Michael v. St. Louis Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1885
• Parties: JOSEPH MICHAEL ET AL., Respondents, v. ST. LOUIS MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

17 Mo.App. 23

JOSEPH MICHAEL ET AL., Respondents,

v.ST. LOUIS MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Mar. 17, 1885.

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, LUBKE, J.

Reversed and remanded.

MADILL & RALSTON, for the appellant: The insurer is responsible only to the extent of the interest of the applicant, and that must be shown at the trial.-- Ayers v. Insurance Co., 17 Iow. 176-181; Tyler v. Insurance Co., 12 Wend. 513; Mers v. Insurance Co., 68 Mo. 127, 132; Wood, Ins., sects. 257, 258, 260, 281.LEO RASSIEUR and DEXTER TIFFANY, for the respondents: Indefeasibility of title is not the criterion of insurable interest.-- Gaylord v. Insurance Co., 40 Mo. 13, 17.

ROMBAUER, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action on a policy insuring plaintiff, Joseph Michael, and his assigns against loss by fire, in the sum of two thousand dollars, on a stock of goods in a country store. Martin Michael, who claims to hold the policy as collateral security for Joseph's debt to him of one thousand dollars, joins as plaintiff in the action. The main controversy between the parties on the trial of the cause was whether the policy had been avoided by part alienation of the property, and whether the instructions of the court, touching plaintiff's right of recovery, the ownership of the goods, and the measure of damages, are correct.

The by-laws of the insurance company, which are made part of the policy, provide that, in case of any transfer of the interest of any person insured by it, in the property insured, either by sale, process of law, by change in partnership, or otherwise, the policy of such person insured should from thenceforth be void and of no effect.

The assured acquired his interest in the property from his co-plaintiff, Martin Michael, and the contract by which such interest was acquired was offered in evidence on the trial by himself. That contract recited that the vendor would sell and deliver to him the property as soon as he shall have paid to the vendor the total sum of three thousand and sixteen dollars, agreeably to his twelve certain promissory notes of even date therewith, and also further recited “and it being distinctly understood that as agent of and for the benefit of said Martin Michael, the said Joseph Michael, without any compensation or charge, will carry on the said country store, in the usual way of business, selling and buying for cash and not contracting any debts whatever, nor signing any notes or other liabilities, until the above sum, evidenced by said notes, shall have been fully paid and satisfied, to all of which I, Joseph Michael, in consideration of the promises hereby agree.”

This contract was signed by both Joseph and Martin Michael and bears date March 10, 1882. The policy sued on bears date June 24, 1882, and under the same date the following endorsement was made upon it: “Having conveyed by deed of trust the property within insured and the land whereon they stand to Martin Michael, as his interest may appear, I do hereby assign to him the within written policy, to hold as collateral security for the performance of the condition of said conveyance.

JOSEPH MICHAEL.

JOHN C. VOGEL, Prest.

The Directors consent.

ATTEST: JOHN C. SUTTER, Secretary.”

There was no evidence offered by either party that Joseph Michael ever acquired any other interest in the property insured than the one conveyed to him by the above contract.

When the bill of sale was introduced by plaintiff, the trial court suggested that counsel for plaintiff offered to show further acts of the parties making an absolute and complete transfer, but in point of fact, no such evidence was ever offered. On the contrary, the conduct and acts of Joseph Michael, the assured, in his dealings with his brother-in-law, and one Aukeny, to whom, as he himself claimed, he successively transferred interests, purely conditional and to become vested only upon a full payment of his notes held by Martin Michael, clearly indicates his own understanding of the contract, and that he himself was not to become owner of the property until the claim of Martin Michael was fully paid and satisfied.

The only evidence which could possibly be claimed as bearing on this question of modification of the original contract, is the testimony of the assured to the effect that the insurance was taken out upon consultation with Martin Michael, and that Martin Michael said when he informed him he would take out the insurance and assign the policy to him, “that was all right.” No claim is even advanced that the deed of trust mentioned in the assignment of the policy was ever executed or to be executed.

It is true that where a contract is ambiguous, the court should leave the parties to be governed by their understanding of their own language, because it thus in effect enforces the contract they have made; but evidence of such understanding is inadmissible when the language is clear and will admit only of one interpretation.-- St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. City of St. Louis, 46 Mo. 128.

The contract between Martin Michael and Joseph Michael is clear and unambiguous. It is a contract well known to the law, a contract of future sale. The parties might make another contract subsequently if they saw fit to do so, but they could not make another contract by simply concluding that the contract which they had made meant another thing than what its terms clearly import. The question of sole ownership of the property was an issue raised by defendant's answer. As evidence of such ownership, the assured offered the contract of future sale executed by Martin Michael. The interpretation of that contract, its language being free from ambiguity, was a question of law and not of fact. It was for the...