Middleditch v. Williams

• Decision Date: 17 June 1889
• Citation: 17 A. 826,45 N.J.E. 720
• Parties: MIDDLEDITCH et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

17 A. 826

45 N.J.E. 720

MIDDLEDITCH et al.

v. WILLIAMS et al.

Prerogative Court of New Jersey.

June 17, 1889.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from orphans' court, Essex county; KIRKPATRICK, BUTTNER, and LEDWITH, Judges.

Francis E. Marsh, for appellants. J. Frank Fort, for respondents.

VAN FLEET, Vice-Ordinary. The question presented by the appeal in this case is whether a decree made by the orphans' court of Essex county, on the 4th day of June, 1888, admitting to probate a paper purporting to be the last will of William H. Livingston, deceased, is such a decree as the court should, in view of the facts of the case and the law applicable to them, have made. The paper in question was executed on the 11th day of January, 1887, in the city of New York, where the testator then resided. It appears to have been executed in strict conformity to the requirements of our statute regulating the execution of wills. After the execution of the paper in question, Mr. Livingston removed to the city of Newark, in this state, where he died, on the 4th day of February, 1888. His wife died in August, 1886, and after that date, up to the time of his own death, his family consisted of himself, his daughter, Lillian, (his only surviving child,) and his mother-in-law, Marie G. Williams. His daughter, at the time of her mother's death, was five or six years of age. The testator, by the paper in question, gives all his property, of every kind and description, to his mother-in-law, and at her death to her son, William P. Williams, in trust for his daughter, to be held until his daughter has attained the age of 25 years, when, in the language of the will, "said property shall be handed over intact to her: provided, however, that in consideration of taking care of Lillian till twenty-five years of age, or until her marriage, said Marie C. Williams shall be supported and maintained, in her ordinary manner of living, out of the income derived from said property; and should Marie C. Williams be living when Lillian shall arrive at twenty-five years of age, then Lillian shall give unto Marie C. Williams a satisfactory bond or guaranty for securing to Marie means for her support during the balance of her life. Should my daughter, Lillian, die before Marie C. Williams, then my property shall belong to the latter; and should both Lillian and Marie die before William P. Williams, then my property shall belong to the last named, William P. Williams." Mrs. Williams and William P. Williams are appointed executors. It is not shown who drew this paper, nor where, nor under what circumstances, it was drawn. One of the subscribing witnesses says that he thinks the testator wrote it himself. That is the only information we have respecting its preparation or origin.

The validity of this paper, as the will of William H. Livingston, is contested on two grounds: First, it is said that it is shown to be the product of an insane mind; and, second, that it is shown to be the result of the exercise of undue influence. And it is claimed that the contents of the paper itself furnish strong evidence of the truth of both these objections. A will may be contrary to the principles of justice and humanity,—its provisions may be shockingly unnatural and extremely unjust; nevertheless, if it appears to have been made by a person of sufficient age to be competent to make a will, and also to be the free and unconstrained product of a sound mind, the courts are bound to uphold it. The courts must so treat papers of this kind, in order to maintain that great principle, which confers upon every citizen, of full age and sound mind, the right to do with his own as he pleases, so long as he does not attempt to apply his property to an immoral or unlawful purpose. But in cases where want of testamentary capacity or undue influence is alleged, it is the duty of the court to scan the provisions of the will to see whether or not they furnish any evidence of the truth of the charges made against its validity.

The feature of the paper under consideration which is most likely to attract attention, as tending to show that the disposition which the testator made of the property is both unnatural and unjust, is the fact that he has, either inconsiderately or designedly, manifested an unnatural preference for his mother-in-law and brother-in-law over the issue of his daughter. On scanning the will, it will be observed that it contains no indication whatever that the testator intended, in case his daughter had issue, but did not survive her grandmother and her uncle, that her issue should take his property. On the contrary, if the will be read according to its plain words, it would seem to be entirely clear that he intended, if his daughter died in the life-time of either her grandmother or her uncle, that his property should go, even if his daughter left issue, not to her issue, but first to her grandmother, if she was then living, but, if not living, then to her uncle. Such, I understand, to be the plain direction of the will. It says: "Should my daughter Lillian die before Marie C. Williams, then my property shall belong to the latter; and, should both Lillian and Marie die before William P. Williams, then my property shall belong to the last named, William P. Williams." Death is here spoken of generally, and without restriction as to time. The testator does not say, "If my daughter Lillian shall die without leaving lawful issue surviving her, before attaining twenty-five years of age, then my property shall go either to her grandmother or her uncle;" but what he says is, if Lillian shall die before her grandmother or before her uncle, then his property shall go to her grandmother, if living, but, if not, then to her uncle. Lillian's issue is not mentioned, nor is any provision made for it, either expressly or constructively, though the possibility that she might have issue before attaining 25 is a thing which, it would seem, must have been before the testator's mind; for in making provision for her care he limits the period that her grandmother shall take care of her to the time when she attains 25, or until her marriage. But suppose we say that, according to the settled rule of construction in such cases, the true meaning of the will is that neither the grandmother nor the uncle will take unless Lillian shall die before attaining 25 years of age,—and that, I think, is the construction which should be adopted,—still it is apparent that under this view the will is not such an one as a father, having an only child, and in the full possession of his senses, and with the instincts and affections common to our nature, would, when entirely free from any sinister influence, have been likely to make; for under this view it will be seen that if Lillian marries, has issue, and dies before attaining 25, her grandmother or her uncle will take the property given by the will to the exclusion of her issue. The will in this respect is, in my judgment, both unnatural and unjust.

But this, standing alone, constitutes no reason why the paper should not be given effect as the will of the testator. It may help to show that the testator lacked testamentary capacity, or that his will is not the free expression of his mind and heart, but in a case where it appears that he had the requisite capacity, and that his will is the unfettered expression of his wishes, it amounts to nothing at all. The paper in question is, however, assailed on other grounds. It is charged that it is the direct product of an insane delusion. The testator was a believer in spiritualism; that is, he believed the spirits of the dead can communicate with the living, through the agency of persons called "mediums," and who possess qualities or gifts not possessed by mankind in general. The proofs show that the testator stated to several persons, prior to the execution of his will, that the spirit of his dead wife had requested him, through a medium residing in Forty-Sixth street, in the city of New York, to make provision for his mother-in-law in his will. To one person he said that his wife's spirit had requested him to give all his property to her mother, and to do it in such a way that none of his relatives could get it away from her. To the same person he said, at another time, that the spirit of his wife was constantly urging him to make a will in favor of her mother. To another person he said that the spirit of his wife had requested him to be good to her mother, and see that she was made comfortable during the remainder of her life, and he also said that he intended to make a will, leaving enough to his mother-in-law to make her comfortable, because his wife wanted him to do so. The testator's wife, by her will, gave all her property to the testator, subject, however, to an annual payment of $500 to her mother, and the like sum to her brother, William P. Williams, during their joint lives, and, after the death of either, then to the payment of $1,000 annually to the survivor during his or her life. The evidence shows, I think, beyond doubt, that the testator believed, fully and thoroughly, that the messages which were delivered to him, as communications from his wife, actually came from her spirit, and that her spirit knew constantly all that he was doing.

The important question which this branch of the case presents for decision is, was such...