Mid-Florida Television Corp. v. Boyles

• Decision Date: 07 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 63753,MID-FLORIDA,63753
• Citation: 467 So.2d 282,10 Fla. L. Weekly 153
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 153, 11 Media L. Rep. 1774 TELEVISION CORP., et al., and Pat Beal, Petitioners, v. Jack BOYLES, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 282

467 So.2d 282

10 Fla. L. Weekly 153, 11 Media L. Rep. 1774

MID-FLORIDA TELEVISION CORP., et al., and Pat Beal, Petitioners, v. Jack BOYLES, Respondent.

No. 63753.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 7, 1985.

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1985.

John M. Robertson of Robertson, Williams, Duane & Lewis, William G. Osborne and John L. Woodard, III, Orlando, for petitioners.

Elizabeth J. Gulden of Gulden, Heller & Sheaffer, and Marcia K. Lippincott, Orlando, for respondent.

Richard J. Ovelmen, General Counsel, and Parker D. Thomson, Sanford L. Bohrer and Gary B. Pruitt of Thomson, Zeder, Bohrer, Werth, Adorno & Razook, Miami, amicus curiae, for The Miami Herald Pub. Co.

SHAW, Justice.

We have before us by petition for review Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 So.2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), which is in express and direct conflict with decisions of other district courts of appeal. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We approve the decision of the district court.

The facts leading to this lawsuit, by a private person against a media defendant, are set out in detail by the Fifth District Court of Appeal, and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. Count I of respondent's complaint alleges defamation per se. Count IV incorporates Count I by reference and adds an allegation of actual malice. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The district court surmised that the trial court dismissed Count I because it found that libel per se no longer exists in a defamation action against the media after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); and, even if it does exist, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action for libel per se due to its reliance on innuendo, or facts extrinsic to those published, to show that the words were defamatory.

The district court reversed the trial court on Count I, holding that libel per se is still a valid cause of action in Florida and that "the defamation alleged was libelous upon its face, without any need for innuendo." Boyles, 431 So.2d at 641. The court reversed on Count IV, as it relates to Count I, holding that it states a cause of action for punitive damages.

The district court specifically found that Count I of respondent's complaint complies with the Gertz requirement that the media cannot be held liable without fault in that it alleges that petitioner "knew or should have known that the statements were false and defamatory, thereby meeting the standard of negligence." Id. at 634. It found that Count IV, as it relates to Count I, complies with the Gertz requirement that there cannot be presumed or punitive damages without New York Times malice--knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth--in that it claims punitive damages by alleging that the acts were performed "in reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, and that the defendants had knowledge of the statements' falsity, which they disregarded." Id.

The issue for review is whether Gertz has abrogated a cause of action for libel per se brought by a private person against a media defendant. Undoubtedly the distinction between libel per se and libel per quod, once clear, has blurred. At common law, before Gertz, we said "[w]ords amounting to a libel per se necessarily import damage and malice in legal contemplation, so these elements need not be...