Michael v. St. Joseph County, 00-4200

• Decision Date: 03 August 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-4200,00-4200
• Citation: 259 F.3d 842
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2001) Eric Michael, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. St. Joseph County, et al., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 842

259 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2001)

Eric Michael, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. St. Joseph County, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-4200

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued June 6, 2001

Decided August 3, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, No. 3:99cv0495AS, Allen Sharp, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Fairchild, Bauer, and Posner, Circuit Judges.

Fairchild, Circuit Judge.

Eric Michael, a former employee of the St. Joseph County Health Department (the "Department"), brought this action alleging that the Department and various managers violated his First Amendment rights by suspending him for publicly criticizing the Department's water- quality policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.

Michael began working for the Department as a sanitarian in 1989. Eight years later Michael's supervisors began receiving complaints from local developers and other Department employees about Michael's negative attitude. On July 17, 1997, local subdivision planner John Linn sent a letter to Anthony Patton, the Department's director ofenvironmental health, expressing concern over Michael's attitude:

Recently, while driving through a residential subdivision site in Harris Township, Eric Michaels, [sic] happened to be at the site, so I stopped to have a casual conversation with him. At the conclusion of the discussion, I was slightly disturbed by his negative attitude and his personal antagonism toward the policies of the Local and State Health Departments with regard to septic systems and water supply in St. Joseph County.

If appropriate, you may wish to discuss and clearly explain the policies, goals and objectives of the Health Department with Mr. Michaels [sic].

(R. 22 at 4.) The next day supervisor Tony Mancuso directed Michael to return boxes to storage but Michael refused. Afterward, Michael submitted a written grievance accusing Mancuso of being rude, demeaning, arrogant and unprofessional. On August 1, Mancuso wrote a letter to George Plain, the Department's health officer, complaining about recurring acts of insubordination by Michael. In the letter, Mancuso referenced Michael's conversations with the public: "We do not need employees, such as Eric, showing disrespect for the whole department by talking to outside contacts and telling them he (Eric) thinks we (Anthony and Tony) don't know how to run a department." (R. 23 at 4.) Plain immediately referred Mancuso's complaint to Patton, who then prepared a memorandum assailing Michael's lack of professionalism. On August 4, Plain suspended Michael without pay and ordered Robert Gonderman, the Department's attorney, to investigate past complaints levied against Michael.

After conducting an investigation, Gonderman submitted a letter to Plain detailing various disciplinary offenses committed by Michael. On September 22, Plain wrote Michael and apprised him of the investigation. Plain informed Michael that the Department would be conducting a hearing to determine the need for further disciplinary action. Plain's letter referred to Michael's conversation with Linn:

While conducting an inspection at Fox Chase subdivision, Mr. Michael told Mr. Linn, one of the subdivision professional planners that he did not agree with the way that the State Health Department and the St. Joseph County Health department [sic] were handling the sanitary system of the subdivision and specifically that the St. Joseph County health [sic] Department does not do what it should do with respect to handling subdivision septic systems.

(R. 22 at 7.) On October 7, 1997, Michael resigned.

On August 4, 1999, Michael brought this action in St. Joseph County Circuit Court. Michael's complaint alleged under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 that St. Joseph County, Plain, Patton and Mancuso violated his First Amendment rights by suspending him in retaliation for his ongoing public criticism of the Department. Michael also alleged state law claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Specifically, he claimed that his suspension violated the St. Joseph County Human Resources Policies and Benefits Manual, which allegedly forbids the Department from penalizing employees for filing a grievance against supervisors.

The defendants removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1446. After discovery the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that Michael failed to establish that his speech was protected by the First Amendment and that the defendants had a legitimate basis for suspending his employment. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Michael's estoppel claim, concluding that he did not detrimentally rely on the county's manual.

On appeal Michael argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the defendants on his First Amendment and promissory estoppel claims. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Vela v. Vill. of Sauk Vill., 218 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Because the purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims, Michael must respond to the defendants' motion with evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2001). To successfully oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Michael must do more than raise a "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts, see Wolf v. Northwest Ind. Symphony Soc'y, 250 F.3d 1136, 1141 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation omitted), and instead must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion, see Albiero, 246 F.3d at 932.

Michael argues that he had a protected First Amendment right to criticize the Department's water-quality policies. Michael claims that his comments to Linn regarding the Department's water policies constitute public speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Government employees do not relinquish their First Amendment right to freedom of speech as a condition of public employment. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Myers v. Hasara, 226 F.3d 821, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2000). We must analyze Michael's claim under a two-step test. First we determine whether he engaged in speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. See Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 940-41 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147). The First Amendment is implicated when a public employee speaks as a citizen upon a matter of public concern, but not as an employee upon matters only of personal interest. See Myers, 226 F.3d at 826. We evaluate whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern by examining the content, form, and context of the speech. See Snider v. Belvidere Township, 216 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2000). The second step under Pickering/Connick is a balancing test. If Michael engaged in speech that is a matter of public concern, we must then balance...