Michigan Civil Rights Commission ex rel. Boyd v. Chrysler Corp., Mack Ave. Stamping Plant

• Decision Date: 22 September 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 18597
• Citation: 16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1578,64 Mich.App. 393,235 N.W.2d 791
• Parties: MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ex rel. Elmer BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, MACK AVENUE STAMPING PLANT, Defendant-Appellee. 64 Mich.App. 393, 235 N.W.2d 791, 16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1578, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,571
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 791

235 N.W.2d 791

MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ex rel. Elmer BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, MACK AVENUE STAMPING PLANT,

Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 18597.

64 Mich.App. 393, 235 N.W.2d 791,

16 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1578,

10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,571

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Sept. 22, 1975.

Released for Publication Dec. 16, 1975.

[64 MICHAPP 394] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Karin A. Verdon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ripple & Chambers (for Boyd), by John F. Chambers, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

A. William Rolf, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and R. B. BURNS and MAHER, JJ.

R. B. BURNS, Judge.

We are called upon in this case to consider two independent questions of first impression in this jurisdiction. First, we must construe the meaning of M.C.L.A. § 423.307(b); M.S.A. § [64 MICHAPP 395] 17.458(7)(b), concerning a requirement of a written complaint as a condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings before the Michigan Civil Rights Commission (hereinafter 'CRC'), plaintiff-appellant in this action. Second, we must consider the impact of a contrary arbitration decision upon a discharged employee's alternative access to relief via the CRC. Our analysis requires us to reverse the Ingham County Circuit Court's grant of defendant Chrysler Corporation's (hereinafter 'Chrysler') motion for a summary judgment.

Elmer Boyd, a black, was suspended from his job at Chrysler on March 25, 1968. Two days later, March 27, Mr. Boyd filed a complaint with the CRC including an allegation of racial discrimination in employment. On April 25, 1968, Chrysler discharged Mr. Boyd for failure to exert a normal effort to do his job. Three days later, April 28, Mr. Boyd filed a union grievance charging 'unjust discharge'. The grievance progressed through prescribed steps to binding arbitration. On December 26, 1968, the arbitrator concluded that Mr. Boyd had been properly discharged for deliberately failing to exert a normal effort to do his job.

On October 20, 1970, the CRC issued a 'Charge' or formal complaint, on behalf of Mr. Boyd against Chrysler alleging that race was a factor in his suspension and discharge. The CRC held a hearing before a hearing referee on January 18, February 8, 9, 11, and 12, 1971. On July 29, 1971, the referee issued his report containing the recommendation that Mr. Boyd's complaint be dismissed. On January 17, 1972, the CRC issued findings of fact and a final order contravening the referee and concluding that race had been a factor in the discharge of Mr. Boyd.

On February 22, 1972, Chrysler filed a petition [64 MICHAPP 396] for review and claim of appeal from the January 17 order in the Ingham County Circuit Court. Before trial Chrysler moved for a summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Boyd had elected an arbitration remedy for his discharge to the preclusion of CRC proceedings. After argument, the court, at its own initiative, wrote the CRC requesting the complaint of Mr. Boyd relating to his April 25, 1968 discharge. In response the CRC indicated that no request had been made of Mr. Boyd to file a second complaint, that the CRC felt that no such complaint was necessary, that its conciliation efforts and hearings had begun subsequent to the discharge and focused thereupon, and that the CRC did not require a new complaint where the subject matter of a cause related to an existing complaint. Chrysler responded by stating that it would not raise as a defense the failure to have the discharge specifically covered by a complaint.

On May 23, 1973, without further argument, the court granted Chrysler's motion for summary judgment setting aside the CRC's order for two reasons: (1) The CRC acted without authority because Mr. Boyd had not filed a written complaint setting forth the particulars of his discharge; and (2) Mr. Boyd, by pursuing his contract grievance procedure to a determination, caused a binding decision to be made preclusive of CRC action to the contrary.

We first consider the question of the nature of a complaint necessary to trigger the involvement of the CRC, and note at the outset what is obvious: the commission is a constitutionally-created entity deriving its powers directly from the people. The full text of the relevant constitutional provisions reads as follows:

Article 1, § 2.

[64 MICHAPP 397] 'No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin.

The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation.'

Article 5, § 29.

'There is hereby established a civil rights commission which shall consist of eight persons, not more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party, who shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, for four-year terms not more than two of which shall expire in the same year. It shall be the duty of the commission in a manner which may be prescribed by law to investigate alleged discrimination against any person because of religion, race, color or national origin in the enjoyment of the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution, and to secure the equal protection of such civil rights without such discrimination. The legislature shall provide an annual appropriation for the effective operation of the commission.

'The commission shall have power, in accordance with the provisions of this constitution and of general laws governing administrative agencies, to promulgate rules and regulations for its own procedures, to hold hearings, administer oaths, through court authorization to require the attendance of witnesses and the submission of records, to take testimony, and to issue appropriate orders. The commission shall have other powers provided by law to carry out its purposes. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state.

'Appeals from final orders of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court having jurisdiction provided by law.'

It is necessary to understand the antecedents of [64 MICHAPP 398] the CRC in order to properly conceive the issue considered herein. The year 1955 saw enactment of the Fair Employment Practices Act, M.C.L.A. § 423.301 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.458(1) Et seq., defining a civil right to employment without discrimination and creating the Fair Employment Practices Commission to administer the act. The new constitution became effective on January 1, 1964, and, in anticipation, the Legislature enacted M.C.L.A. § 37.1 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.548(1) Et seq., to take effect on the same day. This statute amended the 1955 law by substituting all references to the former FEPC with appropriate references to the new CRC, but leaving intact those sections of the 1955 law defining an unfair employment practice and the procedures available to persons claiming to be aggrieved by such practice. Of specific import is the language of M.C.L.A. § 37.4; M.S.A. § 3.548(4), that 'a complaint alleging an unlawful discriminatory practice is subject to the same procedure as a complaint * * * under * * * sections 423.301 to 423.311'. The test of the relevant portion, M.C.L.A. § 423.307(b); M.S.A. § 17.458(7)(b) reads as follows:

'Any individual claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment practice may, by himself or his agent, make, sign and file with the board, within 90 days after the alleged act of discrimination, a verified complaint in writing, which shall state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful employment practice complained of, and which shall set forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information as may be required by the board. Any employer whose employees, or some of whom, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate with the provisions of this act, may file with the board a verified complaint asking for assistance by conciliation or other remedial action.'

[64 MICHAPP 399] The critical language in the 1963 Constitution, article 5, § 29, is that it shall be the CRC's duty 'in a manner which may be prescribed by law' to investigate alleged discrimination and to secure the equal protection of the law. Focusing on the constitutional origin of the CRC, we need determine if M.C.L.A. § 423.307 and M.C.L.A. § 37.4 represent a permissible exercise of the Legislature's restricted authority to prescribe 'the manner' of the CRC's operation, or if these statutes impose a possibly unconstitutional jurisdictional limitation upon the commission. Preliminarily, a determination of the apparent intent of the constitutional framers as to any legislative authority or influence over the CRC is mandatory. ¹

The extensive and impassioned convention debate over the proposals that eventually merged into article 5 § 29 was almost exclusively concerned with the potential role of the Legislature vis-a-vis the projected commission. Proponents of the commission repeatedly observed that it 'has been bottled up in committee' for '10 long years, in this state legislature'. 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p. 2004 (delegate Hodges) (hereinafter 'Record'). Others worried lest 'our legislature disappear * * * completely beneath the waves'. 2 Record 1997 (delegate Heideman). As expressly recognized: 'It's a question of how much you want to require the legislature to do, or to require it by the constitution.' 2 Record 1990 (delegate Martin).

The efforts of the proponents united around an amendment presented by delegate Austin Et al. The ultimate goal was to provide a 'self executing'...