Middleton v. Lincoln County

• Decision Date: 14 June 1920
• Docket Number: 21411
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: MIDDLETON et al. v. LINCOLN COUNTY

84 So. 907

122 Miss. 673

MIDDLETON et al. v. LINCOLN COUNTY

No. 21411

Supreme Court of Mississippi

June 14, 1920

March 1920

1 STATUTES. Construction harmonizing with public policy adopted:

statutes in pari materia construed together.

The courts in construing a statute considers all statutes in pari materia together in order to find the legislative intent and, where a statute is susceptible of two reasonable constructions, will adopt that construction which harmonizes with the public policy of the legislature gathered from all its legislation on the subject.

2 COUNTIES. Statute construed to authorize county loan warrants for current expenses not exceeding sixty thousand dollars including warrants already issued.

Chapter 470, Laws of 1920 (Senate Bill 423), provides that Lincoln county (a county having less than 30,000 inhabitants) may issue loan warrants to the amount of sixty thousand dollars to defray current expenses, and, when construed with other statutes on the same subject, means that the county may issue loan warrants to an amount not exceeding sixty thousand dollars, not excluding loan warrants already issued for current expenses, and does not mean that it may issue sixty thousand dollars in addition to loan warrants already issued for current expenses.

3. STATUTES. Revenue statute not construed to impose double taxation.

Revenue statutes are considered favorably to the citizen and the taxpayer, and the court will not place a construction thereon that will impose double taxation on the citizen, unless the language is plain.

HON. V. J. STRICKER, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Lincoln county, HON. V. J. STRICKER, Chancellor.

Suit for injunction by Henry F. Middleton and others against Lincoln county. Injunction dissolved, and complainants appeal. Reversed, and the injunction made perpetual.

Judgment reversed.

Brady & Dean, for appellant.

The bill of complaint in this cause is full, and with the foregoing summary, is really in itself sufficient to present complainant's contentions so that this court will see their soundness. We particularize still further, however, by calling to the attention of the court that the questions presented here are really three, as follows:

I. Whether or not the board of supervisors of Lincoln county has authority to levy a special tax to repay the fifty thousand dollars borrowed under chapter 121 of the Laws of 1918, in addition to a ten-mill tax for general expenses?

II. Whether or not the special act authorizes the board of supervisors to borrow sixty thousand dollars in addition to the fifty thousand dollars authorized by chapter 121 of Laws of 1918, and House Bill No. 647, of Laws of 1920?

III. Whether or not the provision in the special act that amounts borrowed under it may be repaid ahead of any other indebtedness is not unconstitutional, making said special act to that extent unconstitutional?

We shall discuss these questions briefly, as presented.

I.

It is complainant's contention that the use of the words "for all purposes" in the Act of April 2, 1920, Senate Bill 531, includes every purpose not in said Act excluded, and to this maximum the board is limited, namely, ten mills on the dolar.

As opposed to this contention, defendants cite the case of Y. & M. V. R. R. Company v. Grenada County, 76 So. 154, which we insist is not applicable for the following reasons:

1. Even conceding for the sake of argument that under chapter 121 of the Laws of 1918, the board might have borrowed fifty thousand dollars for certain purposes and have repaid it by a special tax, this authority existed only so long as chapter 121 of the Laws of 1918, was in force and effect. This chapter was expressly repealed by act taking effect upon May 16, 1920, prior to the filing of the bill of complaint in this case, and while House Bill No. 647 of Laws of 1920, also provides for a special tax to repay sums borrowed under it, the causes thereby authorized are different and the method of repayment is different. It does not, therefore authorize a special tax to repay amounts borrowed under chapter 121 of the Laws of 1918.

The rights of the holders of the county's loan warrants issued to secure the fifty thousand dollar loan under chapter 121 of the Laws of 1918, are not in any way affected by this necessary interpretation of the acts, for they will be fully protected by a levy of ten mills on the dollar on the county's 1920 assessment.

2. The objection in this case as raised before the board, by any sort of mistake, honest or otherwise, has incurred excessive indebtedness. The attitude of the complainants in this case, therefore, is that of the complainants in the case of W. B. Strong et al. v. Monroe County, reported in 29 So. 530, under the style of Monroe County v. Strong. The contemplated additional loan by the county would create a debt in excess of the county's revenue for the year and therefore, is beyond the authority of the board.

II.

The question of whether or not the legislature knew of the desire of Lincoln county to borrow as much as one hundred and ten thousand dollars is not material. It is complainants' contention that the language of the special Act is such that there can be no doubt that it was in effect only an increase of the maximum allowed them by the general law. Intending to authorize Lincoln county to borrow as much as sixty thousand dollars, and with authority already existing to borrow fifty thousand dollars, the legislature had two ways in which they might express this additional authority, namely:

A. Authorize sixty thousand dollars. "In addition to existing authority," or words to that effect.

B. Authorize a borrowing of sixty thousand dollars.

The legislature adopted the second mode of expression, and expressing it so, it is complainant's contention that if it had been intended to give authority to borrow one hundred and ten thousand dollars, the act would have said specifically "in addition to existing indebtedness, or authority to borrow," or words to that effect. Also, the legislature had reason to know that Lincoln county's assessment would not be as high as twelve or thirteen million dollars, which it would have to be in order for sufficient money to be raised by a ten mill levy to repay any such loan, with interest, and with other general causes.

III

Finally, Senate Bill No. 423 the "Special Act" referred to, is partially unconstitutional in so far as it attempts to prefer the holders of the loan warrants of the county, issued under its provisions, over the holders of warrants issued prior thereto under the provisions of chapter 121 of the Laws of 1918, or other previously existing indebtedness payable out of the taxes of 1920. The equity of this position is too plain for argument and it should be held that the ten thousand dollars borrowed under its authority shall be repaid on an equal basis, and at the same time as previously incurred and existing indebtedness.

The subject-matter of this litigation is important, to complainants no less so than to other citizens of the county who will be vitally affected by illegal and ultra vires action of the board of supervisors. To facilitate a hearing, counsel have agreed to many minor points, but complainants earnestly request most serious consideration of the questions presented since they involve questions not heretofore decided by this court, and which affect not only Lincoln county, but the counties of the entire state, whose financial destinies are within the hands of boards that all too frequently are scarcely controllable by its citizenry, the legislature and this court.

A. A. Cohn and H. V. Wall, for appellee.

Appellants contend that under no circumstance can Lincoln county borrow one hundred and ten thousand dollars to defray the current expenses for the year 1920, because they say the assessed valuation of Lincoln county is in round numbers eight million five hundred thousand dollars, and that the general revenue tax for the year 1920, being ten mills, could yield to the county only eighty-five thousand dollars for the year 1920 and inasmuch as the revenues collected for the year 1920 under a ten-mill levy, as aforesaid, will not yield as much as the loan made for the current expenses for the year 1920, therefore the act on the part of the county is null and void.

This contention is based on false premises. In the first place it is necessary to trace briefly the history of the laws of our state, granting to the various counties the right to borrow money in anticipation of taxes to defray current expenses. This statute first appears in the Code of 1892, section 313 "May borrow money, etc., in counties of more than thirty thousand inhabitants; the board of supervisors for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the county, other than its judiciary expenses, may borrow money not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars in one year, and may execute loan warrants upon the treasury of the county therefor. The loan warrants shall bear interest at a rate to be fixed by the board, not exceeding eight per cent. per annum, and they shall be payable upon the first day of January next after their issuance. For the payment of such loan warrants the board of supervisors may levy a special tax each year sufficient to pay the amount borrowed that year, with interest, and such loan warrants shall be first paid out of the money collected for taxes for that year. Loan warrants shall not be issued save upon the same limitations, restrictions and conditions as are provided in this chapter for the issuance of bonds." It will be noted from this section a county having less than thirty thousand did not have the privilege and power to borrow any amount for the purpose of...