Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State

• Citation: 630 N.W.2d 297,464 Mich. 359
• Decision Date: 29 June 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 119274, Calendar No. 1.
• Parties: MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION CLUBS, Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners, Ross Dykman, David K. Felbeck, and Corrie Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and State Board of Canvassers, Defendants-Appellees, and People Who Care About Kids, Intervening Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

630 N.W.2d 297

464 Mich. 359

MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION CLUBS, Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners, Ross Dykman, David K. Felbeck, and Corrie Williams, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SECRETARY OF STATE and State Board of Canvassers, Defendants-Appellees, and People Who Care About Kids, Intervening Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 119274, Calendar No. 1.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued June 13, 2001.

Decided June 29, 2001.

Dickinson, Wright, P.L.L.C. (by Peter H. Ellsworth, Jeffery V. Stuckey, and Scott R. Knapp), Lansing, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Gary P. Gordon and Katherine C. Galvin, Assistant Attorneys General, Lansing, for the defendants-appellees.

Timothy A. Baughman, Royal Oak, for the intervening defendant.

Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones, P.L.C. (by Michael A. Zagaroli and Elizabeth K. Bransdorfer), Grand Rapids, for amici curiae Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police. Dykema, Gossett, P.L.L.C. (by Richard D. McLellan, and Sandra M. Cotter), Lansing, for amici curiae Michigan State Senator Hoffman and Michigan State Representatives Richner and DeVuyst.

TAYLOR, J.

The issue here is whether 2000 Public Act 381 is exempt from the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution. Having granted leave to appeal and heard oral argument, this Court finds as follows:

(1) The power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution "does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions...." Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9.

(2) 2000 PA 381 states that "one million dollars is appropriated from the general fund to the department of state police...." M.C.L. § 28.425w(1).

(3) An appropriation of $1,000,000 is an "appropriation," and the Department of State Police is a "state institution."

(4) Therefore, the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution does not extend to 2000 PA 381.

Accordingly, consistent with Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9 and an unbroken line of decisions of this Court interpreting that provision,¹ the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the relief sought in the complaint for mandamus is granted. The May 21, 2001 declaration by the Board of State Canvassers of the sufficiency of the petition for referendum on 2000 PA 381 is vacated and defendant Secretary of State and the Board of State Canvassers are directed that 2000 PA 381 is not subject to referendum for the reasons set forth herein.

Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(4), the clerk is directed to issue the judgment order in this case forthwith.

CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with TAYLOR, J.

CORRIGAN, C.J. (concurring).

I concur in the result and reasoning of the majority opinion. I write to emphasize that the intervening defendant retains a direct remedy, the initiative process. Under our state constitution, this remedy is available even when the Legislature has made an appropriation to a state institution.

I also wish to emphasize that the Legislature's subjective motivation for making a $1,000,000 appropriation in 2000 PA 381—assuming one can be accurately identified²—is irrelevant. Intervening defendant contends that despite the appropriation in 2000 PA 381 and the plain language of Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9, the act is subject to the referendum process because the "purpose" of the appropriation, as purportedly revealed by the legislative history, was to evade a referendum. This argument is misplaced. This Court has repeatedly held that courts must not be concerned with the alleged motives of a legislative body in enacting a law, but only with the end result—the actual language of the legislation. See Kuhn v. Dep't of Treasury, 384 Mich. 378, 383-384, 183 N.W.2d 796 (1971); C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 681, 259 N.W. 352 (1935); People v. Gibbs, 186 Mich. 127, 134-135, 152 N.W. 1053 (1915).

Our cases follow Justice Cooley's powerful exposition of this doctrine in his seminal work on constitutional law. It is as persuasive to us as it was to our predecessors:

The validity of legislation can never be made to depend on the motives which have secured its adoption, whether these be public or personal, honest or corrupt. There is ample reason for this in the fact that the people have set no authority over the legislators with jurisdiction to inquire into their conduct, and to judge what have been their purposes in the pretended discharge of the legislative trust. This is a jurisdiction which they have reserved to themselves exclusively, and they have appointed frequent elections as the occasions and the means for bringing these agents to account. A further reason is, that to make legislation depend upon motives would render all statute law uncertain, and the rule which should allow it could not logically stop short of permitting a similar inquiry into the motives of those who passed judgment. Therefore the courts do not permit a question of improper legislative motives to be raised, but they will in every instance assume that the motives were public and befitting the station. They will also assume that the legislature had before it any evidence necessary to enable it to take the action it did take. [Cooley, Constitutional Law, pp. 154-155.]

YOUNG, J. (concurring).

I join and fully concur in the admirably concise majority opinion. I write separately to provide the rationale and analysis for my conclusion that 2000 PA 381 is exempt from the referendum power of art. 2, § 9 of our 1963 state constitution and why I take exception to the constitutional exegesis offered by my dissenting colleagues.

I. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT

There is no gainsaying that 2000 PA 381 has become the focus of a heated debate among various segments of Michigan's citizens; Justice Cavanagh's dissent is generous in providing his own extensive personal views on the public controversy surrounding 2000 PA 381. However important, this political issue—the merits or demerits of the underlying act—is not before this Court. The sole question we are to decide in this case is a legal one: Is 2000 PA 381 subject to the referral process under the provisions of art. 2, § 9? If it is, 2000 PA 381 will not become effective until the next general election—if a majority of the voters then approve it. Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9; MCL 168.477(2). If the stated limitation on the people's referral power contained in art. 2, § 9 applies, the act is not subject to the referendum process at all.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2000, the Legislature enacted 2000 PA 381, M.C.L. § 28.421et seq., which modifies the standards for the issuance of concealed weapons permits. The effective date of the law is July 1, 2001.

Intervening defendant is a group that filed with defendants Secretary of State and Board of State Canvassers a petition, signed by approximately 260,000 Michigan voters,³ requesting a referendum on the new law. Although the Board of Canvassers initially, by a two-to-two vote, declined to certify the petition on the basis that the law may not be subject to referendum, on May 21, 2001, the board certified the petition. Approximately 230,000 valid signatures supported the petition (80,000 more than the number required).⁴

On March 23, 2001, plaintiffs—two organizations that lobbied for the law and three individuals who want to apply for concealed weapons permits—filed a complaint for mandamus in the Court of Appeals, seeking to prevent the Board of State Canvassers from proceeding with the canvass of the petitions. Plaintiffs argued that 2000 PA 381 is not subject to referendum because it contains an appropriation to a state institution, the Department of State Police, and the Michigan Constitution provides that "[t]he power of referendum does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions...." Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9.

As stated, plaintiffs contended that two provisions in 2000 PA 381 make appropriations for a state institution within the meaning of art. 9, § 2. The first, § 5v of the act, (1) creates a concealed weapon enforcement fund in the state treasury, (2) allows the state treasurer to receive money or other assets from any source for deposit into the fund and to direct the investment of the fund, (3) provides that money in the fund at the close of the fiscal year shall remain in the fund and not lapse to the general fund, and (4) directs the Department of State Police to expend money from the enforcement fund only to provide training to law enforcement personnel in connection with the act.⁵ The second, § 5w(1) of the act, provides that "[o]ne million dollars is appropriated from the general fund to the department of state police for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001" for such activities as distributing free safety devices to the public and creating and maintaining a database of individuals applying for a concealed weapons license.⁶ Plaintiffs further argued that defendants Secretary of State and the Board of Canvassers had a threshold duty to determine whether the petition on its face meets the constitutional prerequisites for acceptance and canvassing, and that, until this determination was made, canvassing should cease.

In an order dated April 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted People Who Care About Kids permission to intervene and accepted the amicus curiae brief of the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police. The panel then dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for mandamus, holding—on a ground not raised by the parties—that

the matter is not ripe for this Court's consideration. The Board of State Canvassers has not completed its canvass of the referendum petitions. MCL 168.479.⁷

On plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal, this Court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals for plenary consideration of the complaint for mandamus.⁸ 463 Mich. 1007-1008, 625 N.W.2d 377 (2001).

On remand, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' request for mandamus, holding that "2000 PA 381 is...