Middleton v. State

• Decision Date: 04 March 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 66629,66652,s. 66629
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly 149 William MIDDLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. William MIDDLETON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1218

465 So.2d 1218

10 Fla. L. Weekly 149

William MIDDLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

William MIDDLETON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Respondent.

Nos. 66629, 66652.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 4, 1985.

N. Joseph Durant, Special Asst. Public Defender of Gelber, Glass & Durant, Miami, for appellant/petitioner.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee/respondent.

BOYD, Chief Justice.

These proceedings are before the Court on appeal of the denial of William Middleton's motion to vacate judgment and sentence and on his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant-petitioner Middleton is a state prisoner held pursuant to a conviction of first-degree murder and other crimes and is under a sentence of death and a warrant for the execution thereof. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief and deny the habeas corpus petition.

Appellant was convicted of and sentenced to death for the premeditated murder of Gladys Johnson, a woman who had taken appellant into her home upon his parole from prison because of appellant's friendship with her son. Appellant's guilt was determined in a jury trial. He testified in his own behalf, denying his guilt. At the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury recommended a sentence of death. On appeal, this Court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction of first-degree murder and the sentence of death. Middleton v. State, 426 So.2d 548 (Fla.1982). A petition for review to the United States Supreme Court was denied. Middleton v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3573, 77 L.Ed.2d 1413 (1983).

In connection with his appeal and petition, Middleton seeks a stay of the scheduled execution of sentence. Because we have satisfactorily resolved all his claims and find no basis for relief on the underlying proceedings, we deny the petition for stay of execution.

Rule 3.850 Appeal

Appellant argues that it was error for the lower court to deny his motion without holding an evidentiary hearing on the factual allegations contained in the motion. The trial court found that each of the matters raised in the motion could properly be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. As will be explained below in connection with discussion of each of appellant's points on appeal, the determination of the trial court as to all issues was correct under the applicable legal standard. The motion itself, viewed in light of the record in the case, conclusively showed that the movant was entitled to no relief. Under such circumstances the court may deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 456 So.2d 466 (Fla.1984); Martin v. State, 455 So.2d 370 (Fla.1984).

Appellant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial and that the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing and a stay of execution. Appellant's claims pertain principally to trial counsel's asserted failure to bring out facts that appellant says could have cast doubt on his guilt, asserted inadequacy of the challenge to the legality and admissibility of the confession, and the asserted lack of an adequate presentation of evidence and argument on mitigating circumstances at the sentencing phase of the trial.

The lower court judge hearing the motion, who was also the judge who presided at appellant's trial, gave detailed consideration to appellant's arguments and related factual allegations, and found as follows:

The first of these is the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting the testimony of certain individuals that they had called the residence of the victim, Gladys Johnson, after her death on February 14th, and before the police found her body on February 16th, and that the phone was answered by a male. The second claim is that counsel was ineffective for not presenting mitigating circumstances at the penalty phase of Defendant's trial. The court disagrees and finds that a hearing is not required as to either contention.

To consider the claim regarding the telephone calls, it is necessary to understand the nature of the evidence at trial. The State's case was based on the fact of the victim's death and Defendant's confession to the crime. According to Defendant's statements, he killed the victim on February 14th and then drove in her car to Tampa, returned to Miami and then took a bus to New York (Transcript, hereinafter referred to as "T", pp. 299-333). The State presented no other evidence that Defendant had gone to Tampa.

At trial, Defendant testified that he had gone to the store on the night of the 14th, that when he returned he found the victim murdered, that he drove to Tampa and back and then took the bus to New York, all without ever returning to the house (T. 340-424).

Defendant now contends that the testimony in question would have been beneficial to him in that it would have shown that someone else was in the house, thereby, he asserts, supporting his claim that someone else killed Ms. Johnson.2

That this contention is without merit is apparent from looking to the statements of the witnesses themselves.

Leila Jenkins' statement, which is attached to Defendant's second amended motion, indicates that when she phoned, she heard Defendant's voice, along with that of someone else. Adabelle Jenkins states that when she called, a male voice answered. She stated, "Billy?", obviously indicating her belief that it was Defendant who answered. Thus, if these witnesses had testified, they would have demonstrated that Defendant was present at the house the day after the killing.3 Not only would this fact have been tremendously damaging in itself to Defendant, but it would have been entirely inconsistent with Defendant's own testimony. Moreover, it would have deprived Defendant of the right to final argument before the jury, a right he retained by presenting only his own testimony.

In order to obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show a specific act or omission of counsel which constituted a substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel. Further, he must show a "reasonable probability" of a different result had the omission or act not occurred. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla.1981). Defendant's claim here is woefully insufficient to meet either of these criteria. Indeed, presenting the testimony in question would have been to Defendant's clear disadvantage. It is much more likely that counsel would have been ineffective by presenting the testimony than by not doing so.

As a subissue relevant to this claim, Defendant also asserts that counsel should have established the existence of threats and prior criminal activity directed against Ms. Johnson. Defendant's claim in this respect is based primarily on the depositions of Adabelle Jenkins and Odessa Love. These individuals, however, did not have personal knowledge of these matters and therefore any testimony they could have offered would have clearly been inadmissible hearsay. The one threat that Ms. Jenkins did have personal knowledge of was a threat made by Defendant, less than a week before the crime. Needless to say, it can hardly be considered ineffective representation not to bring this testimony before the jury. In addition, counsel was able to, and did, establish through Defendant's testimony the fact that Ms. Johnson had been the victim of numerous crimes (T 345-358) and that she received obscene phone calls (T 345).

In considering the prejudice aspect of the Strickland-Knight test, it should also be realized that Defendant's own testimony was so incredible and unbelievable that, even putting aside the negative aspects of the proposed testimony, no reasonable probability of a different result could be said to exist had the testimony now asserted been presented. Defendant stated that he got the money for his bus trip to New York because Ms. Johnson had given him 30 or 40 dollars (T 387) and that in the few hours that he was in Tampa, he was fortunate enough to find someone who paid him over 80 dollars for five or six hours work (T 409-410). Moreover, Defendant testified that when he left the victim's house, he locked it up (T 402-403), but when the police arrived, they found no signs of forced entry and even had to tear part of the house down to get in (T 160-165). Additionally, defendant claimed that a bicycle left in the house was not his (T 401), even though two rebuttal witnesses stated that they had seen Defendant on that bicycle (T 476, 487). Another unbelievable aspect of Defendant's testimony is his claim that upon his return from the store, he found Ms. Johnson, a woman he characterized as the mother he never had (T 352), still gagging and gurgling (T 356, 394), but that he nonetheless fled (T 374) without calling for either the police or medical assistance (T 395). Such an action hardly seems to be that of an innocent man. In addition, Defendant testified that he had made no effort to have the store clerk testify on his behalf (T 390), certainly something that a defendant would be likely to do if his story was truthful.

Accordingly, it seems clear that Defendant's claim is insufficient to meet the Strickland-Knight standard and that a hearing on this issue is not warranted.

The same is true as regards Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness in not presenting mitigating circumstances at the penalty phase of the case. In Defendant's first amended motion and the memorandum in support, Defendant asserts that his counsel should have presented testimony that in 1974, a psychiatric screening report described him as having a "passive aggressive personality", that as a youth Defendant was subjected to abuse from his father, that Defendant's mother died when he was young and that Defendant was shuffled among foster homes.

These claims do not...