Michigan State Bd. of Ed. v. School Dist. of Garden City, Docket No. 22756
| Decision Date | 25 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 22756,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 233 N.W.2d 547,62 Mich.App. 376 |
| Parties | MICHIGAN STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF GARDEN CITY et al., Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Gerald F. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellant.
James E. Tobin, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.
Before T. M. BURNS, P.J., and CAVANAGH and O'HARA, * JJ.
This is a case in which complete and literal compliance with a state statute is impossible because of the time at which the State Board of Education began its legal action.
Thus indisputably the question becomes how much compliance by the Garden City School District is legally sufficient compliance?
The panel noted this anomaly and persistent bench questioning finally resulted in the conclusion that the state board ordered the district board to jump across a creek. The district board replied in effect we can't jump the creek, it's too wide. The state board's reply was to jump as far as you can. The district board said it had done just that. The state board said it hadn't. A circuit judge agreed with the district board. We agree with the circuit judge. This is how it came about.
There was a teacher strike in the Garden City School District. It was bitter and disruptive, with a sprinkling of violence. An injunction was issued against the teachers. A finding was made that it was violated. Contempt citations were issued. Sentences were imposed.
Finally, in the manner provided by the controlling statutes, after interminable and bitter bargaining sessions between the teachers and the district board, a labor contract was agreed upon. A result reached by bargaining was that there would be 158 instructional days in the present school year.
A complaint for mandamus and a motion to show cause was then filed by plaintiff State Board of Education. The complaint requested that defendants be required to provide the maximum possible days of student instruction for the 1974--1975 school year. After oral argument by counsel for the parties, the trial court issued its opinion from the bench denying the relief sought by plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed its claim of appeal with this Court.
On appeal, the appellant's contentions may be concisely stated as follows: Section 575 of the School Code of 1955 1 and Sections 13(2) 2 and 101(2) 3 of the Gilbert E. Bursley School District Equalization Act of 1973 impose a clear legal duty upon school districts to provide a minimum of 180 days of student instruction excluding days lost because of strike. A reading of the pertinent statutes discloses that defendants are without discretionary authority in establishing the number of days of student instruction. In addition, the phrase 'traditional school holidays' simply means that defendants are not required to provide student instruction on public holidays. Therefore, error was committed by the trial court in failing to grant the writ of mandamus since the current controlling statutes compel the conclusion that defendants are required to provide the maximum possible days of student instruction for the 1974--1975 school year.
Per contra, the appellees argue that there was no clear house of discretion by the trial court in denying mandamus. Neither Section 575 of the School Code of 1955 nor Sections 13(2) and 101(2) of the Gilbert E. Bursley School District Equalization Act of 1973 impose an uncontrovertibly clear legal duty to provide 180 days of student instruction. In light of the fact that it is impossible to provide 180 days of student instruction, defendants were given statutory discretion uncer Section 575 to determine the length of the school term, and, as such, their determination does not constitute a ministerial act. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in denying mandamus since the trial court's decision was firmly grounded upon several sound considerations, including the equities of the situation.
Both parties concede that as of the time mandamus was sought by the plaintiff that there was no way under the sun to get in the statutorily mandated 180 days of student instruction within the time limit for the school year. 176 days was the maximum number that could be afforded the students and the statutes satisfied. Of these, 6 potential days of student instruction have since been lost for various reasons. As aforesaid, the district board and the teachers had agreed on 158 days of instruction.
158 from 170 is 12 instructional days. Already kids have gone to school and teachers taught on Christmas Eve, and other days normally included in vacation days.
Had 180 instructional days been possible there is no doubt a clear legal duty would have rested upon the district board to comply with the statute as directed by the state board. 4 It seems to us further that this Court would have been obligated to require it.
Judicial fiat cannot accomplish the impossible.
We think the district board jumped as far as it could under the circumstances.
The important thing to remember about this opinion is that we spedifically declare it precedent for nothing. It is a practical solution to an insoluable legal problem. By it we do not dilute in any measure the supervisory power of the State Board of Education over district school boards. We merely acknowledge our inability to turn back the clock. We add that any attempt by a district board or a teacher association to take advantage of this holding by seeking deliberately to come within its terms will receive a very chilly judicial reception in this Court. We also suggest that should a similar situation arise in the future the state board might well consider acting more promptly so that the district board can make its limitations known earlier.
For the reasons and within the limitations set forth we affirm the trial judge. No costs.
* MICHAEL D. CAVANAGH, former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const.1963, art. 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.
1 M.C.L.A § 340.575; M.S.A. § 15.3575 provides:
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