Michele K. Feinzig, P.A. v. Deehl & Carlson, P.A.
| Decision Date | 12 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 3D14–2539,3D14–904.,s. 3D14–2539 |
| Citation | 176 So.3d 305 |
| Parties | MICHELE K. FEINZIG, P.A., etc., et al., Appellants, v. DEEHL & CARLSON, P.A., etc., Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Mase Lara, P.A., and Curtis J. Mase, Jennifer N. Hernandez, Miami, Michele K. Feinzig, and Joanne Rose Telischi, Coral Gables, for appellants.
Deehl, P.A., and David L. Deehl, Coral Gables, for appellee.
In this consolidated appeal, defendant below, Deehl & Carlson P.A. (“Deehl”), appeals a February 24, 2014 final judgment that awarded the sums of $192,269.36 to plaintiff Michele K. Feinzig, P.A. (“Feinzig”) and $82,420.58 to plaintiff Joanne Rose Telischi, P.A. (“Telischi”) (the “Main Appeal”).
Feinzig and Telischi appeal separate post-judgment orders denying them entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to separate proposals for settlement served on Deehl, pursuant to section 769.78 of the Florida Statutes and Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure(the “Fee Appeal”).
We consolidated the appeals and heard oral argument only on the Fee Appeal. For the reasons stated within, we affirm the trial court's final judgment in the Main Appeal, but we reverse and remand the trial court's denial of Feinzig's and Telischi's fee motions in the Fee Appeal.
At all times material, Deehl was a two-lawyer law firm, composed of David Deehl, who owned ninety-five percent of the firm, and Susan Carlson, who owned five percent of the firm.
In 2004, Deehl, representing the plaintiffs, filed in Miami–Dade Circuit Court the case of Maynoldi v. Archbishop Coleman F. Carroll High School, Inc.(the “Case”). Deehl entered into oral contracts with both Feinzig and Telischi to assist Deehl with trial and appellate legal support in the Case. Under these contracts, attorneys Michele Feinzig and Joanne Telischi performed a combined total of 3320 hours of trial support and appellate work on the Case.
The parties' dispute arose sometime in 2010, after this Court overturned a judgment for the Maynoldiplaintiffs, which had been entered after a seven-week jury trial.1Deehl refused to pay Feinzig and Telischi for their services. In December of 2011, Feinzig and Telischi responded by filing the instant four-count complaint against Deehl, asserting that Deehl had breached the parties' oral agreements or, in the alternative, that Feinzig and Telischi were entitled to quantum meruit damages.
The hourly rates Deehl had agreed to pay Feinzig and Telischi, and the reasonableness of the amounts billed by Feinzig and Telischi, were not in dispute. Moreover, there was no dispute that Feinzig's and Telischi's entitlement to compensation was not contingent on the outcome of the Case.
Rather, Deehl asserted that the fees were not yet due to Feinzig and Telischi because the Maynoldicase was not yet complete. Specifically, Deehl alleged that: (i) payment would become due when Deehl was able to pay; and (ii) in the alternative, Feinzig and Telischi failed to complete work on the Case by not accepting additional assignments and, therefore, Feinzig and Telischi had forfeited all or part of their payments.
In addition to these defenses to payment, Deehl also argued below that Florida's Statute of Frauds precluded Feinzig and Telischi from recovery of the fees. Essentially, Deehl argued that the time for performance of each oral contract exceeded one year.
On December 10, 2012, Feinzig and Telischi each served a proposal for settlement on Deehl, pursuant to section 768.79 of the Florida Statutesand Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Feinzig proposed to settle its case for $125,000; Telischi proposed to settle its case for $50,000.
In accordance with Rule 1.442(c)(2)(A), each proposal identified the respective plaintiff making the proposal; each identified Deehl as the party to whom the proposal was being made; and each proposal indicated that, in exchange for payment, the offering plaintiff would file a notice of dismissal with prejudice of that party's claims against Deehl.
Each proposal also included an exhibit titled “Mutual Release” purporting to require each party to release the other party for any claims associated with the case. Each mutual release document contained two signature lines for execution: one line for the offeror's signature (either Feinzig or Telischi) and another for the offeree's signature (Deehl).
The mutual releases contained language which, in pertinent part, read as follows:
The trial court conducted a two-day bench trial in September of 2013, and entered final judgment in favor of Feinzig and Telischi on February 24, 2014. The trial court's final judgment contains detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court concluded that: (i) Feinzig and Telischi did not abandon their work on the Case when they stopped accepting assignments from Deehl as a consequence of Deehl not paying them; (ii) payments to Feinzig and Telischi for their work on the Case at their respective hourly rates were due within a reasonable time; (iii) Florida's Statute of Frauds did not preclude recovery; and (iv) Deehl breached its oral contracts with Feinzig and Telischi.3
Having met the mathematical threshold of section 768.79, entitling them to a recovery of costs and attorney's fees,4Feinzig and Telischi timely filed their respective motions for such fees.
Deehl opposed Feinzig's and Telischi's motions, arguing that Feinzig's and Telischi's proposals for settlement were ambiguous. Specifically, Deehl argued that the language contained in each mutual release, specifically identifying each individual attorney within the firms involved, contradicted that portion of the proposal for settlement that identified each proposal's offeror and offeree.
On September 17, 2014, the trial court entered an order determining that the inclusion of the names of the individual attorneys in the mutual releases' prefatory language created an ambiguity that rendered each proposal for settlement unenforceable.
Deehl timely appealed the trial court's February 24, 2014 final judgment, and Feinzig and Telischi timely appealed the trial court's September 17, 2014 order denying their motions for costs and attorney's fees.
We consolidated the two appeals and entertained oral argument solely on the Fee Appeal.
We review the trial court's final judgment in the Main Appeal to determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent substantial evidence.Miami Fourth, LLC v. GC Lounge, LLC,137 So.3d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). We review de novo the trial court's interpretation of contract law. Gray v. D & J Indus., Inc.,875 So.2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(Mem). When the trial court resolves an issue by a grant of summary judgment, our review is also de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,760 So.2d 126 (Fla.2000).5
Because the trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion for fees was based on an alleged ambiguity in the actual proposal for settlement documents, we review de novo the trial court's order in the Fee Appeal, which denied Feinzig and Telischi their proposed attorney's fees. Oasis v. Espinoza,
In its February 24, 2014 order, the trial court found that: (i) the Statute of Frauds did not apply to invalidate the oral contracts between Deehl and Feinzig and Telischi because, by several measures, the parties intended the contracts to be performed within one year; (ii) the time for payment to Feinzig and Telischi was a “reasonable time” after their performance, and Feinzig and Telischi were not required to wait until the end of the Case for payment; (iii) Feinzig and Telischi, as independent contractors, did not abandon their entitlement to payment for the services they had performed, by declining to accept additional assignments; and, therefore, (iv) Deehl breached the enforceable oral contracts with Feinzig and Telischi.
We affirm the final judgment for Feinzig and Telischi in the Main Appeal. The trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent substantial evidence. The trial court's interpretations of law are well founded.
The trial court determined that...
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