Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service v. Caruso

• Decision Date: 08 October 2008
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:05-CV-128.
• Citation: 581 F.Supp.2d 847
• Parties: MICHIGAN PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff, v. Patricia L. CARUSO, in her official capacity as Director, Michigan Department of Corrections, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

581 F.Supp.2d 847

MICHIGAN PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff, v. Patricia L. CARUSO, in her official capacity as Director, Michigan Department of Corrections, Defendant.

Case No. 5:05-CV-128.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

October 8, 2008.

Mark A. Cody, Thomas G. Cecil, Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service, Inc., Lansing, MI, Robert Dixon Fleischner, Northampton, MA, Abraham Singer, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.

Linda M. Olivieri, A. Peter Govorchin, William R. Morris, MI Dept. Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

Opinion and Order

Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment to Defendant on State-Law Claim; Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on State-Law Claim

PAUL L. MALONEY, Chief Judge.

This is a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. ("MPAS") is a private non-profit entity that is statutorily authorized "to monitor facilities and programs that house individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities, to investigate suspected incidents of abuse and neglect, and to pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on behalf of [such] individuals ... wherever programs for such individuals are operated within the State of Michigan...." See Third Amended Complaint filed Nov. 20, 2006 ("Comp") ¶¶ 9-10. MPAS challenges the conditions under which the defendant Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") confined certain mentally ill and disabled prisoners who are under the age of 27 ("prisoners"). This challenge centers on but is not limited to the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility ("MYCF") in Lake County, which operated as a maximum-security ("Level V") prison from July 1999 until its closure in October 2005,¹ housing about 480 male prisoners between the age of 14 and 19 who were convicted and sentenced as adults. See Comp ¶¶ 2, 9-11, and 23.

In particular, MPAS challenges MDOC's alleged use of isolation and its failure to provide adequate mental-health and educational services, both of which it contends violates the prisoners' Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their rights under three federal statutes: the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 section 504 as codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("the Rehab Act"), and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. ("IDEA"). See Comp ¶¶ 1, 4, 525, 528-29. MPAS also contends that MDOC violates prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment dueprocess right by imposing "major misconduct" punishments without determining whether the prisoner should be held responsible for his actions, see Comp ¶ 527, leading to negative disciplinary records and security designations that followed MYCF prisoners to other facilities, with adverse consequences, see Comp. ¶ 28. Finally, MPAS alleges that MDOC retaliated against certain prisoners for cooperating with MPAS and participating in this lawsuit, violating their federal constitutional right of access to the courts. See Comp ¶¶ 28 and 530.

MPAS's complaint does not seek compensatory or punitive damages. Rather, it seeks a declaration that MDOC has violated the Eighth Amendment, the ADA, the IDEA, and the Rehab Act, and a permanent injunction that (1) prohibits MDOC from subjecting mentally ill prisoners to the conditions described, (2) requires MDOC to train its staff to ensure that they do not punish young prisoners for symptoms of their mental illness or developmental disability, (3) requires MDOC to offer adequate special-education and mental-health services to prisoners who have been affected by the challenged practices, (4) requires MDOC to adjust the security status of prisoners affected by the failure to consider the prisoner's disability or mental illness before imposing punishment or a more restrictive or onerous security classification, (5) requires MDOC to adjust the parole eligibility of prisoners who were housed at MDOC, to reflect MYCF's use of administrative segregation and its failure to provide adequate education and mental-health services to such prisoners. See Comp at 87-88 (Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-6). MDOC also seeks attorney fees and costs under a federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Comp at 88 (Prayer for Relief ¶ 7).

On January 30, 2008, MPAS moved for partial summary judgment on a single purely legal question. MPAS seeks a declaration "that students over the age of 22 but under the age of 27 who are in the custody of Defendant are entitled to special education services" under the Michigan Mandatory Special Education Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 380.1701-380.1766 ("the Act"), while MDOC seeks, roughly, a contrary declaration. MDOC filed an opposition brief on February 29, 2008; MPAS filed a reply brief on March 14, 2008; and with leave of court, the Michigan Department of Education ("DOE") filed an amicus curiae brief in support of MDOC on April 1, 2008.

In August 2008, the parties jointly moved to stay this action for one year while they attempt to agree on changes in the Michigan prison system that may lead to an amicable resolution of MPAS's federal claims. The parties made clear, however, that they did not wish to delay consideration of their cross-motions for summary judgment on the state-law issue. The court entered a stay of the action with the exception of the instant motions. For the reasons that follow, the court will grant summary judgment to MDOC on the statelaw issue, and the case will remain stayed on the federal-law issues.

A Federal Court's Application of State Law

"`In applying state law, we anticipate how the relevant state's highest court would rule in the case and are bound by controlling decisions of that court.'" Appalachian Railcar Servs. v. Boatright Enters., Inc., 2008 WL 828112, *14 (W.D.Mich.2008) (Paul L. Maloney, J.) ("ARS") (quoting National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Alticor, Inc., 472 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir.2007) (Richard Allen Griffin, J.) (citation omitted)). If the state supreme court has not conclusively decided the issue, a federal court presumptively looks to the decisions of the state's appellate courts: "In anticipating how the state supreme court would rule, `we look to the decisions of the state's intermediate courts unless we are convinced that the state supreme court would decide the issue differently.'" ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *14 (citing US v. Lancaster, 501 F.3d 673, 679 n. 3 (6th Cir.2007) (Griffin, J.) (citation omitted)). In determining what is the controlling law of the State, a federal court also "may give weight" to the decisions of the State's trial courts, Bradley v. GMC, 512 F.2d 602, 605 (6th Cir.1975) (citing Royal Indem. Co. v. Clingan, 364 F.2d 154 (6th Cir.1966)), especially when the trial court's decision is consistent with state appellate decisions, Bradley, 512 F.2d at 605.

Precedential Value of Michigan Decisions

A federal court must accord the same precedential value to a state-court decision as it would be accorded by that state's courts. See Appalachian Railcar Servs., Inc. v. Boatright Enters., Inc., 2008 WL 828112, *14 (W.D.Mich. Mar.25, 2008) (Maloney, J.) ("ARS") (citing Mutuelle Generale Francaise Vie v. Life Ass. Co. of Pa., 688 F.Supp. 386, 397 n. 15 (N.D.Ill.1988) ("[O]ne Supreme Court decision (Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940)) ... required a federal court to ascribe the same precedential force to a New Jersey trial court decision that such a decision would receive in that state's court system under the peculiarities of New Jersey law.")). If a state court would not be bound by a particular state-court decision, then neither is this court. ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *14 (citing King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153, 161, 68 S.Ct. 488, 92 L.Ed. 608 (1948) ("a federal court adjudicating a matter of state law in a diversity suit is, in effect, only another court of the State; it would be incongruous indeed to hold the federal court bound by a decision which would not be binding on any state court.")) (citation omitted).

Michigan Court Rule 7.215(C)(2) states that "[a] published decision of the Court of Appeals has precedential value under the rule of stare decisis." This subsection makes no distinction based on when the decision was issued. ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *14.

However, Michigan Court Rule 7.215(J)(1) provides that "[a] panel of the Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified by the Supreme Court or by a Special Panel of the Court of Appeals as provided in this rule." Emphasis added. ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *14.

Synthesizing Michigan Court Rules 7.215(C)(2) and 7.215(J)(1), the Michigan Court of Appeals accords precedential value to all of its prior published decisions, regardless of when they were issued. ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *14. When a post-November 1, 1990 published Court of Appeals decision conflicts with a pre-November 1, 1990 published Court of Appeals decision, however, the post-November 1, 1990 decision prevails. ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *14.

When there is a conflict between two published decisions of the Court of Appeals that were both issued after November 1, 1990, Michigan courts must follow the first opinion that addressed the matter at issue. ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *15 (citing Novak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 235 Mich.App. 675, 599 N.W.2d 546, 554 (1999) (citation omitted)).

By contrast, Michigan Court of Appeals panels are not bound by unpublished decisions of that same court, regardless of when they were issued. ARS, 2008 WL 828112 at *15 (citing Iqbal v. Bristol West Ins. Group, 278 Mich.App. 31, 748 N.W.2d 574, 582 (2008) (citing MICH. CT. R. 7.215(C)(1))).

Finally, a federal court's...