corporations for the purpose of constructing their road is, in legal contemplation, taken not for private use, but for a public use, and the tenure of railroads in lands condemned for such a purpose is in the nature of a trust for public use, subject to the supervision of the government. In one of the earliest cases in this State, Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427, 439, the court, in upholding proceedings under the right of eminent domain, discussed the delegation of the right of condemnation to a railroad corporation, and the theory upon which such power could be delegated. The court said:
The United States supreme court has observed: ‘Railroads are a peculiar species of property, and railroad corporations are in some respects peculiar corporations.’ Union Pac. R. Co. v. United States (Central Pacific R. Co. v. Gallatin), (Sinking Fund Cases), 99 U.S. 700, 722, 25 L.Ed. 496.
The principles enumerated in the various cases, and our statutory and constitutional provisions, may be best considered by having in mind such distinct difference between railroad corporations and other corporations and persons.
If, by right of eminent domain, plaintiff in this case could acquire title to mineral rights, it would be clear that such rights were based upon a showing of necessity, as otherwise there would be no authority for such proceedings under the Constitution. If such rights could not be acquired by condemnation because of lack of necessity, it would disprove a title claimed to be acquired by adverse possession.
Elliott on Railroads, §§ 462, 463.
As provided in our Constitution, private property shall not be taken by the public, nor by any corporation for public use, without the necessity therefor being first determined, Const.Mich.1908, Art. 13, § 1; and the necessity must be a real necessity. City of Detroit v. Daly, 68 Mich. 503, 37 N.W. 11. The statute granting railroads the power to condemn provides that after the necessary proceedings and payment to the owner, ‘the company shall be entitled to enter upon and take possession of and use the said land, franchise, and other property for the purpose of its incorporation; and all persons who have been made parties to the proceedings, either by publication or otherwise, shall be divested and barred of all right, estate, and interest in such real estate, franchise, or other property, until such right or title shall be again legally vested in such owner.’ 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 11135.
In Re Petition of Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co., 248 Mich. 28, 226 N.W. 663, 665, the court said that ‘in general it has been held that such land as is essential to the construction, maintenance, and operation of a railroad may be secured by it through condemnation proceedings,’...
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Thompson v. United States
...whether a railroad right-of-way is obtained in fee simple absolute or a lesser estate. Id. at 378-79. In Mich. Cent. R.R. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 290 N.W. 833 (Mich. 1940), the Court held that when a railroad acquires a right-of-way by prescription10 or condemnation11 it cannot acquire......
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Thompson v. United States, 09-612L
...whether a railroad right-of-way is obtained in fee simple absolute or a lesser estate. Id. at 378-79. In Mich. Cent. R.R. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 290 N.W. 833 (Mich. 1940), the Court held that when a railroad acquires a right-of-way by prescription10 or condemnation11 it cannot acquire......
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...taken by the courts is to analogize to the interest acquired by condemnation. In Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292 Mich. 373, 290 N.W. 833, 127 A.L.R. 507 (1940), the issue was whether the railroad could acquire title to mineral rights beneath the right of T......