Michael Moore, Charles Hooks, Peggy Fechter, Jon Maier, Second Amendment Found., Inc. v. Madigan
| Decision Date | 24 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | 11-03134 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
| Parties | MICHAEL MOORE, CHARLES HOOKS, PEGGY FECHTER, JON MAIER, SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC., and ILLINOIS CARRY, Plaintiffs, v. LISA MADIGAN, in her official capacity as Attorney General for the State of Illinois, and HIRAM GRAU, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois State Police, Defendants. |
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees (d/e 58), Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (d/e 84), and Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Corrected) (d/e 86). Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Renewed (d/e 72). Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees (d/e 58) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. For thereasons detailed in this opinion, Plaintiffs' Attorneys are entitled to attorney's fees totaling $153,871.00. Plaintiffs' Bill of Costs is allowed in the amount of $3,008.29. Plaintiffs' Motions for Sanctions (d/e 84; d/e 86) are DENIED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Renewed (d/e 72) is GRANTED.
In May 2011, individual Plaintiffs Michael Moore, Charles Hooks, Peggy Fechter, and Jon Maier, along with organizational Plaintiffs the Second Amendment Foundation ("SAF") and Illinois Carry filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan and Director of the Illinois State Police Hiram Grau for violations of Plaintiffs' rights under the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that certain Illinois gun laws, the Unlawful Use of Weapons statute, 720 ILCS 5/24-1 [hereinafter "UUW" statute], and the Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon statute, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 [hereinafter "AUUW" statute], violated Plaintiffs' right to keep and bear arms because they restricted possession of guns outside the home under certain circumstances. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the gun laws wereunconstitutional as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions against the laws' enforcement.
This Court denied Plaintiffs' injunctions and granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Moore v. Madigan, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Ill. 2012), rev'd 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). On appeal, this case was consolidated with Shepard v. Madigan. See 863 F. Supp. 2d 774 (S.D. Ill. 2012). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded both cases for entry of a declaration of unconstitutionality and a permanent injunction, but stayed its mandate for 180 days to permit the Illinois General Assembly to "craft a new gun law that will impose reasonable limitations, consistent with the public safety and the Second Amendment." Moore, 702 F.3d at 942. After Defendants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc was denied and the stay was extended an additional 30 days to accommodate the General Assembly's legislative process, the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILCS 66/1 et seq., was passed over gubernatorial veto on July 9, 2013. See Shepard v. Madigan, 734 F.3d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 2013). The same day, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims were moot. (D/e 51.) This Court deniedDefendants' Motion, (d/e 57), and Plaintiffs filed the present Motion for Attorney's Fees claiming $219,808.00 in fees and $3,193.29 in costs. (D/e 58.)
Subsequently, this Court permitted limited discovery including interrogatories and depositions of Plaintiffs' Attorneys in light of the substantial sum Plaintiffs sought in fees and costs in this case, which did not proceed beyond the preliminary injunction stage in this Court. (See Text Order of Jan. 2, 2014; Text Order of Jan. 7, 2014.) On May 5, 2014, Defendants filed their response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, (d/e 70), and the renewed Motion to Dismiss as Moot now before the Court. (D/e 72.) Finally, Plaintiffs filed their Motions for Sanctions, (d/e 84; d/e 86), in July 2014.
Now that the Illinois General Assembly has passed the Firearm Concealed Carry Act and the Illinois State Police have begun accepting, processing, and granting concealed-carry licenses, Defendants assert that no live controversy persists in this case.Accordingly, Defendants move again to dismiss this case as moot. (D/e 72.)
The case at bar no longer presents a case or controversy and must be dismissed as moot. The case-or-controversy requirement applies through all stages of federal proceedings, trial and appellate. Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). "When a challenged statute is repealed or significantly amended pending review, and a plaintiff seeks only prospective relief, a question of mootness arises." Rembert v. Sheahan, 62 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)). The general rule is that "repeal, expiration, or significant amendments to challenged legislation ends the ongoing controversy and renders moot a plaintiff's request for injunctive relief." Fed'n Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Lewis, 494 U.S. 472). To determine whether the Firearm Concealed Carry Act's amendments to the statutory provisions at issue have rendered the instant case moot, this Court must look at the plain language of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act along with "the environment, association and character of the statute in its field of operation, the history ofprevious legislation, the legislative history of the act, the nature of the defect sought to be remedied by its enactment, . . . and the time of taking effect." 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction: Interpretation of Repealing Statutes § 23.6 (7th ed. 2009).
As more fully detailed in this Court's denial of Defendants' first Motion to Dismiss as Moot, the General Assembly did not repeal the UUW and AUUW statutes. See Moore v. Madigan, No. 11-cv-3134, 2013 WL 5587289, at *2 (Oct. 10, 2013). Rather, as of July 9, 2013, the General Assembly significantly amended the statute providing exemptions to criminal liability under the UUW statute, see 720 ILCS 5/24-2, and the AUUW statute itself, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6, to provide a defense to prosecution for these offenses where the defendant has been issued a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act.
From the outset of this case, Plaintiffs sought an end to the ban on private citizens carrying any firearms outside the home—and they expressly reserved support for any new law in Illinois to regulate the carrying of firearms in public, including a constitutional licensing program. (See Am. Compl., d/e 5, p. 2,¶ 4.) They prevailed at the Court of Appeals, whose mandate required the entry of declarations of unconstitutionality and permanent injunctions against the UUW and AUUW statutes as they existed prior to their amendment. 702 F.3d at 942. But the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, first for 180 days and then for an additional 30 days at Defendants' request to accommodate the General Assembly. Subsequently, the General Assembly in the Firearm Concealed Carry Act materially altered the text of the AUUW statute and the "the environment, association and character of the statute in [the] field of operation" of both the UUW statute and the AUUW statute, making the issuance of a currently valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act a defense to prosecution for violating these statutes. See Singer & Singer, supra, at § 23.6.
All this was just as true at the time this Court denied Defendants' initial Motion to Dismiss as Moot on October 9, 2013, as it is now. Last October, however, this Court held that this case still presented a live controversy, and was not moot, for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs had initially sought the end to the ban on carrying any firearms in public, while the Firearm Concealed CarryAct authorized the licensed carrying of a "pistol, revolver, or handgun." See Moore v. Madigan, No. 11-cv-3134, 2013 WL 5587289, at *6-*9 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2013). Accordingly, this Court reasoned that issues raised in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint remained live. Second, this Court noted that, as of October 9, 2013—just 92 days after passage of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act1—no one in Illinois had yet been issued a license under the Act, and, therefore, no relief had yet been provided. Id. at *9.
Since October 9, 2013, two significant events have changed the "environment, association, and character" of the challenged statutes in their field of firearm regulation, rendering the present case moot. See Singer & Singer, supra, at § 23.6. First—as Defendants point out and Plaintiffs concede—the Illinois Department of State Police has begun processing applications for and issuing licenses under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act. (See Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Renewed, d/e 73, p. 2; Pls.' Mem.Opp. Defs.' Renewed Mot. Dismiss, d/e 78, p. 7.) Defendants dispute the relevance of the Department of State Police's actions because the issuance of licenses was the anticipated outcome of passage of the new Firearm Concealed Carry Act and, fundamentally, the anticipated outcome of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. But the issuance of actual licenses provides the relief sought, an end to the flat ban on carrying any firearms outside the home, by permitting the licensed carrying of concealed pistols, revolvers, and handguns. The Firearm Concealed Carry Act remedied the unconstitutional defect of the UUW and AUUW statutes. In light of the relief now provided, the environment, association, and character of criminal liability under the UUW and AUUW statutes have changed.
Second, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the dismissal of this suit's companion case out of the Southern District of Illinois as moot. See Shepard v. Madigan, 734 F.3d at 751-52. In Shepard, plaintiffs pointed out on...
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