Michael v. Guilford County, 690
| Decision Date | 01 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 690,690 |
| Citation | 153 S.E.2d 106,269 N.C. 515 |
| Parties | William T. MICHAEL v. GUILFORD COUNTY, Curtis R. Kennedy and Lindsay W. Cox. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Jack W. Floyd, Greensboro, for plaintiff appellant.
Ralph A. Walker, Greensboro, for defendant appellee.
According to plaintiff's allegations: The zoning regulations of which he complains were adopted by the Board of Commissioners of Guilford County in 1964. Runway No. 5--23, for many years, has been maintained by the Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority to accommodate aircraft during takeoff and landing. Plaintiff's property is located approximately 7,000 feet from the northern end of said runway. Prior to 1965, aircraft passing directly over plaintiff's property did not unreasonably interfere with the use thereof. The depreciation in the value of plaintiff's property resulting from the frequency and lower altitudes of larger and noisier aircraft passing directly overhead has occurred since the adoption of said zoning regulations.
Plaintiff does not allege any facts relating to the legal status of the Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority. His brief directs our attention to Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1946), in which three special acts of the General Assembly relating to the Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority, Public-Local Laws of 1941, Chapter 98, and Session Laws of 1943, Chapter 601, and Session Laws of 1945, Chapter 206, are cited and discussed. The 1941 Act creates the Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority, consisting of five members, as 'a body corporate and politic,' with authority to acquire property for the construction of airports and to make rules and regulations for the maintenance and operation thereof. It provides for the appointment of one member by the City Council of Greensboro; one by the City Council of High Point; and three by the Board of Commissioners of Guilford County. It confers authority '(t)o sue and be sued in the name of said Airport Authority.' The 1943 Act provides, Inter alia, that '(p)rivate property needed by said airport authority for any airport, landing field or facilities of same may be acquired by gift or devise, or may be acquired by private purchase or by the exercise of the power of eminent domain * * *' In Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Johnson, supra, it was held the 1945 Act 'gives complete and express recognition of the plaintiff Authority as the agency of Greensboro and High Point, as well as of Guilford County; and the authority is given each municipality to deal with it, and upon a plebiscite to lend credit and to issue bonds and raise money for its support.' According to These statutes, said Airport Authority is a separate and distinct corporate entity, with power to sue and be sued in its corporate name and to acquire property in its corporate name by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
Whether plaintiff can maintain an inverse condemnation action against said Airport Authority for compensation on account of its appropriation of a flight easement over all or a portion of plaintiff's property is not presented. In this connection, see Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 140 S.E.2d 341. The present action is to enjoin enforcement of particular provisions of a zoning ordinance with reference to plaintiff's property.
The complaint refers to the 'Guilford County Zoning Ordinance' and to certain zoning regulations affecting plaintiff's property. Neither the ordinance in its entirety nor any specific portion thereof is set forth in the complaint or attached thereto as an exhibit.
Since the complaint contains no reference to a special enabling act relating to Guilford County, we must assume the zoning ordinance was adopted pursuant to the statutory authority conferred by G.S. Chapter 153, Article 20B, § 153--266.10 et seq. G.S. § 153--266.10 empowers the board of commissioners of any county to regulate and restrict, Inter alia, '(t)he location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, except farming.' It provides further: G.S. § 153--266.17 requires the appointment of a board of adjustment and contains the following provisions, Inter alia, relating thereto. 'Such board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals from and review any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative official charged with the enforcement of any ordinance adopted pursuant to this article.' Again: Again: 'Every decision of such board shall be subject to review by the superior court by proceedings in the nature of certiorari.'
To what extent, if any, the zoning ordinance purports to define the status, function and powers of an 'Inspections Director' or of a 'Planning Director' is not disclosed. The function of a 'Planning Board' is to make recommendations to the Board of County Commissioners. G.S. § 153--266.15. Obviously, an 'Inspections Director' is an administrative officer from whose decision plaintiff was authorized by G.S. § 153--266.17 to appeal to the board of adjustment. Plaintiff does not allege he has in any manner applied to the board of adjustment for relief.
Plaintiff does not attack the validity of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jackson v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment
...of this Court, in none of which was the authority of the General Assembly to delegate the power questioned. Michael v. Guilford County, 269 N.C. 515, 153 S.E.2d 106; Austin v. Brunnemer, 266 N.C. 697, 147 S.E.2d 182; Durham County v. Addison, 262 N.C. 280, 136 S.E.2d In Harrington & Co. v. ......
-
Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 17
...application to the board for the granting of a variance, in its administrative discretion, on the basis of hardship. Michael v. Guilford County, 269 N.C. 515, 153 S.E.2d 106, was a suit by the landowner to enjoin enforcement of a zoning ordinance by reason of hardship brought after the boar......