Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Castellano

• Decision Date: 31 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14602,14602
• Citation: 623 A.2d 55,225 Conn. 339
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MIDDLESEX INSURANCE COMPANY v. Anthony CASTELLANO.

Page 55

623 A.2d 55

225 Conn. 339

MIDDLESEX INSURANCE COMPANY v. Anthony CASTELLANO.

No. 14602.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 5, 1993.

Decided March 31, 1993.

Roger J. Frechette, with whom was Matthew E. Frechette, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Frederick M. Vollono, Wallingford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, FRANCIS X. HENNESSY and MENT, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Anthony Castellano, appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Middlesex Insurance Company, that vacated an arbitration award of $330,000 rendered in favor of the defendant. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award; and (2) granted the plaintiff's application to vacate the award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following relevant facts are undisputed. On June 18, 1985, the defendant sustained injuries when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was involved in a hit and run collision with a car. At the time of the accident, the defendant resided with his parents and sister and owned a motor vehicle, which he had insured with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. After exhausting the uninsured motorist coverage on his automobile liability policy, the defendant sought uninsured motorist benefits from the automobile liability policies issued by the plaintiff to the defendant's father and sister. The defendant's father's policy provided $300,000 of uninsured motorist coverage on each of the two motor vehicles the father owned. The defendant's sister's policy provided $50,000 of uninsured motorist coverage on the one motor vehicle that she owned. The defendant was not a named insured under either his father's or his sister's policy, nor was he occupying a vehicle insured under these policies at the time of the accident.

The plaintiff denied coverage on the basis that the defendant owned an automobile that was not itself insured by the plaintiff and therefore was not a covered person under the policies. ¹ Pursuant to the terms of the policies, the defendant applied for an order to proceed with arbitration. On September 4, 1991, the arbitrators found that the defendant was a covered person within the provisions of his father's and sister's policies, and awarded the defendant $330,000 of uninsured motorist benefits.

On September 13, 1991, the plaintiff moved the trial court to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the defendant was not a covered person under the terms of his father's and sister's policies because he owned an automobile. A show cause order was issued by the trial court in conjunction with the motion, and a hearing date was set for October 25, 1991. The show cause order stated that notice was to be served upon the defendant in the manner prescribed by law at least twelve days prior to the hearing date. The defendant was never served. On October 25, 1991, the plaintiff filed another motion to vacate, requested another hearing date, and a new show cause order was issued. The trial court set a new hearing date for November 25, 1991, and again stated that notice of the hearing was to be served upon the defendant in the manner prescribed by law at least twelve days prior to the hearing date. This second motion to vacate was filed under the same docket number as the first. The defendant received notice on November 12, 1991, more than twelve days prior to the hearing.

On November 25, 1991, the defendant moved the trial court to dismiss both the September 13, 1991 motion to vacate and the October 25, 1991 motion to vacate on the grounds that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. On December 13, 1991, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss concluding that there were no jurisdictional defects that would preclude it from reaching the merits of the plaintiff's motion to vacate. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court stated that the plaintiff had filed its motion to vacate within the thirty day time limit set forth by General Statutes § 52-420(b), ² and that notice had been given within a reasonable period of time. ³

On February 13, 1992, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate, concluding that the defendant was not a "covered person" under the terms of the policies issued by the plaintiff. The court further found that the definitional portion of the policy that limited coverage to resident relatives who do not own a car did not violate the public policy of Connecticut's uninsured motorist laws. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court vacating the arbitration award and denying his motions to dismiss. We subsequently transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c), and now affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The defendant argues that although the first motion to vacate was timely filed within thirty days of notice of the arbitration award as required by General Statutes § 52-420(b), the plaintiff failed to comply with the attached order requiring that notice of the hearing be served on the defendant at least twelve days prior to the hearing date. With respect to the plaintiff's first motion to vacate, the defendant contends, therefore, that the plaintiff's failure to give notice in accordance with the court's order deprived the court of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. With respect to the plaintiff's second motion to vacate, the defendant argues that this was a new motion over which the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the motion was not filed within the thirty day time limit as required by § 52-420(b). The defendant maintains, therefore, that the trial court did not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction to vacate the arbitration award. We are unpersuaded.

A proceeding to vacate an arbitration award is not a civil action, but is rather a special statutory proceeding. Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 406, 407 A.2d 1013 (1979); Boltuch v. Rainaud, 137 Conn. 298, 301, 77 A.2d 94 (1950). As a special statutory proceeding, it is "not controlled by the formal requirements for service of process." Boltuch v. Rainaud, supra. Section 52-420(b) requires that a motion to vacate an arbitration award be filed within thirty days of the notice of the award to the moving party. If the motion is not filed within the thirty day time limit, the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the motion. Vail v. American Way Homes, Inc., 181 Conn. 449, 452-53, 435 A.2d 993 (1980). Once the application has been timely filed, Practice Book § 525 requires that "the court or judge to whom the application is made shall cause to be issued a citation directing the adverse party or parties in the arbitration proceeding to appear on a day certain and show cause, if any there be, why the application should not be granted." ⁴ Neither General Statutes § 52-420 nor Practice Book § 525 establishes any express time limit within which the moving party must serve notice of the motion to vacate and the assigned hearing date upon the nonmoving party. "It is elementary that the [defendant] cannot be bound by the action of the court without reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard." Boltuch v. Rainaud, supra, 137 Conn. at 300, 77 A.2d 94; Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck, 195 Conn. 558, 560, 489 A.2d 1022 (1985). Thus, in the absence of a specific time limit, the statute and Practice Book section are "satisfied if notice was given within a reasonable time." Boltuch v. Rainaud, supra, 137 Conn. at 301, 77 A.2d 94; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, 15 Conn. Sup. 118, 122-23 (1947); see also note, "Judicial Interpretations and Applications of the Connecticut Arbitration Statutes," 7 Conn.L.Rev. 147, 178-79 (1974). ⁵

The plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of § 52-420(b) by filing its application to vacate the arbitration award on September 13, 1991, within the thirty day time period. The trial court, DeMayo, J., satisfied the requirements of Practice Book § 525 by issuing a citation and directing the defendant to appear on October 25, 1991, and to show cause, if any, why the plaintiff's application should not be granted. The court also set forth a twelve day time period within which the defendant had to have been served with notice of the hearing date.

Although the defendant contends that the plaintiff's failure to comply with this time limit deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, the plaintiff's failure to serve the defendant within that time period did not remove the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. The only jurisdictional requirement in filing a motion to vacate an arbitration award is that it be filed with the trial court within thirty days of the moving party's notice of the arbitration award. Because the plaintiff complied with this requirement, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. The only other requirement is that the nonmoving party receive notice of the motion and the hearing within a reasonable amount of time prior to the hearing date. There are no provisions or statutes expressly mandating the time period within which the nonmoving party must receive notice, and the...