Michael G. v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty.
| Docket Number | S271809 |
| Decision Date | 06 April 2023 |
| Citation | 14 Cal.5th 609,526 P.3d 120,306 Cal.Rptr.3d 387 |
| Parties | MICHAEL G. et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent; Orange County Social Services Agency et al., Real Parties in Interest. |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Martin Schwarz, Public Defender, Seth Bank, Assistant Public Defender, and Brian Okamoto, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Dominika Campbell and Dennis Smeal for California Dependency Trial Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, Aurelio Torre, Deborah B. Morse and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency.
Jennifer B. Henning; and Samantha Stonework-Hand, Deputy County Counsel (Alameda), for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency.
Law Office of Harold LaFlamme and Hannah Gardner for Real Party in Interest A.G.
Kristin Hallak and Leslie Starr Heimov for Children's Law Center of California, Children's Legal Services of San Diego and Dependency Legal Services as Amici Curiae.
Under California's child dependency law, when a child is removed from a parent's custody, the juvenile court ordinarily must order reunification services to help the parent address the conditions that led to the child's removal. Reasonable reunification services must be offered to qualifying parents for a minimum period of six or 12 months, depending on the age of the child, and generally may be extended for up to a maximum total period of 18 months. This statutory timeline is designed to achieve a delicate balance between families’ interests in reunifying and children's interests in avoiding protracted uncertainty about who will care for them.
The question in this case is whether a juvenile court is automatically required to grant a further extension of services if it finds that reasonable services were not provided during the 12- to 18-month extension period. Under the governing statutes, the answer is no. Once a child has been out of the parent's custody for 18 months, the law ordinarily requires the court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan for the child's care. A parent who has not received reasonable services may seek an extension of services beyond 18 months, but such extensions are not automatic: In addition to ensuring other statutory conditions are met, the juvenile court must consider the child's interests in deciding whether the extension, and consequent delay to the child's permanent placement, is warranted. ( Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.22, subd. (b), 352.)
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached the same conclusion.
This case arises from dependency proceedings involving the minor A.G. At the start of the proceedings, A.G. was 14 years old and living in the care of her father (Father).1 In a dependency petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, the Orange County Social Services Agency (Agency) alleged that Father suffered from unresolved mental health issues that sometimes manifested in violent behavior. After determining that Father's delusions and paranoia put A.G. at risk of serious harm, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over A.G. and ordered that she be removed from Father's custody. The court directed the Agency to provide Father with reunification services and mandated a psychological evaluation.
At the six-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had received his case plan several months earlier but had yet to sign the plan or engage in the recommended services, which included parenting classes and individual counseling. Father also resisted completing a psychological evaluation. Father attempted to keep in touch with A.G. via periodic phone calls, but she was reluctant to communicate until he received mental health services. Given this information, the juvenile court found that Father had been offered reasonable services but had made minimal progress in mitigating the circumstances that had led to the juvenile court's intervention. The court concluded that returning A.G. to Father "would create [a] substantial risk of detriment to [her] safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being" and continued the case. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(1).)
At the 12-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had made moderate progress since the last hearing: He had signed the case plan, begun individual counseling, and completed parenting classes. He had also completed his psychological evaluation. The Agency reported that Father was eager to increase communication with A.G., and the parties established a schedule for regular phone calls. While the Agency believed returning A.G. to Father's custody still presented a substantial risk of detriment to her well-being, it recommended continuing the case to the 18-month review because "there [wa]s a substantial probability that the child w[ould] be returned to the physical custody of her parent" by then. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subds. (f), (g)(1).) The court agreed to the extension, finding that the Agency had provided reasonable services to Father and that Father had now made moderate progress in alleviating the causes leading to A.G.’s removal.
At the 18-month hearing, however, the Agency reported that returning A.G. to Father's custody still presented a substantial risk of detriment to her well-being. The Agency noted that Father was not returning calls from his social worker and had abruptly moved out of state without advance notice. Father had also informed his psychological evaluator that he would not consent to continued mental health services because they interfered with his religious beliefs. The Agency recommended that the court end reunification efforts and schedule a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 ( section 366.26 ) so that A.G. could be permanently placed with her older brother and adult family friend, with whom she had been staying since she was removed from Father's custody.
Father contested the Agency's recommendation. He argued that he had completed all aspects of his case plan, including his psychological evaluation, but the social worker assigned to his case had not obtained or reviewed his evaluation report in a timely fashion, facilitated visitation with A.G., or contacted him about further mental health services. Father asked the court to find that the Agency had not offered or provided reasonable reunification services during the most recent extension period, exercise its discretion to continue the case and to extend reunification services, and wait to set a section 366.26 hearing where A.G.’s permanent placement would be decided.
The court found that while the Agency had provided reasonable services for the first 12 months of reunification, it had not provided reasonable services in the period between the 12- and 18-month hearings. The court was, in particular, troubled by the Agency's failure to timely consider the report of Father's psychological evaluation, once Father had finally consented to participate, and to offer Father appropriate mental health support. But while the court acknowledged that it could exercise discretion to continue the case and order more services, it declined to do so. Given Father's inconsistent visitation with A.G. and uneven progress over the past 18 months in addressing the causes that led to A.G.’s removal, the court found that additional services would neither be in A.G.’s best interests nor reasonably likely to lead to reunification. The court ended reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
Father filed a writ petition challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate reunification services. He argued that he was entitled to an extension, given the court's determination that the services provided in the 12- to 18-month extension period were not reasonable. The Court of Appeal denied the petition. ( Michael G. v. Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1138, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 ( Michael G. ).) The Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court was not statutorily required to grant an extension of services. On the contrary, Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), which governs the conduct of the 18-month hearing, instructs that the juvenile court must set a permanency planning hearing if the child is not returned to the parent's custody at the 18-month hearing, regardless of whether reasonable services were provided in the most recent review period. ( Michael G ., at p. 1143, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 110.) The Court of Appeal further held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying a discretionary extension of services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 352 ( section 352 ), given Father's "lack of consistent and regular contact and visitation," "lack of significant and consistent progress in the prior 18 months in resolving the problems that led to [A.G.]’s removal," and a "lack of evidence that [he] had demonstrated the capacity or the ability to complete the components of the case plan." ( Michael G. , at p. 1145, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 110.)
As the Court of Appeal observed, some appellate courts have expressed uncertainty about the proper course of action when a court determines at the 18-month hearing that the parent did not receive reasonable reunification services during the 12- to 18-month extension period. ( Michael G. , supra , 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 ; see In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 21, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 510 [collecting cases]; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251–1252, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 928 ( T.J. ); see also J.C. v. Superior Court (June 28, 2017, G054816) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Aug. 23, 2017, ...
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