Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 21 July 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 16-cv-11844
• Citation: 209 F.Supp.3d 935
• Parties: MICHIGAN STATE A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, Mary Lansdown, Erin Comartin, Dion Williams, and Common Cause, Plaintiffs, v. Ruth JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Michigan Secretary of State, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

209 F.Supp.3d 935

MICHIGAN STATE A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, Mary Lansdown, Erin Comartin, Dion Williams, and Common Cause, Plaintiffs,

v.Ruth JOHNSON, in her official capacity as Michigan Secretary of State, Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-11844

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed July 21, 2016

As Amended July 22, 2016

Mark C. Brewer, Goodman Acker, Southfield, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Adam L.S. Fracassi, Denise C. Barton, Erik A. Grill, Joseph Yung-Kuang Ho, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [4]

HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, United States District Court Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Mary Lansdown, Erin Comartin, Dion Williams, and the Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Institute ("Plaintiffs") commenced this action against the Michigan Secretary of State, Ruth Johnson ("Defendant") on May 24, 2016.¹ See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that the passage of Public Act 268 ("P.A. 268") impermissibly burdens the right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301.

On May 27, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, to prevent the enforcement of P.A. 268. A hearing was held on July 14, 2016 at 11:00 a.m. The matter is fully briefed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the preliminary injunction.

II. BACKGROUND

The current litigation centers on legislation to ban "straight-party voting" on Michigan ballots. Straight-party voting allows citizens to vote for all of the partisan candidates of a particular party by filling a single bubble on their ballot. The most common reasoning behind the use of straight-party voting is that it reduces the amount of time needed to complete a ballot. Dkt. No. 4 at 19 (Pg. ID No. 336).

Voters in Michigan have had the option to cast a straight-party vote for the last 125 years. Complaint, ¶ 23. However, there have been several attempts to abolish the practice. First in 1964, the Michigan Legislature enacted P.A. 240. However, during the November 1964 election, the citizens rejected P.A. 240 via referendum. In 2001, the Legislature tried again with P.A. 269. However, the law was again struck down by voters.

Most recently, on January 20, 2015, Senator Marty Knollenberg introduced Senate Bill 13 to eliminate straight-party voting in Michigan. The Legislature passed P.A. 268 on December 16, 2015. On January 5, 2016, Governor Snyder signed P.A. 268 into law. P.A. 268 will go into effect for the first time in the November 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Attached to P.A. 268 is an appropriation, thereby blocking a referendum. See Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State , 464 Mich. 359, 630 N.W.2d 297 (2001).

The new ballots for the 2016 election look identical to the 2014 ballots, except that the section for straight-party voting has been removed. Critically however, the new 2016 ballots still contain vignettes of the major political parties, thus raising further concerns about voter confusion. Complaint, ¶ 3.

There is no dispute that straight-party voting helps to save time in the voting process. Several elections officials in Oakland County, Detroit and Lansing have filed affidavits asserting that the elimination of straight-party voting will increase line lengths and waiting times for voters. Complaint (Exhibit 14). They claim they are most concerned with wait times in urban settings, predominantly populated by African-American voters.

Kurt Metzger, a Regional Information Specialist with the U.S. Census Bureau in Detroit, Michigan, conducted an analysis (the "Metzger Report") of the likely impact of P.A. 268 on African-American and white voters. See Complaint (Exhibit 10). In addition, the Metzger Report also provided an analysis of socioeconomic, housing and voting data for Michigan. Id.

Metzger acquired the voting results by precinct for nine of the largest counties in Michigan for which straight-party voting data were available. These counties included Genesee, Ingham, Kalamazoo, Kent, Macomb, Muskegon, Oakland, Saginaw and Wayne. Id. (Pg. ID No. 224). Metzger also used 2010 Census data on the racial/ethnic composition of the voting age population for all communities within the nine counties. Id. The Metzger Report found that there was a direct correlation between the use of straight-party voting within a community and the African-American population within that community. Generally, as the African-American population increases in a county, so does the use of straight-party voting.

Within the county data, Metzger documented the voting patterns of each city. Metzger found fifteen cities in Michigan with a straight-party voting rate of about 65% or higher. Metzger Report, Appendix A. Of those fifteen cities, only two, Hamtramck and Mount Morris, were majority white. Id. The five cities with straight-party voting rates greater than 75%, were all majority African American. Id.

City

Percent Black

Percent Straisht-Partv Vote in 2014

Royal Oak Charter Township

95.6%

82.1%

Highland Park

93.1%

82.0%

Detroit City

82.3%

75.5%

Inkster City

70.8%

78.2%

Flint City

53.4%

75.2%

Id. In fact, although the average straight-party voting rate in Michigan is about 50%, the straight-party voting rate in African-American majority districts was 67% in 2012, and 73.5% in 2014. Id.

From this finding, Metzger concluded that African-American voters were much more likely to use straight-party voting than white voters, and that P.A. 268 would have a larger impact on African-American populations than white ones. Id. (Pg. ID No. 231).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies designed to protect the status quo pending final resolution of a lawsuit. See University of Texas v. Camenisch , 451 U.S. 390, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) ; Bonnell v. Lorenzo , 241 F.3d 800, 808 (6th Cir.2001) (finding that preliminary injunctive relief "is an extraordinary measure that has been characterized as 'one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies.' "). Whether to grant such relief is a matter within the discretion of the district court. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp. , 511 F.3d 535, 540 (6th Cir.2007). The same factors are considered in determining whether to grant a request for either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. See Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Assoc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir.1995).

The four factors that must be balanced and considered before the court may issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction include: (1) the likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) the harm to others which will occur if the injunction is granted; and (4) whether the injunction would serve the public interest. Certified Restoration , 511 F.3d at 542 ; In re Eagle–Picher Industries, Inc. , 963 F.2d 855, 858 (6th Cir.1992) ; N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Mansfield, Ohio , 866 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir.1989).

"None of these factors, standing alone, is a prerequisite to relief; rather, the court should balance them." Golden v. Kelsey–Hayes Co. , 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir.1996). Nevertheless, in this Circuit "a finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal." Gonzales v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs , 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir.2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

In response to Plaintiffs' motion, the Defendant makes several arguments for its denial. First, the Defendant argues that the doctrine of laches should apply. Second, the Defendant argues that the Court should abstain from ruling on this matter under the Burford doctrine. Third, the Defendant argues that there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction. Fourth, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims. Finally, the Defendant argues that the four factors considered when analyzing a motion for preliminary injunction favor the Defendant. The Court shall address each argument in turn.

A. Laches

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed under the doctrine of laches. This argument is without merit. P.A. 268 was signed into law on January 5, 2016. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit on May 24, 2016 and filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction three days later. The election does not take place until November. Defendant has failed to show that any actions have been taken that would justify barring this claim under the doctrine of laches. Defendant has also failed to produce evidence that the Plaintiffs purposefully delayed, or exhibited a lack of diligence. Accordingly, this argument fails. See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted , 768 F.3d 524, 538 (6th Cir.2014) (" Husted II "); see also Ohio Organizing Collaborative v. Husted , No. 2:15–cv–1802, 189 F.Supp.3d 708, 726–27, 2016 WL 3248030 at *12 (S.D.Ohio May 24, 2016).

B. The Burford Abstention Doctrine

Defendant next argues that the Court should abstain from hearing the case under the Burford doctrine. Dkt. No. 20 at 13 (Pg. ID No. 548). This argument is also without merit.

The Supreme Court has explained that "Burford abstention is appropriate where timely and adequate state-court review is available and (1) a case presents 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the case at bar,' or (2) the 'exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.' " Caudill v. Eubanks Farms, Inc. , 301 F.3d 658, 660 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans , 491 U.S. 350, 361, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) ...